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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1975

Colby Explains 'Missteps' of the CIA

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency conducted a hurried, cursory check of CIA misdeeds in the wake of the Watergate scandal, failed to tell the White House of its findings and destroyed some of the records of its illegal activities.

CIA Director William E. Colby said he ordered the destruction of various CIA files in 1973, but said he regarded it as a routine step at the time.

"Even before 1973, prior to that time," Colby said, "people had been burning up collections of files that we really had no business owning. This is a natural process of any bureaucracy."

Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Colby said he recognizes that he should have reported the missteps to the Justice Department, that the old standards which made the CIA virtually sacrosanct have slipped away.

The CIA director discussed these matters in an hour-long interview in his 7th-floor suite at the agency's headquarters Friday, coupling candid admissions with repeated expressions of concern about the hazards of unaccustomed public exposure.

In Colby's view, there has been too much publicity already. The agency, he insisted, has served the country far better than it realizes.

But Colby acknowledged, too, that even he had no clear idea of the abuses lurking in its past until the investigation by the Rockefeller commission was completed this month. Even more sweeping congressional inquiries lie ahead.

The seeds were planted on May 9, 1973, when then-CIA Director James R. Schlesinger sent a memorandum to all employees calling for immediate reports on any questionable activities, past or present, that they might know about.

The impetus for the directive came from the Watergate scandal. The 1971 Ellsberg case burglary, which G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt Jr. carried out with CIA technical assistance, had just come to light, and Schlesinger said he intended to do all he could "to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter."

The result, Colby agreed, was a rush job that could not even be called a genuine investigation. The CIA inspector general's office, which handled the assignment, submitted a report just 11 days later, on May 21, 1973.

"It was an accumulation rather than an investigation, if you get the distinction," Colby said. "In other words, the Schlesinger memo went to all employees. Well, the first employees it went to was the command line.

And the command line basically reported what it heard down through the regular hierarchy: what do you know, what do you know, what do you know. And that was gathered together and given to the inspector general.

"In addition," Colby said, "few employees went to the inspector general with something they remembered. But ... inspector general didn't go out and look through every file drawer in the place or anything like that."

The report included a section on assassination plots and schemes. Other portions were just a rehash of old inspector general reports that CIA officials pulled out of their desks, apparently including information on testing LSD on unsuspecting subjects, part of a controversial program that lasted from 1953 to 1963.

The White House was not informed, but not, by Colby's account, because of any preoccupation with the Watergate scandal. The day after Schlesinger wrote his May 9, 1973, memo, President Nixon nominated him to become Secretary of Defense, and Colby, who was then CIA deputy director for covert operations, was named to take over the spy agency.

"This one does embarrass me a bit," Colby said of the failure to notify the White House. "I think what happened, quite frankly, is that it fell between the tools—of Schlesinger's leaving and my taking over. I imagine he thought maybe I was going to take care of the National Security Council [the White House agency which is supposed to supervise the CIA] and I imagine that I thought he was."

The Justice Department also was kept in the dark by virtue of a long-standing agreement, disclosed and denounced by the Rockefeller commission, to let the CIA decide whether a crime had been committed by its employees or agents and whether security considerations precluded prosecution even when a crime had taken place.

Organized in January with the inspector general's 1973 report as one of its basic primers, the commission concluded this month that the CIA had engaged in "plainly unlawful" conduct—from burglary through bugging to the LSD testing and other activities. But Colby indicated that he never even contemplated going to the Justice Department at the time.

"In retrospect, I would say yes, I should have," the 55-year-old Colby acknowledged. "No question about it, we should have done it."

Colby said he first reached that conclusion "sometime in December"—which was the month that The New York Times disclosed some of the activities recounted in the 1973 report. The CIA director said he realized that month that "I do have an obligation to actually carry down to the Department of Justice and let them make the decision as to whether anything should be prosecuted or not."

After conferring with Schlesinger,

Capitol Hill, Colby said he briefed both Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) and Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), the chairmen of the Senate and House subcommittees in charge of CIA oversight, in late May, 1973, on the agency's improprieties. But clearly, Colby agrees now, "that isn't enough."

Now chairman of the special House committee investigating the CIA, Nedzi, who has recently come under fire for taking no action two years ago, "asked a lot of additional questions," Colby recalled, but was apparently satisfied with the answers he got and did not inform his colleagues.

Colby did not characterize Stennis' reaction, but he has long been a stolid defender of the CIA. Apparently both he and Nedzi accepted Colby's assurances that corrective action would be taken.

No follow-up investigation was conducted, including within the CIA, to determine whether any of the activities warranted prosecution or to find out how extensive they actually were. Repeatedly, Colby emphasized that his mind was on the future, on making sure they didn't happen again.

He said he issued "specific instructions with respect to each of the categories of activities included in the inspector general's report" on Aug. 29, 1973, banning some, laying down strict rules for others and declaring still others permissible.

Concerning the CIA's "following of people around in America," Colby said, for example, he "issued a directive saying 'you won't do that any more' ... I frankly didn't care at that point whether it was 20 cases or 40 cases. The fact was there weren't going to be any more."

The Rockefeller commission found more instances of burglary, bugging, and other misdeeds than he was aware of, Colby indicated. Another reason for the escalating statistics, he said, was the fact that he agreed with the commission at the outset that the CIA would not interview former employees—to avoid any suggestion that the agency was trying to influence their testimony.

Consequently, Colby said, "the commission knows more than I do ... There's a couple of cases, a couple of incidents mentioned [in the commission report] that I didn't know about. I don't challenge the fact that they happened. But they're not in our records."

The commission also said in its report that some CIA records had been ordered destroyed in 1973, including

152 separate files on the drug-testing program.

Colby said he had various documents destroyed, and indicated that the drug-testing records were among them.

"We had files around here we shouldn't own, some of these surveillance things and stuff like that," he said, "and I had directed, 'let's get rid of that stuff,' in 1973." Colby recalled that former CIA Director Richard M. Helms took a similar step with tapes he had on leaving the agency in January, 1973.

"He [Helms] said it didn't have anything to do with Watergate, [that] he was just getting rid of all this junk people collect, you know," Colby said.

Asked whether he now felt that the documents he ordered destroyed should have been sent to the Justice Department in 1973 along with the inspector general's findings, Colby paused and said softly, "I guess, maybe. I don't know." Then he added that not all should have gone to Justice, since some of the incidents were rather flimsy, but other documents, he agreed, probably should have been sent over.

The Justice Department is studying the evidence compiled by the Rockefeller commission, concerning both domestic spying and CIA involvement in assassination plots, to determine whether any prosecutions should be

undertaken.

Colby said he was confident that no CIA employees will be indicted because, he said, he feels, they were acting under the belief that whatever they did, while perhaps "technically" illegal, was permissible "in the course of their duties."

Among Colby's August, 1973, directives was an order that the "CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed," but he said an earlier ban had been issued by Helms in March, 1972, three months before the Watergate break-in.

Asked what prompted the Helms edict, Colby said it was issued because of the heavy amount of publicity stemming from Colby's 1971 congressional testimony on Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam, which critics charged relied heavily on torture and assassination.

The 1972 directive, Colby said, was written "just to make clear what his [Helms] policy and my policy were . . . to clarify the records so that it's clear what our policy was."

The Helms order was not widely disseminated, however. Neither the White House nor congressional overseers were told about it at the time, Colby said. Even the CIA's general counsel

in 1972, Lawrence Houston, who is now retired, said he never heard of it until it was publicly disclosed several days ago.

Voicing high praise for the CIA and its employees despite the current furor, Colby said he has no idea when the investigations will end, but made plain that he hopes they will close down as quickly as possible.

"I think any less dedicated group of people would have all flown away long ago, but this is an enormously highly motivated, dedicated, talented group of people," Colby said. "Our intelligence is the best in the world."

Unquestionably, Colby said, the CIA made mistakes, but he called this the result of an old tradition that its work was not supposed to be talked about, a climate that no longer exists.

"If you let any large organization operate without controls and without supervision, it will get in some trouble," Colby said, but even so, he said, "the country's been well served by this agency and I think it will be well served by it in the future, even better."

In any case, Colby said with a grin, he plans to "tear up" a lot more files as soon as investigators are done with them.

Have a bonfire? he was asked.

"Damn right," the CIA director said, pointing out the windows to the closely guarded 219-acre site. "Right out there."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1975

Colby Says He Rejected All Suggestions for C.I.A.

WASHINGTON, June 19 (AP)—William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, said today that over the years foreigners had suggested assassinations to him and United States Government employees had discussed the possibility of assassinations with him, but that he had rejected the ideas every time.

The 55-year-old head of the United States spy agency declined to name the suggested or potential targets or the persons who had made the suggestions. Nor would he give the dates or locations of these conversations.

Mr. Colby said that he opposed public disclosure of facts behind these or other alleged assassination schemes involving the C.I.A. because "I think there is positive harm to the reputation of the country to go into great detail on these things."

He said, "Our policies today are clear . . . I am opposed to assassinations because I think they're wrong and because I think they frequently bring about absolutely uncontrolled and unforeseeable results—usually worse results than by continuing to suffer the problem that you're facing."

During an interview of more than an hour in his seventh-floor office at C.I.A. headquarters

in suburban Langley, Va., Mr. Colby discussed a wide range of issues raised during investigations of his agency by the news media, a Presidential commission and several Congressional committees.

These were among his major points in the first interview he has given since the Rockefeller Commission last week reported that it had found some "plainly unlawful" domestic activities by the agency.

He cannot envision that agency employees would again feel that the political climate in this country justified their violating the legal limits on the agency's domestic activity. He does not believe that any C.I.A. employees will be convicted of crimes or even prosecuted for illegal activities.

He cannot be certain that all the agency's illegal or improper activities have come to light, but argues that no Federal agency could give such an assurance about its operations.

It is up to the Congressional committees and the Justice Department to decide whether to make public the names of persons responsible for the agency's illegal activities.

He confirms that foreigners approached others in the agency with a plot to assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle, and that it was flatly rejected. He does not know

whether the French Government was advised of that plot, nor can he say that in all instances he would advise a foreign government of a plot that came to his attention.

He intends to implement the Rockefeller Commission's recommendation that the agency's inspector general's office be enlarged but hopes that efforts to police the agency will not impair its intelligence-gathering mission.

He has not been asked to resign and intends to stay at

Assassinations

his post so long as the President and he agree that he is useful.

He thinks that a career in intelligence should be neither a bar nor a requirement for the job of director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Colby said that the United States had the best intelligence service in the world and that he believed a major part of his role is to convince this country's citizens of that.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 30, 1975

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Troubles of the CIA have all but dried up an important source of the Agency's information—exchanges with intelligence services of U.S. allies. Word has been passed from abroad that there's little chance of renewal of a free flow of information until congressional investigations of the CIA have been completed.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, June 22, 1975

Why Not a Detente in Dirty Tricks?

By Arthur M. Cox

Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former official in the State Department and the CIA. His next book, "Myths of National Security," will be published this summer.

IN AN ERA of budding detente the clandestine operations of the KGB and CIA are an anachronism. Even so, both sides will continue to engage in secret political warfare and espionage as long as the other side conducts such operations. But the decline of the Cold War and technological advances in information-gathering clearly challenge the validity of these operations. The time has come to add this subject to the agenda of U.S.-Soviet negotiations toward the goal of phasing out the clandestine functions of both the KGB and CIA.

For years Washington and Moscow have used the clandestine operations of the other side as a sort of litmus paper to measure true intentions. A U.S. President or a Soviet Communist Party secretary might talk of peace, but the knowledge of on-going clandestine operations is always hard evidence of the other side's continuing aggressive intentions. Thus, the activities of the KGB and the CIA reinforce the continuity of each other. If the Soviets are going to conduct secret political action and espionage, then we should, too.

Yet, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev says time and again that "the process of detente is irreversible." Detente means a relaxation of tensions for the purpose of reducing the possibility of war. But the clandestine operations of the CIA and KGB manifestly increase tensions. They are a form of warfare.

KGB Blunders

IF THESE CLANDESTINE programs were achieving important foreign policy gains for either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S., then their continuation, though debatable, would be understandable. But that is not the case. The KGB has had very few political warfare successes in recent years. The same is true of the CIA, unless the "destabilization" of the Chilean government is considered a success. The U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs and the CIA failure in Vietnam have been highly publicized, but less is known about some of the reversals for Soviet foreign policy caused by the KGB. For example:

- In early 1969 there were a number of serious military incidents on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets demanded that the Chinese sit down at the negotiating table to settle the matter, but the Chinese refused. In August Boris Davidov, a senior KGB officer in the Washington embassy, had lunch with an American specialist in

Sino-Soviet affairs. Soon there was a story in the American press indicating that the Soviets were considering a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. In September a story appeared in the London Evening News signed by Victor Louis, undoubtedly the most publicized of all KGB operatives, which speculated about a Soviet strike to eliminate Chinese nuclear bases. These stories were followed by a flurry of news items, datelined from Hong Kong to Helsinki, about Soviet aggressive intentions against China.

In December, 1969, under a headline saying "Chinese Communists Appear to Expect a Russian Attack," Joseph Alsop reported that long-stalled talks dealing with border incidents were proceeding between the Soviets and Chinese. "It is perfectly clear," he wrote, "that the Chinese only consented to talk at all because of Soviet threats . . . The language of the Chinese announcement of the talks quite openly implied that there had been Soviet threats of an extremely crude and brutal kind."

So the KGB operation succeeded in pressuring the Chinese to resume the talks, but it also alarmed the Chinese leaders so much that they signaled interest in secret negotiations with the U.S. Soon there was ping-pong diplomacy, and not long thereafter Henry Kissinger was on the way to the breakthrough which led to President Nixon's visit to China, the beginning of more friendly U.S.-Chinese relations and membership for China in the United Nations. Surely, no development in recent history has been a greater setback for Soviet foreign policy.

- In 1955 and '56 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles turned down the appeals of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser for U.S. arms aid and help in building the Aswan dam. So the Soviets filled the vacuum and their relations with the Egyptians became very close.

However, things began to change when Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat was neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Western, but he was very much of an Egyptian nationalist. He showed such independence that the Soviets began to worry whether they would have sufficient political influence to protect their vast investment in Egypt. By the spring of 1971 the Soviets were so alarmed that they instructed the KGB to arrange a coup to eliminate Sadat from power.

But the KGB failed. Sadat moved swiftly to arrest more than 90

plotters. He was astounded to discover that his trusted chief of intelligence, Sami Sharaf, was a KGB agent. The KGB had begun cultivating Sharaf in 1955, and by 1959 he had emerged as the de facto chief of Egyptian intelligence. By 1967 he had become Nasser's closest adviser. Sharaf was the key KGB agent in the plot against Sadat.

After the failure of the attempted coup it looked as though Soviet Middle East policy would collapse. The Soviets were so desperate that they presented Sadat with a 15-year Treaty of Friendship, pledging to stay out of the internal affairs of Egypt and agreeing to provide vast quantities of weapons. Later, even after Sadat had expelled 10,000 Russian technicians, the Soviets continued to send planes, tanks and ground-to-air missiles.

Sadat accepted anything he could get until he had achieved his purpose in the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel. However, he has not forgotten how close the KGB came to ending his career. This explains, in part, the restoration of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations and Sadat's extraordinarily friendly talks with Kissinger and now Mr. Ford.

- In the years after World War II the Soviets' greatest concern was that German rearmament might lead to a Bonn attempt to take over East Germany and Berlin—and to war. But then Willy Brandt emerged as Chancellor of the Federal Republic with his *Ostpolitik*. The most important step in the policy, designed to promote relaxation of tensions with the Soviet bloc, was Bonn's recognition of Pankow as a separate, independent nation, marking the abandonment once and for all of the concept of a reunited Germany. General Secretary Brezhnev vigorously supported all elements of the *Ostpolitik*, but especially Bonn's recognition of East Germany.

Under the circumstances Brandt's sudden decision to resign must have come as a stunning blow to the Kremlin. And yet Brandt resigned because of the discovery that one of his highest ranking assistants, Gunter Guillaume, was a spy. What happened is now amply on the record:

In 1956 the East German intelligence service, which for years had been directed by the KGB, sent Guillaume to West Germany. Posing as an escapee from communism, he did remarkably well—for himself and for his bosses. In 17 years he progressed from running a wurst and flower stand to the position of personal assistant to the federal chancellor. Despite

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crucial Soviet foreign policy objectives, the KGB

took the incredible risk of leaving Guillaume in place. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened had Brandt's successor rejected his *Ostpolitik*.

Electronic Intelligence

THE EGYPTIAN AND German stories illustrate the fact of intelligence life that spy operations can be conducted with remarkable success over a long period of time—and yet end up having disastrous or potentially disastrous results for policy. It is clear that, in an era when negotiation is supposed to be replacing Cold War confrontation, the clandestine operations of the KGB and CIA are archaic. They are hostile, provocative acts running counter to the professed objectives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Of course, good intelligence will continue to be important for both sides. But intelligence data does not have to be obtained through espionage.

Strategic intelligence of utmost importance can now be obtained through technological, rather than human, means. We are able to observe Soviet medium, intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missile tests through the use of radar and electronic interception of telemetry signals. We know what they have tested and what they have not tested.

Through seismic and acoustic receivers we know the size and location of all their nuclear tests. Through the precision cameras of space reconnaissance we know the size and location of their missile silos.

For years we have known how big, and approximately how accurate, their missiles are—and how many they have. We are able, via sonar and other sophisticated devices and techniques, to track their missile-firing submarines.

The miracles of high-flying cameras which can photograph the entire U.S.S.R. in a few days, combined with the information obtained from electronic interception, radar and computers, provide us with much more accurate intelligence than we had available when espionage was rampant at the height of the Cold War. In fact, in an era of strategic parity or essential equivalence it is imperative that both sides have excellent information about the capabilities of the other. That is the only way the balance of deterrence can work.

In the interim SALT agreement signed in Moscow in 1972, both sides acknowledged the importance of space reconnaissance as an essential means of verifying that the terms of the agreement are fulfilled. If the Soviets had not developed accurate space reconnaissance of their own, it would have been in our interest to make such facilities available to them. If both sides intend to limit strategic arms, it will be essential that information about the systems of each be open, not secret.

There remain, for example, problems about verifying the limit on the number of missiles upgraded into MIRVs by being fitted with multiple warheads.

The high-flying cameras can locate the missile silos, but if the silo is covered, the cameras cannot determine whether the missile within it has multiple warheads. One solution is simply to assume that all categories of missiles successfully tested with multiple warheads will be so equipped when placed in the silo.

Since the days of the McCarthy era and the national hysteria over communist penetration and spies there has remained in this country an exaggerated sense of the threat of the KGB. Even if the FBI were not doing its job, there are very few vital secrets for the KGB in the United States. We want the Soviets to have a very thorough understanding of our strategic strength. That is the point of deterrence.

Code machines and computers have made our codes and cryptographic systems virtually impenetrable. Our war plans are supposed to be secret, but a careful reading of the annual Defense Department posture statement, the congressional hearings and the technological journals gives any trained observer most of the essential data. There are diplomatic secrets, but those secrets are very short-lived, usually valid only during the period of negotiation.

Secrecy Hurts

ACTUALLY, SECRECY is often an impediment to national security in a democracy. In 1970 the Pentagon asked its Defense Science Board to establish a task force to study the effects of the secrecy system. The board concluded that as much as 90 per cent of classified scientific and technical defense information should not be so designated. The board members estimated that most secret information would become known within a year. They noted that excessive secrecy tended to stifle inventiveness and useful research in weapons systems.

One member said, "If present trends continue for another decade our national effort in weapons research will become little better than mediocre." Another member concluded that, "while secrecy is an effective instrument in a closed society, it is much less effective in an open society in the long run; instead, the open society should recognize that openness is one of its strongest weapons."

The U. S. moon program was open; the Soviets' was secret. It was the U.S. which landed on the moon.

As in the past, most essential information will continue to come from open sources. The technological means for information-gathering will provide most of the additional required material. Of course, there will also be a continuing quest for information by diplomatic establishments. Just as newspaper reporters have confidential sources, so diplomats will have confidential sources. Whether the diplomat is called a KGB or CIA officer or a foreign service officer makes little difference. If he is part of the diplomatic establishment he has the same privileges and the same risks of being made persona non grata.

But there is a difference between diplomatic information gathering

and the recruitment of agents within the opposing government. The latter is a much more provocative and hostile action. When discovered, such acts sharply increase tensions. In a time when both sides are advocating detente, the risks of developing a Penkovsky or a Philby outweigh the benefits.

Now it will be said that the Soviets—because they have a closed society, a police state and an ideology which advocates conspiracy—will never give up their clandestine operations. Perhaps so, but if we intend to move ahead with a growing detente, now is the time to find out.

It must be anticipated that there will be vigorous opposition in the Kremlin, both bureaucratic and doctrinal. Nevertheless, Brezhnev and his fellow politburo members have demonstrated that their advocacy of detente may be overriding. In the struggle for power in the Kremlin the politburo has ousted Shelest and Shelepin, both anti-detente hawks. It is worth noting that Shelepin was a former chief of the KGB. Brezhnev and the others know that the KGB has made serious blunders and has sometimes set back Soviet foreign policy.

Phasing Out Spying

THERE IS A LONG history of negotiations between the U.S. and Soviets in the field of clandestine operations, but never an attempt to negotiate a broad reduction. There have been many spy exchanges, some of them highly publicized, such as the swap of Col. Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Gary Powers. There have been deals about provocative "black" radio broadcasts, and Soviet jamming has been reduced as inflammatory political commentary has been phased out.

Political warfare and espionage, like strategic missiles, form a subject for negotiation. One technique that has worked before is to announce that we are unilaterally phasing out certain operations and will be carefully watching to see whether the Soviets follow suit. This was the technique used by President Kennedy which led to the partial nuclear test-ban agreement.

As the phase-out proceeded both sides would verify the implementation of the arrangements through the techniques of counter-espionage. The FBI would have responsibility within the U.S., while CIA counter-espionage and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services would bear responsibility abroad. The KGB counter-espionage system would obviously monitor whether the U.S. was carrying out its side of the bargain.

Once the dialogue begins, all sorts of possibilities will come into view. There will, as noted, be strong resistance by the hawks on both sides. If the Soviets are unwilling to go along, it is important that we should know that, especially in these days of review of the role of the CIA. But if we have sufficient self-confidence combined with the common sense to maintain our guard while showing flexibility, there is now a prospect for persuading the Soviets to join us in ending the clandestine war.

NEWSDAY
13 JUNE 1975

CIA

Behind the Cloak, A Placid Wooded Headquarters

On the surface are charges of assassination plots and illegal deeds. But underneath, there is an everyday human side.

By Jane Morse

Newsday Staff Correspondent

Until quite recently, one of the few provable facts known about the cloaked and secretive Central Intelligence Agency is that its headquarters are in Langley, Va., just outside Washington. Current probes of the organization suggest, however, that it may be a way out, and that anything at all could be going on there.

Indeed it is.

Although the knitting and crocheting club has adjourned for the summer, the 60-voice chorus continues to hold once-a-week practice sessions, the grand slam bridge club has regular duplicate games every Tuesday at 6:15 and the Bible study class gets together twice a week at midday.

The fact is that behind the shadowy, faceless spy facade and in the midst of recent revelations and investigations, there exists a not-so-faceless bunch of individuals linked by federal-style bureaucracy that's complete with a hyperactive employee activities association, a private washroom for the director, a credit union and a car pool. It has, as well, carved-in-marble a testimonial to honor 31 of its people killed in the line of duty, a clinic set up with the specialized equipment needed for the prompt treatment of heart attack victims (something that's required with startling regularity it is said), and a "helping hand" fund that takes up voluntary, anonymous collections to help staff members in need.

Nonetheless, these days, anyone who veers off the highway after the sign that says "CIA Next Right" is apt to cause other drivers and passengers to risk dislocating their vertebrae twisting for a look. It's hardly a wonder, of course. The place has never been on the Gray Line tour and there are relatively few people, outside the staff and its professional associates, who have ever been inside.

The rare visiting outsider would find that what's inside is a magnificently wooded, 213.1-acre campus—and campus is what it's called. Like most campuses it's a little short on parking, but that's partly because Allen Dulles, who was the agency director when the new headquarters were built, had strong feelings about trees.

"He'd say, 'Gee, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0

tie something around it to mark it for saving, even if it had to be moved. I figure he cost us something like 250 parking spaces," an associate recalls.

Dulles hired the architectural firms of Harrison and Abramowitz and Frederic R. King, reportedly outmaneuvering the General Services Administration, which had some other ideas. The seven-story, off-white, reinforced-concrete building that resulted was completed in 1961—and promptly infiltrated. Field mice moved in almost at once.

Present-day two-legged infiltrators might get by the guards at the toll-booth-like main entrance gate (they seem to be accustomed to unannounced visitors arriving to pick up and haul away passengers) but to park or to get more than 20 yards inside the front door, you need papers. If you're expected, guards—behind signs warning that such things as cameras, firearms and incendiary devices are prohibited—will point you toward a reception room stocked with magazines and pay phones. There, one of three receptionists will smilingly offer a visitor's form to be filled out in duplicate.

Once you receive the seal of approval (a clip-on card saying "Visitor"), it's entirely possible that you might even get inside someplace as exotic as the self-service postal center. It will happen, though, only if the person whom you're meeting or the escort who's assigned to you is agreeable. From the reception room on, you must have company.

The building is roughly a quadrangle. In the center is an enclosed patio that you'd pass if headed for the "open" cafeteria or the Muzak-free but cocktail-lounge-like Rendezvous Room. Alcohol, though, does not cross the border of any government food service installation. The Rendezvous Room is, instead, noted for its \$2.20 daily all-you-can-eat buffet.

When the weather permits, numbers of employees opt for outside eating at rustic tables on the grounds behind the building. Still others patronize a second cafeteria that duplicates the first with the same vaulted ceiling and expanse of glass that, as interior decorators have established, brings the outdoors in. The latter cafeteria, though, lets in only the outdoors and certain well-cleared CIA employees.

Some of the same employees were no doubt involved in a successful 1962 coup that resulted in the elimination of the building's thoroughly depressing all-gray corridors. Designers were rushed in and finally agreed on white walls punctuated by colored doors and panels, each shaded to follow the other like spokes in a color wheel.

The new look was a hit with most employees, although one senior official is supposed to have the story

of a visitor shown around the home of a newly rich woman. "Madam," the visitor said, "I'll pay for the drinks but I won't go upstairs."

Upstairs, one hears, there are still some problems with personal clutter. Personal clutter is "the enemy of good design," according to a 7-page booklet, and employees are admonished that they may be siding the opposition when they tape cartoons to their office safes or pile junk on top of them.

The CIA has won the design-clutter war on the first floor, though, and in style. Bright contemporary paintings borrowed from Washington art collector Vincent Melzac are positioned effectively on various walls, and an Exhibit Hall in the southeast area is currently displaying near eastern and Indo-Pakistani art objects from the private collections of CIA employees. The agency's own fine arts commission is at the moment being chewed out by in-house critics for putting phony grass beneath the magnolia trees in a small patio off the cafeteria area, but it has been lauded for other moves. It gave its approval, for instance, to "wrapping" the four main banks of elevators in floor-to-ceiling blow-ups of antique maps, one of Rome, one of Paris, one of London and one of St. Petersburg in Czarist Russia.

The elevator interiors fell into waggish hands, and, although standard "no smoking" signs are carefully posted, they're in such not-so-standard languages as Japanese, Persian, Hindi and Hausa, as well as French and German. If a Chinese-speaking spy ever penetrates the place, he probably would feel most at home using the stairs, since floors are numbered in various Asian and foreign numerals.

He should not, however, bet any money on getting that far.

Anywhere on "campus," you can tell the regulars from the drop-in trade at a glance. The regulars have their pictures on their ID cards and seem to favor hanging them on chains around their necks. They're also the ones who don't stop to gawk at the portraits of former CIA directors that are spaced out along one of the first-floor corridors. Or at the framed display of CIA medals, some of which have to be stashed on the premises until they're not too hot to be handled by recipients whose cover or operation might be blown if

they took delivery. Or at the copy of George Washington's letter articulating his own strong feelings of the necessity of intelligence gathering and the need to keep it secret.

It's hard, of course, for a newcomer not to stop and stare. What the CIA may really be running is a mini-museum with research facilities.

Even inside the library are more artifacts and memorabilia. For one thing, there's the big wooden seal that identified the agency's old headquarters in midtown Washington. It was saved in an informal Sunday morning salvage operation performed by a thoughtful history-minded staff member.

There's also the historical intelligence collection of some 20,000 "tradecraft" books frequently consulted by intelligence officers in search of a precedent. The library's main collection is now primarily a body of about 75,000 reference books plus a worldwide selection of telephone directories and enough newspapers to provide the English with a few centuries' worth of fish-and-chip wrappings.

To keep further abreast of current events and thinking, the CIA training office, from time to time, invites guests such as missile man Werner von Braun, author-editor-educator Irving Kristol, Marquette University Journalism School Dean George Reedy and former Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiator Paul Nitze to speak before employees in a bubble-domed 500-seat auditorium attached to the main building. Keeping up also means that the Northern Virginia Community College sends over instructors to hold regular after-work-hour classes in a variety of subjects.

That last move, though, seems like a coals-to-Newcastle waste of effort. As one of the resident intellectuals puts it, if the CIA closed down tomorrow as a spy operation, it could reopen the following day as one of the country's leading universities. Enough academic expertise could be rounded up on the premises to set up shop immediately in everything from "A" for anthropology to "Z" for zoology. For a language-studies department alone, the new university could call on people with competence in 97 different tongues and dialects, not including the desk officer, who has achieved international recognition for his hobby, 16th-Century Latin. /E

NEW YORK TIMES

22 June 1975

Life Imitates Conjecture in C.I.A. Inquiry

The Central Intelligence Agency obviously does a lot nobody else knows about; just as obviously it gets blamed for things it didn't do, because what is known makes it a natural suspect. Unhappily for the beleaguered agency, mobster Sam Giancana was murdered last week, and an investigator would have to be moribund himself if he didn't wonder about the C.I.A.

Mr. Giancana was killed in his Chicago home. There were six bullets in and around his head, but no witnesses. There is no known evidence at all that the C.I.A. had anything to do with the murder.

Mr. Giancana and another underworld figure, John Roselli, were recently publicly linked with a C.I.A. assassination plot against Fidel Castro. The plan was allegedly hatched in the

Closing days of the Eisenhower Administration in 1960 and carried forward during the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. Mr. Giancana was supposed to testify soon before a Senate committee investigating intelligence activities.

Mr. Giancana's business associates presumably include a number capable of homicide and perhaps some with the motive; he had reportedly been testifying about underworld matters before a Federal grand jury. There has been at least one other mob murder recently in Chicago.

Yet in the current atmosphere especially, the C.I.A. is not immune from suspicion; what used to be considered the paranoia of the few is now the rational skepticism of many, including respected writers in respected journals. There are constant reports to feed the skepticism:

• Vice President Rockefeller said the assassination of John and Robert Kennedy and "a real problem of amnesia among those still around" made it impossible to determine conclusively the involvement of the

Kennedy White House in Castro assassination plots.

• President Ford indicated he will turn over to the Senate committee minutes of National Security Council meetings at which assassination was discussed. One source who had read the minutes said, "There were some pretty bizarre suggestions, as though a group of guys were sitting around and talking over a beer."

At the C.I.A., one spokesman (who asked to remain unidentified) said: "They're going to pin the crucifixion on us next." It was only gallows humor and may prove as ineffective as most in the genre.

The Rockefeller Commission itself accused the agency of violating the rights of thousands of Americans. The Senate Committee is said to have enough evidence of the Castro affair so that it will not seriously miss Mr. Giancana's testimony. There are reports that Mr. Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger are seeking the resignation of the C.I.A. director, William E. Colby. It might be a while before anyone get around to the crucifixion.

TIME
30 JUNE 1975
THE CIA

The Assassination Plot That Failed

Of all the charges of wrongdoing by the Central Intelligence Agency, the most disturbing are those that implicate the agency in plots to assassinate foreign rulers who were deemed inimical to U.S. interests. Among the putative targets were Congolese Nationalist Leader Patrice Lumumba and Dominican Republic Dictator Rafael Trujillo, who were assassinated in 1961; South Viet Nam President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was murdered in 1963; and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. The allegations are being investigated by a Senate committee, which last week continued to question past and present CIA officers about the alleged plots. At TIME's request, Charles J.V. Murphy, a former editor and Washington correspondent of FORTUNE, talked with his long-time sources in the U.S. intelligence field about the charges and sent this report:

The suspicion is that two Presidents—Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy—authorized or condoned foul plots by the CIA to do in several foreign leaders. Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who heads the Senate investigating committee, has claimed to have "hard evidence" of the agency's complicity but nothing that would implicate any President. Still, in the singular relationship of the agency to presidential authority, evidence of a CIA assassination plot would seem to implicate one President or the other, even both, unless, of course, the CIA had become a law unto itself. What the Rockefeller commission report revealed was "in all likelihood just the tip of the iceberg," according to Church. The real likelihood is that so far as the actual assassinations are concerned, there was never much more to this floating body than a deceptively shimmering tip. Castro, however, was another matter. The agency version of the charges is this:

TRUJILLO. Former senior officers of the CIA maintain that neither the agency nor Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy had anything directly to do with the dictator's death. Officials in the American embassy had tried to persuade Trujillo to resign to end the domestic unrest that the U.S. feared might make the country ripe for Communism. They had also been gingerly in touch with leaders of the political opposition and as a token of the American interest in seeing a change, had provided one faction with three rifles. A group of seven or eight men ambushed Trujillo on the road from his house to the presidential palace. Whether any of the U.S.-supplied rifles were used in the killing has never been determined to the senior CIA men's satisfaction.

LUMUMBA. The Soviet Union sup-

ported him with money and arms in the contest to take the former Belgian Congo out of the West's orbit. While the CIA supported President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga against Lumumba, it had no part in Lumumba's arrest and murder by Katangese soldiers. He was a casualty of African tribal politics.

DIEM. The coup against Diem was planned with the knowledge of Dean Rusk and Averell Harriman at the State Department, Robert S. McNamara and Roswell Gilpatric at the Defense Department and the late Edward R. Murrow at the U.S. Information Agency. The U.S. hoped Diem's overthrow would halt the domestic turmoil that had weakened South Viet Nam. But the CIA's director, John A. McCone, vigorously opposed the overthrow of Diem on the reasoning that none of the generals enlisted in the coup would be half as effective a leader as the man they wanted to bring down. After the coup, Diem was murdered. Former senior CIA officials insist that the slaying was the private work of the Vietnamese generals' junior officers and was done without the U.S. Government's foreknowledge.

CASTRO. Though Castro is still alive, it is not because the CIA did not consider various ways of doing him in. The design on the "maximum leader's" life burgeoned over a span of some two years into a corpus of schemes. As best the principals remember, the idea first emerged in the late spring or early summer of 1960 as a simple, even simple-minded plot to poison Castro's food or slip him a poisoned cigar. By some accounts, the notion originated with a senior officer in the agency's Western Hemisphere division whose ideas interested Colonel Sheffield Edwards, director of the agency's Office of Security. Edwards passed the idea on to Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr.

He instructed Edwards to explore the feasibility of the project. For help, Edwards turned to a former FBI agent and later Howard Hughes associate, Robert A. Maheu. Maheu, then a private consultant and investigator, was believed to have a line to Mafia interests that had operated gambling casinos in Havana. Through the connection, Edwards sought to find out whether the Mafia could produce, if need be, a man in Havana in a position to liquidate Castro.

Through Chicago Mafia chieftain Sam Giancana, who was murdered last week in his suburban Chicago home, and his lieutenant, John Roselli, the CIA recruited a gangster reputed to be in Castro's entourage of bullboys. In late September Bissell and Edwards informed Director Allen Dulles of the results of their tentative explorations. Bissell

with Dulles was in the most general terms; he was merely encouraged to test the ground further.

The medical section of the CIA produced some exotic pills and even "fixed" a box of fine Havana cigars. The cigars seem never to have left the laboratory, but the pills were turned over to the Mafia. The would-be assassin was to have been paid \$150,000 if he succeeded; some earnest money, "a few thousand dollars," was turned over to him. Giancana and Roselli expected something more important than money: both were under investigation by the Department of Justice and hoped to escape prosecution. In due course, the pills moved to Miami but no farther.

No one seems to know why nothing happened. Perhaps the man in Havana got cold feet. Or he may have been eased out of his former close proximity to Castro. By some accounts, Giancana and Roselli found a replacement for the original assassin and turned the pills over to him. The substitute later claimed to have put two separate three-man teams of infiltrators ashore in Cuba. If he did, nothing more was ever heard of them.

There is a further mystery as well. It would scarcely have been in character for Dulles to proceed in such a delicate, potentially notorious enterprise without Eisenhower's sanction or at least the authorization of the National Security Council. But there is no record of such authority.

Problem of Amnesia. One of Bissell's senior lieutenants in the Cuba business later stated he was advised by Bissell on two different occasions that the plan had White House authority. Bissell claims to have no memory of making such a statement. But he has also said he would not dispute his colleague's memory. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller has described "a real problem of amnesia" that pervades the recollection of the principals still alive. Bissell swore an oath to keep secret whatever they were called upon to do in the national interest. In their view, amnesia may well be another word for integrity in these times of damaged vocabularies.

With the advent of the Kennedy Administration, the CIA plainly assumed that the new President would favor the enterprise against Castro. In February 1961 Bissell brought a new personality into the plan: a CIA officer named William K. Harvey. Long retired and living now in Indianapolis, Harvey was a pear-shaped fellow with a swinging stride. An intelligence officer of the direct-action school, he habitually carried a revolver in his belt.

Bissell charged Harvey with the responsibility for preparing the ground for what in the jargon of the intelligence trade is called an "executive action." That is the term for an action calculated to neutralize an adversary. The means may include defamation of character by propaganda or luring a leader out of his post of influence with the promise of a fine villa on the Côte d'Azur and a bottomless Swiss bank account. The form, in theory, also includes assassination, though the CIA possessed no machinery for this kind of executive action. Harvey had no authority to act, Bissell said and advise.

In the wake of the failure at the Bay

TIME

23 JUNE 1975

Lunch with the President

of Pigs in April 1961 Dulles and Bissell both left the agency. They were succeeded by McCone as director and Richard M. Helms as deputy director for plans. Helms, who had known nothing about the schemes against Castro until he succeeded Bissell, did not inform McCone about them until some months after McCone took charge. His reasoning: "Harvey was merely looking into various possibilities. If he came up with anything realistic, that would be the time to bother John with the decision."

By then, of course, the Mafia connection was dormant, but a blunder threatened to blow its cover a year later because of an unrelated bit of skulduggery in October 1960. As TIME has reported, Giancana became upset because his girl friend, Singer Phyllis McGuire, took up in Las Vegas with Comedian Dan Rowan. It was arranged to have Rowan's hotel room bugged. Through ill chance, the snooper was caught in the act of planting his gear. The investigation progressed slowly, but eventually the Las Vegas police insisted on putting the evidence before the FBI, and Maheu informed Colonel Edwards that Giancana and Roselli expected to be protected. By May 1962 the FBI got in touch with Edwards about the matter.

With Edwards in tow, CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston warned Assistant Attorney General Herbert J. Miller Jr. that the CIA's connection with the Mafia faced exposure if the snoopers were prosecuted. A day or so later, Houston and Edwards met with then Attorney General Robert Kennedy. He was upset but apparently not unduly alarmed. There would be no prosecution. His parting words were: "If you people want to get involved again with Mafia types, I want you to consult me first." It was Houston's impression that Kennedy had not known of the operation until that afternoon but had no objection to its going forward.

Special Meeting. In August 1962 the assassination project came under discussion at the highest levels of the Government. McCone called a special meeting of officials—among them Rusk, McNamara and Murrow—to discuss the growing Soviet activities in Cuba. McCone and another man present remember that McNamara raised the question of disposing of Castro. Murrow at once objected to any discussion on that point. McCone echoed the protest. Nevertheless, a memorandum circulated two days later by Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency expert attached to McNamara's office, included a mention of a plan for "eliminating" or "liquidating" or otherwise doing Castro in—no one remembers the exact phrase.

When the memo was hand-carried to McCone, he hit the roof. He telephoned the Pentagon and demanded that the memo be withdrawn at once. That was done, but a copy, with the objectionable terms blanked out, somehow survives, and was the object of much speculation among the Rockefeller and Senate panels. Two months after the August meeting, the Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba. In the turmoil, Harvey's executive action and the Mafia connection all disappeared into the void, never to be revived.

The Rockefeller commission's report on the Central Intelligence Agency is something of a vindication for the New York Times, which broke the story of CIA domestic spying in an article last Dec. 22 by Investigative Reporter Seymour Hersh. Yet for months the Times sat on an even juicier part of the CIA story—President Ford's concern over the agency's alleged role in foreign assassination plots—but chose not to print it. Times editors last week were standing by their decision, but the episode underlined the hazards of giving and taking off-the-record information.

Shortly after Hersh's CIA story, White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen called Clifton Daniel, the Times Washington bureau chief, and told him that invitations were being sent for an "informal" lunch with the President. On Jan. 16, seven top Timesmen were ushered into a small dining room in the East Wing for lamb chops with Ford, Nessen, Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Economic Adviser Alan Greenspan and Special Consultant Robert Goldwin. The gathering was cordial, though Ford occasionally interjected "Now this is off the record" and "This is not for public." Talk eventually turned to the Rockefeller commission. Ford expressed concern that the inquiry could uncover embarrassing CIA activities not related to domestic spying. "Like what?" asked Managing Editor A.M. Rosenthal, always the reporter. Replied the President: "Assassinations."

Ford's Concern. Afterward, the editors gathered in Daniel's office and agreed that since the lunch was off the record, the Times could not print the President's disclosure. When Daniel tried to get Nessen to relent and put the quote on the record, the press secretary stood firm. A day or two later, Daniel chatted with Reporter Hersh about the CIA's possible role in foreign assassinations, but Daniel says he did not reveal the President's mention of the subject; in any case, Hersh kept busy on the story's domestic angle. "Why didn't I tell him to drop everything and get on the foreign-assassination story?" asks Daniel. "Be-

cause it wasn't new. What was new was that Ford was concerned. We couldn't print that story. I don't take my word lightly. I don't think gentlemen and journalists are mutually exclusive."

Word of the lunch eventually got to CBS Newsman Daniel Schorr, who on Feb. 28 reported the President's concern about CIA assassination plots. Schorr's report stirred a mild sensation, and former CIA Director Richard Helms denounced the reporter as "Killer Schorr! Killer Schorr!" But by then the Rockefeller commission was well into its investigation, and its final report pleads—not too convincingly—that there was not enough time to examine the subject fully. Schorr refuses to identify his source.

Did the President deliberately make that off-the-record lunchtime disclosure in order to keep the paper—and the hard-charging Hersh—off the assassination trail? Government and corporate officials occasionally try to "lock up" news organizations with strategically placed not-for-publication disclosures. In the President's case, it is unlikely that he spoke out of guile. "I don't know how devious the President is," answers Ron Nessen, "and I'm not going to ask him." Managing Editor Rosenthal sees no skulduggery in the President's remark. Says he: "How did he know that we would respect the off-the-record part?"

Leaky Table. Not everyone at the Times is entirely pleased that the paper elected to be so trustworthy. "As far as I'm concerned, when you've got that many people around a table, nothing is off the record," says Associate Editor Tom Wicker, who attended the lunch. "But I work here, so I accepted the decision." Says Hersh: "Things have a way of leaking—which is why it's ridiculous to make those agreements."

Ridiculous it may be, but journalists often find it essential to let their sources say things privately that they would never say otherwise. Some of these sources may try to entomb sensitive information by using the off-the-record stratagem, but the presidential luncheon episode seems to prove, as Seymour Hersh says, that such things do have a way of getting out.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
30 JUNE 1975

Washington Whispers®

The operating budget of the Senate committee investigating the CIA has zoomed from the original \$750,000 to nearly 1.2 million dollars. About 90 staff members are now at work, including a battery of experienced interrogators, plus a number of specialists with CIA or FBI experience.

The Washington Star

Friday, June 13, 1975

Garry Wills

Abolish the CIA: it's the only cleansing

The Rockefeller Commission did not fulfill its purpose. It did not because it could not.

The purpose of an expert panel making a report to the President is to clear up public doubt about murky situations. The Warren Commission on the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Eisenhower Commission on violence, the Kerner Commission on riots, the Walker Commission on the Chicago convention — these and other reports were controversial.

But their investigations were thorough and their results were made public. The controversy arose from an irreducible minimum of confusion in events and of prejudice in hearers.

The contrast with the Rockefeller Commission is obvious. Even President Ford, while congratulating Rockefeller and saying the report could restore CIA credibility, went on to add that there can be no cover-up because other investigations will follow, or because Ed Levi is a fine man.

The President accepted the report while saying we should withhold judgment. Yet the report's job was to facilitate judgment, and to convince the rest of us that its own norms of judgment were sound.

Ford assured us he did not want to be a Monday morning quarterback. But that is just the assignment given to investigators.

The reference to Attorney General Levi's integrity was beside the point. The report should have had its own credibility, entirely aside from criminal proceedings.

The attorney general, in this case, may not prosecute individuals for any number of reasons — ambiguity in the law, the statute of limitations, the death of participants in illegal activities (which go back 20 years, the President tells us), the use of "executive privilege" to protect National Security Council members.

The failure to prosecute now does not assure us that the CIA has stayed within the law — either the moral

law or the federal statutes. Assuring us of that was the job of the Rockefeller Commission and, by the President's own statement, the commission failed.

Why the failure? Was it the fault of Rockefeller, of Ford, of staff members; a goof in timing, publicity, or organization? None of these things. The fault is in the CIA.

What was desired was a convincing assurance that the CIA has not been out of

control and engaged in shabby activities. That assurance will never be forthcoming, because it has been out of control and engaged in morally shabby operations for some time.

The CIA has inculcated in its members and leaders a feeling that they are above the law; that anything they do for what they conceive to be the national interest is justifiable; that all outsiders, even officials, must be lied to and tricked; that any attempt to check their power is an attack on the country's security and must be foiled.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 June 1975

Garry Wills

Abolish the CIA

Apologists for the CIA are right in one respect: You cannot neatly separate the CIA's foreign from its domestic activities. Not when the foreign activities are vast, secretly financed, and do not recognize foreign or international laws.

Take just one problem: How do you prevent people from blowing the CIA's multiple covers? The agency has thousands of present employees it must keep an eye on — and growing numbers of ex-employees who must be watched, silenced or intimidated.

To provide fronts, the agency throws out ever more corporations of its own, and plants men in other organizations — and these, in turn, must be watched. Among other things, the CIA is a set of interlocking businesses that handle millions of dollars.

Each cover must be covered. There is an endless proliferation of spies to spy on spies. If anything, the spinning-off of Hunt and McCord into careers of crime may cause the CIA to increase efforts at watching its own. And that means watching them all, all the rest of their lives — an endless, and endlessly expanding, task.

Just look at the amount of man-hours and money expended to prevent one agent, Victor Marchetti, from publishing a book about the CIA. The effort looks economical.

to its instigators. Let a Marchetti, or a Philip Agee, make themselves wealthy and famous by spilling the beans, and what will follow?

Howard Hunt has already demonstrated that an ex-CIA agent is not above trying to shake down the president of the United States for cash. The CIA has good reason to fear that men will start talking.

The fear that men will talk is an unhealthy thing in a democracy. It gets more unhealthy as the number of men being gagged multiplies, and the justification for their silence diminishes. What the CIA fears is the light of day.

We taxpayers have, with billions of dollars, furnished a thousand dank little cellars we know nothing about, and our own money will be used in the future to make sure we learn as little about them as possible.

If you doubt this, look at the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission itself. After criticizing the CIA, and saying it should stay out of domestic spying, the report makes these four exceptions:

1. When the agency is keeping a watch over its own members, present or past — a large domestic personnel.

2. When it is countering the actions of people outside the agency who might reveal something about CIA "facilities or personnel."

The name of the CIA is never going to be cleared. The more we learn about it, the more despicable it appears. Its directors have lied to Congress. Its members have routinely broken the law inside the agency, and some have felt commissioned to do so even after they leave the firm. Its defenders fall back on every sleazy argument available.

The only cleansing thorough enough, the only one proportionate to the agency's offenses, is abolition.

The CIA is a secret empire with more resources for protecting itself than for protecting the country. Intelligence work goes on in many bureaus where it can still be controlled. They should be maintained and expanded. The CIA should be "terminated with extreme prejudice."

The spies must spy not only on their own spies, but on anyone who might be spying on these spies.

3. When a domestic target is "suspected of espionage." In the past, receiving mail from abroad was enough to qualify under this proviso.

4. When information "incidental" to foreign activities has been uncovered and is referred to other agencies.

In other words, even the commission, in trying to cut back on the CIA's home activity, specifies four powers by which it can police its own, maintain its domestic fronts, use deceit about its financing, and harass those who are suspected of foreign activities or any illegal activities.

We are asked to give the agency money for guarding its spies from exposure. We pay to insure our own deception. If the CIA is authorized to cover up, it is de facto authorized to avoid accountability. It makes no sense for the Rockefeller Commission to call for accountability.

The CIA is already a cyst in our government, a cancerous growth more loyal to itself than to any law, foreign or domestic. It is an enemy of our enemies; but also an enemy to us.

With such friends we hardly need enemies. One does not "reform" a cancer. One cuts it out.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1975

Garry Wills

Common Sense Argues Down CIA

To criticize the CIA, one need not feel any animus toward it on ideological grounds. Even if one agreed entirely with the agency's goals, and had no objection to its past record, there would still be two solid arguments against it. These arguments are not political; they derive from common sense, and can be stated simply:

1. It is hard to keep a secret.
2. The bureaucracy spends most of its time servicing itself.

Put these two insights together, and you see that a huge intelligence agency has the bureaucratic problem multiplied severalfold, since it is servicing a particularly vulnerable thing—its own secrecy. And all the servicing efforts in turn have their secrecy protected.

Bernard Shaw puts the bureaucratic problem perfectly in a brief parable. A wealthy Edwardian couple with one servant got as much service as another family with nine servants. The house that gave living space to 11 persons (the couple and their 9 servants) was of necessity larger than that accommodating 3 persons—and much of those 9 servants' work must go to the upkeep of the larger mansion, even though it was made large in the first place to house them.

The cook can no longer cook for 3 (counting herself), she must cook for 11. Nine ex-

tra persons' clothes must be washed, beds made, hours arranged, conflicts adjudicated, accounts watched, habits corrected, in order to get the 2 persons' needs looked after.

Soon the employer must work harder to keep up this wasteful empire. Or, if he lives off others, they must be harder worked, or a greater portion of their work must pay for the wasteful upkeep of the lord.

You see the parallel—government is the employer, and the taxpayers are being worked to keep up the cannibalizing efforts of the bureaucracy. As such, Shaw's argument tells against all large bureaucratic agencies.

But recast the fable to allow for the secrecy factor. The nine original servants must conduct hidden lives. Even the large house built to contain them is not enough. They must be maintained secretly elsewhere, a new expense; they must be brought to the house in secret—a five-fold expense, for the transportation itself, for the secrecy measures around it, for transporters paid both to transport and to keep the secret, for the off-hours and double-time of the transporters' servants' employment, and for the people who have time to make all these quiet arrangements and keep them in operation.

The housework must be done at night, or in odd hours, as if by magic. Scheduling presents great difficulties. So

does hiding the source of pay given to these servants. Besides, some servants' activities must be hidden from their fellows. That involves still another house, another transportation system; another fake conduit of pay, and another system to check up on what these servants do that their fellow servants cannot see.

Beds are made in the several abodes, tunnels dug to connect them, and more people paid to keep the secret of how, or whether, these things are being done. The main house is filled with secret passages, so all the servants do not collide. Men must be hired for that carpentry, must therefore be checked, and watched, and paid well to keep their secrets. When a servant leaves, he carries secrets with him, and another servant must be hired to watch what he does outside the service. The bureaucratic problem, bad enough, becomes a nightmare in no time when multiplied by the secrecy factor.

That is what the current investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency are all about. And, naturally, we taxpayers are paying for the people to find all these secret tunnels whose construction we also paid for. We pay the hunters and the hunted, the hounds and the foxes, and both multiply like rabbits. It is Alice time in this industrious Wonderland.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1975

Proxmire raps calls to end CIA

Washington (AP)—Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.), a leading critic of the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that calls for abolishing the agency are "foolish and dangerous."

"To disband the CIA and give the military intelligence agencies free rein could result in a new cycle of ominous-threat estimates followed by a dramatic increase in the defense budget," Senator Proxmire said.

"Talk of disbanding the CIA is unreasonable," Mr. Proxmire said in a speech prepared for delivery in the Senate today and released yesterday.

"Strong measures must be taken to insure that future violations of the law or good sense cannot occur," Mr. Proxmire said. "Criminal penalties must be written into law."

"But disbanding the CIA would shut our eyes and ears during a period of tension in the Middle East and elsewhere," he said.

"The CIA is the only organization that can provide this data without self-serving biases," he said.

Senator Proxmire said military intelligence services are subject to a number of strong pressures including "the natural tendency to inflate the foreign military threat and get more money from Congress."

BALTIMORE SUN
17 June 1975

Kissinger says scrutiny of CIA hinders his job

By DEAN MILLS
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, said yesterday that the recent investigations into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency have hampered the conduct of American foreign policy but have not been "a major impediment."

Mr. Kissinger, answering questions in an appearance before a conference of the Public Broadcasting System here, said the investigations have shown that there "obviously have been some abuses" of power by the CIA.

"But," he added, "I consider the CIA essential for the conduct of our foreign policy, and

hope it will not be damaged by these investigations."

He said it is "essential for the United States to have a first-rate intelligence organization under the strict control of the political leadership."

Mr. Kissinger said he thinks the revelations of the investigations have not disturbed foreign leaders as much as Americans, because the foreigners take for granted many of the intelligence activities censured here.

"There is no other country in the world where an intelligence agency could be subjected to the public scrutiny that has been the case here," he said.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
21 JUNE 1975

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Raps CIA inquiries

CHICAGO—As a former staff officer of the Office of Strategic Services [the predecessor of the CIA] I view the investigations of the CIA as a product of the "new morality" which now besets our politicians.

With thousands of dedicated career people involved in gathering vital intelligence necessary for our nation's very existence, it seems picayune to submit this agency to the pick and shovel techniques of 1976 candidates and the media, which now feel the need for a new road show.

There is need, I admit, for new legislation which would compel the CIA to be accountable for expended funds and for an overseer committee, but the committee should be in the Senate, not the House.

Lawrence L. Hollander

WASHINGTON STAR
26 June 1975

Letters to the editor

Wills stirs up a wasps' nest

Your columnist Garry Wills' proposal that we abolish the CIA provides us with a clear example of neo-Jeffersonian folly. To the liberal mind, the solution to unchecked power is its abolition. Institutions are evil inasmuch as they restrain the creative and virtuous individual. Lurking in the background of liberal idealism is that nation of small farmers that would theoretically allow maximum liberty for the individual by severely limiting governmental power over his life.

But it is clear that our system is founded on the restraint of power, not its non-exercise. And, for the most part, our institutions have exerted a force to expand individual liberty, not to restrain it. The end result of the abdication of power-wielding in a society would be, in my opinion, not a Jeffersonian paradise of free men tilling their own part of the soil, but rather a Hobbesian purgatory of *bellum omnia contra omnia* ("the war of all against all").

The CIA is a necessary and vital agency whose functions are indispensable in today's world. The solution to its excesses lies in regulation, not abolition. Mr. Wills' proposal for its demise leads us nowhere but backwards into a never-never land of fantasy.

R. Peyton Howard
Washington, D.C.

As a CIA retiree who served 23 years with the agency, I resent deeply the implicit suggestion by Wills that all those who are serving and have given service with CIA should put on sackcloth and ashes and be stoned in the public square.

During those 23 years, I suffered some fools in the organization and found it necessary to work with the occasional bastard. (There must be a few such folk in, say, the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, or perhaps, perish the thought, even in the journalistic profession.)

Bastardly they may have been, but, with a single exception, I had utmost respect for their capabilities. I consider it a privilege to have been associated with the organization. Not once did I lose the conviction that what I was doing was, at best, significant and important for America, and, at worst, simply dull, plodding work.

Paul E. Carr
McLean, Va.

I realize the necessity for freedom of the press, but Wills' opinions are verging on the brink of tyranny. His cute phrases such as "cyst" and "cancer" are irresponsible and sickening. If he's so smart, why

doesn't he suggest some sort of a solution other than elimination?

I would like to know who he thinks would handle our foreign intelligence if the CIA were abolished.

Albert E. Crandall
Rockville, Md.

Ask Garry Wills who has been the imperialist and the confiscator of property and countries in the past 50 years — the communist totalitarian socialists, the Nazi totalitarian socialists, the Mao Tse-tung totalitarian imperialist expansionist socialists, the Brezhnev totalitarian imperialist expansionist socialists (Soviet Union), the Pham Van Dong totalitarian socialists imperialists-expansionists? Or the United States and its CIA?

Ask Garry Wills who are the exploiters and oppressors of peoples — the United States and its CIA, or the Soviet Union and its KGB? The foremost authority on the Soviet Union's socialism is Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, who wrote "The Gulag Archipelago." He says, "The Soviet Union lives under the rule of serfdom. Free citizens are not at all free. They are free neither to choose their employment, nor to fight for a fair wage for it, and even in their day-by-day lives, they are obliged to conform to the whims of the petty local party bosses."

Solzhenitsyn says the petty local party bosses are generally KGB, and the KGB has infiltrated every country in the world. They have assassinated our agents and other agents, universally. They have penetrated our schools and Congress.

Anton B. Kamenev
Washington, D.C.

Garry Wills doesn't want to cut out the cancer; he wants to kill the patient.

H. Nelson Filton
Alexandria, Va.

In an article you published on June 15, David Wise said: "There have, of course, been coups in which CIA played a role and in which foreign leaders have been killed, notably Diem in South Vietnam in 1963 and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973."

Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* invested a large amount of time and effort investigating the charge that the CIA was involved in the coup that overthrew Salvador

Allende. I asked him about his findings a few weeks ago, and he said that he had been able to find no evidence of any CIA involvement.

Mr. Hersh, who was largely responsible for the exposure in the press of the My Lai massacre, is certainly not one who would conceal evidence of CIA involvement in any wrongdoing. If Mr. Wise has found evidence that neither Hersh nor anyone else has uncovered, he should reveal it. Otherwise he should be asked to retract his "of course" assertion.

Reed J. Irvine,
Chairman,
Accuracy in Media, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

Can honest and intelligent Americans really view it as wrong for local, county, state and federal police organizations to work together for the common good of all? Perhaps some governmental big-wheels have more to hide than us ordinary folk and, therefore, a greater fear of being exposed for what they are.

A few years ago, when a woman was attacked and killed in New York City, nearby citizens were condemned for not going to her aid or calling the authorities. According to the logic of CIA critics, if one of those citizens had been a CIA employee and gone to her aid, he could have been chastised for doing so because it would not have been within the sphere of his agency's mission. Such rationale is most astounding.

Many federal agencies adhere to the principle that their employees would be remiss in their duties if they did not report suspicious actions, potentially detrimental to the U.S., to appropriate authorities. With this tenet, a good citizen must certainly agree.

Elmer Gettis
Falls Church, Va.

What's source for the goose . . .

I'm stumped. Would you please tell me the difference between a "source" (identified as such a dozen times in a *New York Times* News Service story you ran under the headline, "Plot by CIA to Poison Cuba's Top Command Is Disclosed") and a spy? Or do they both add up to hypocrisy?

Maybe this is one of the reasons most Americans have a low opinion of both the press and the government. Both of you could learn to be a lot more honest.

Denis M. O'Donnell
Forestville, Md.

PENTHOUSE
JULY, 1975

THE SPY AMONG US

THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS TO BE
SECURE IN THEIR HOUSES
IS VIOLATED EVERY DAY BY
THE STRANGE
BUREAUCRATS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
BY TAD SZULC

Americans have always believed that the right to privacy is sacred. We shudder at stories told by travelers to the Soviet Union and other dictatorships who take for granted that their hotel rooms and phones are bugged and that they are followed. But now we discover there is literally no place within the United States safe from the illegal snooping of the CIA (which is restricted by law to foreign operations) and the many other government agencies known as the "Intelligence Community."

One extraordinary example is the tiny laser-beam transmitter embedded in the wall of the Oval Office at the White House. This transmitter picked up and relayed to a remote recording center every conversation between Richard M. Nixon and his aides, friends, and visitors during at least several months in 1970, the year the former president launched his secret domestic intelligence program. Presidential telephone conversations, including those conducted over "secure" scrambler lines, were also picked up by the laser transmitter.

The existence in the presidential office of this highly sophisticated device, known by the code name "Easy Chair," remains one of the most sensitive, closely guarded, and intriguing secrets of the Nixon period. This knowledge is restricted to about a dozen key past and present officials of the Intelligence Community. But the precise purpose of the operation, the exact identity of those who ordered the installation of the laser device under a coat of fresh paint on the Oval Office wall, and the ultimate disposition of the instrument remain unclear. Nor do we know if tapes were made of these transmissions—which is, perhaps, the most crucial question.

It is also not known if Nixon himself was aware of and consented to the installation. If he did, the laser system complemented his hidden recording devices that produced the famous White House tapes. (In any event, the laser device picked up with infinitely more clarity every word uttered in the Oval Office, eliminating the "unintelligible" gaps that affected the tapes. In addition, the laser system permits, unlike a tape recorder, the identification of every individual voice in a room and the separation of several simultaneous conversations.) It is not known where the laser beam signal was received, but technical experts believe that such a

device has a transmission range of under a half mile along a clear line of sight. The laser beam must be aimed out a window—it would be deflected by a wall. In the case of the Oval Office it had to go through the panes of the French doors leading to the Rose Garden.

Highly reliable sources told *Penthouse* that one or more senior officials of the Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency are familiar with the "Easy Chair" situation in the White House, although they could not say whether they learned of it only when the laser device was discovered and removed early in August 1970, or whether they knew at some earlier date. The sources would not rule out that the late J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was also privy to "Easy Chair."

In any event, this super-bugging of the presidential office looms as one of the most bizarre episodes in the still unfolding story of domestic spying carried out by six successive administrations, but climaxing most spectacularly during Nixon's tenure.

Penthouse learned of this bugging of the Oval Office as a result of a lengthy investigation. According to highly authoritative sources, the person who installed the laser transmitter, possibly on a second attempt when an original device did not function properly, is a foreign-born individual employed as a painter by the government and apparently controlled by one of the intelligence agencies. His name as well as a number of other relevant details are withheld from publication to avoid causing suffering and embarrassment to persons innocently involved in this operation.

Investigations by *Penthouse* have also produced the significant fact that officials of the General Services Administration, which is responsible for the maintenance of government buildings, have been under strict orders from the Secret Service since 1970 not to discuss with outsiders anything pertaining to the painting of the interior of the White House. The Secret Service also issued orders that all inquiries on the subject be immediately reported to it. These orders apply to painting foremen and their crews as well as to other GSA employees. *Penthouse* sources were unable to say, however, whether these orders are exclusively related to the "Easy Chair" incident.

Beyond the new disclosures of White House bugging, recent investigations, including those by *Penthouse*, also strongly suggest that the cover-up of secret domestic spying activities by U.S. intelligence agencies has continued in 1975, despite President Ford's instructions that all relevant information be supplied to the investigating panels: the Rockefeller Commission and the two special congressional committees. But the White House has excluded certain top-secret material from information given to the Senate and House panels. These are the facts:

- Civilian and military intelligence agencies maintain political files on tens of thousands of American citizens, ostensibly for reasons of "national security" and criminal investigations, but just as often to satisfy the political curiosity of overzealous government sleuths. There are files on sexual, drinking, and other personal habits and

tants, dissidents in general, and real or suspected radicals.

- Court records, disclosed in April of this year (months after Ford ordered the investigation of the Intelligence Community), show that at least twenty federal agencies still maintain electronic surveillance of Americans at home and abroad. Overseas, particularly in Germany, the targets are U.S. military personnel. This surveillance includes telephone tapping and the secret recording of face-to-face conversations either through hidden devices or informers secretly wired for sound. (It is unclear, however, whether all this surveillance is based on court orders or is conducted illegally.)

The immense scope of this activity can be appreciated from this list of agencies engaging in domestic and foreign electronic surveillance of Americans: the FBI; the CIA; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Department of the Air Force; the Postal Inspection Service; the IRS Intelligence Division; the IRS Inspection Service's Internal Security Division; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Naval Investigative Service; the Administrative Services Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Defense Mapping Agency; the Defense Nuclear Agency; the Defense Security Assistance Agency; the Defense Supply Agency; the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; the Defense Advanced Projects Agency; the Defense Communications Agency; the Defense Contracting Audit Agency; the 502nd Army Security Agency Group; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S.

Army in Europe; the Investigation and Police Information Division of the U.S. Army in Europe; the Army Criminal Investigation Command; and the Defense Investigative Service. *It must be kept in mind that all this spying is outside normal criminal surveillance by law enforcement agencies.* In addition, acting on requests from nineteen federal agencies and scores of local law enforcement units, the U.S. Postal Service (which has an intelligence unit) is currently tracing and recording the origins of mail delivered to thousands of American citizens. Our government, from the federal down to the state and municipal levels, appears to have embarked on a veritable snooping binge. (It should be recorded, however, that the Pentagon makes a point that only five of its agencies are authorized to conduct electronic surveillance.)

- CIA director William E. Colby informed President Ford of possible illegal activities by his agency, including domestic spying and conspiracies to carry out assassinations of foreign leaders, only after a part of the veil of secrecy was lifted in press reports last December. This information had been withheld for nearly two years even though former CIA director James R. Schlesinger, now secretary of defense, ordered CIA employees as far back as 1973 to report to him activities exceeding or violating the CIA charter. He received a number of such reports. Colby inherited this material in 1973 and secretly requested the Justice Department to investigate illegal CIA actions—raising the possibility of criminal prosecutions against certain CIA officials—but he reportedly failed to inform Ford of it until the

presentation of his fifty-page written report last December and his supplemental "oral" report on assassinations.

• The CIA maintains its own secret list of enemies, known as the BIGOT file, in addition to 10,000 name files of Americans suspected in some manner of foreign intelligence connections or some vague form of subversion. The latter list includes antiwar and civil rights activists. *Penthouse* reported in its June issue that the CIA maintained since the 1950s separate dossiers on the late senators Joseph McCarthy and Robert Kerr, as well as on Senator Hubert H. Humphrey—in addition to New York congresswoman Bella Abzug, the only member of Congress that the CIA has publicly admitted keeping a file on. The BIGOT file is made up of persons who are regarded as "bigoted" against the agency.

Besides keeping dossiers on thousands of Americans, the CIA is also known to have maintained surveillance on Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas; Representative Claude Pepper, Florida Democrat; former representative Cornelius Gallagher, New Jersey Republican; and the late senator Edward Long, a Missouri Democrat. The CIA's interest in Douglas and Gallagher was apparently based on their contacts in the Dominican Republic. Douglas visited there in 1962 and had close ties to former president Juan Bosch, one of whose advisers had CIA links of his own. (And allegations have been made that the CIA played a role in the 1961 assassination of the Dominican dictator, Rafael L. Trujillo.) Pepper was reportedly a target because of his ties to Cuban refugees in Florida, a major area of CIA operations. Long, according to sources, aroused the agency's interest because of links to foreign corporations operating in the United States.

CIA sources say that many "enemies" on the BIGOT list have been targets of agency bugging by "Easy Chair" laser devices. The advantage of such devices is that they are usually untraceable and do not constitute actual wiretapping for which, at least in theory, either a court order or a "national security" clearance by the attorney general is required.

• The government secretly condoned the production of awesome antipersonnel explosive devices, such as flashlights and telephone receivers loaded with explosives, by the B. R. Fox Company, a private company in Alexandria, Virginia. Some of the officials of this company are believed to have had past ties with the CIA's paramilitary operations branch. There is no evidence that B. R. Fox, which mysteriously went out of business last November, was actually owned by the CIA. But Fairfax County authorities reported upon inquiry that the company never requested nor received the necessary permit for the manufacture of explosive devices in the Fairfax jurisdiction. Intelligence sources indicate that other such companies are presently operating elsewhere in the United States.

• The CIA obtained from the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Administration a special certification for one of its "proprietary" airlines, Southern Air Transport Inc., exempting it from the requirement of flying approved charter routes. Southern's aircraft are thus able to be used anywhere in the world without filing route reports with the CAB.

• To deal with pressures from current investigations, the CIA established at its headquarters last February a secret "CONF-FOUND Task Force," designed to counter charges against the agency. CONFOUND is supported by CIRA, the Central Intelligence Retired Association, formed last March '20. CIRA's board of governors includes some of the best-known former senior agency officials. The CIA, according to informants, also sought to plant at least two of its former officials on the staff of the Senate committee investigating the Intelligence Community.

• Its naval operations ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous, the CIA has been involved with billionaire Howard Hughes in various ventures, including the ship designed to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine, and it continues to operate—from a room in a small New York hotel and from a postal box in Panama—the *Apollo*, a mysterious motor yacht loaded with electronic and communications equipment. The 3000-ton *Apollo*, which is almost 500 feet long, usually operates in southern European waters.

This article will examine in some detail the domestic activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community—many of them clearly illegal and a clear and present danger to the democratic process.

For over twenty-five years these activities have often been in direct violation of U.S. laws. (The CIA, for example, is barred by federal law from domestic intelligence operations and from domestic police functions.) In addition, this domestic espionage has violated the civil rights of Americans on whom secret political files have been kept, whose phones have been tapped with or without court orders, and whose mail has been opened or, at least, monitored through Postal Service "mail covers" on behalf of various intelligence agencies. And there have been many unexplained accidents, deaths, and "suicides" in the U.S. involving persons who had connections with intelligence work.

Moreover, the intelligence agencies, using their immense manpower, and financial and technological resources, have been part of great political power struggles in this country going back at least ten years. "Keeping files on citizens may be the least some of these agencies have been doing," an intelligence expert with long experience in Washington remarked recently.

Some major American political assassinations, on which official files have been closed, may become the subject of new scrutiny by Rockefeller and the special congressional committees. If nothing else, a psychological climate has developed favoring the reopening of investigations of the murders of the Kennedy brothers and the Rev. Martin Luther King.

This climate, in which the CIA and the FBI are being publicly linked to these and other political assassinations, evidently led President Ford to remark at his news conference on April 3 that "it is my understanding that the Rockefeller Commission may, if the facts seem to justify, take a look" at the charges that the CIA was involved in the 1963 murder of President Kennedy and that it was a conspiracy involving more than one gunman. This would be the first fresh official look at the Dallas assassination since the Warren Commission issued its report more

Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin.

Ford, who was a member of the Warren Commission, said that "so far" he has seen no evidence to dispute the original conclusions. David W. Belin, executive director of the Rockefeller Commission and formerly counsel to the Warren Commission, took the same view. (But George O'Toole's recently published book *The Assassination Tapes*, which was excerpted in the April *Penthouse*, presents what may be called the first scientific evidence that Oswald was innocent.) Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Commission has received allegations in form of testimony from private groups that E. Howard Hunt, the ex-CIA official and convicted Watergate burglar, had been arrested in Dallas minutes after Kennedy's shooting. Hunt has denied this charge as well as published reports that he was in Mexico City in August 1963, at the same time as Oswald (see Hunt interview, *Penthouse* May 1975).

There are also new doubts surrounding the murder of Robert F. Kennedy in Los Angeles in June 1968, and the special investigating bodies may look into it, too. Charges of CIA and FBI involvement in the 1968 assassination of King in Memphis were made early in April by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who succeeded King in the leadership of the civil rights movement. This accusation coincided with recent assertions by James Earl Ray, the convicted assassin, that he did not act alone and with his request for a new trial. Acting on Hoover's orders, the FBI had been wiretapping King during the years preceding his death. A Hoover memorandum, disclosed several years ago, said the FBI's mission was "to disrupt, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the civil rights movement."

Political power struggles may have also been behind the installation of the "Easy Chair" laser device in Nixon's office in 1970. This secret transmitter is similar to the one accidentally discovered many years ago inside the Great Seal of the United States in the office of the American ambassador in Moscow. Such devices, unlike standard hidden microphones and transmitters, cannot be located by electronic sweeps. The instrument in the Oval Office was apparently discovered by a Secret Service agent who noticed an extra dab of paint covering the spot on the wall where the device was implanted. The paint caught his eye because of the way in which the light was being reflected by it at that particular moment.

It is possible that Nixon had personally ordered the implanting of the laser device to obtain a more accurate secret record of all conversations in the Oval Office and chose to keep the Secret Service in the dark about it. But it is also possible that, because of the extraordinary importance of policy decisions made in the Oval Office, one of the intelligence services may have installed the device. (There is at least one other case of such spying in the White House: during 1971, a navy yeoman attached to a Pentagon liaison office in the National Security Council regularly supplied the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the most top-secret materials from NSC meetings as well as the most sensitive foreign policy documents handled by Henry A. Kissinger, who then served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs.)

The Oval Office transmissions could be monitored anywhere in the White House or the Executive Office Building. They could also be picked up, technicians

say, in the Treasury Building a block away (the Secret Service is part of the Treasury Department) or in the Commerce Department building three blocks away. But, because laser beams can travel only along a line of sight free of any obstructions, it would be necessary to have "repeaters" located somewhere on the White House grounds to redirect the beam emanating from the Oval Office windows to reception points. If, indeed, the president was spied on by one of his intelligence agencies, the American government was in a greater state of disintegration than we ever realized.

Policy power struggles likewise seemed to loom behind the CIA's own violent reorganization in the wake of the disclosures last December that the agency had engaged in "massive" spying on Americans. CIA director Colby, anxious for a scapegoat, apparently chose the chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, James Angleton, as the public culprit, although knowledgeable agency officials believe that Angleton had relatively little to do with it. The belief in the Intelligence Community is that the spying scandal gave Colby the long-awaited opportunity to dismiss Angleton, a powerful operator who had carved out his private empire in the CIA. Angleton had become a thorn in the side of Secretary of State Kissinger because of his control over the flow of secret intelligence between the U.S. and Israel. Kissinger, it is said, felt that Angleton was interfering with his intricate Middle Eastern policies and persuaded Colby to remove him as soon as possible.

Angleton was quietly replaced by George Constantinides, a fifty-three-year-old Middle East specialist who has directed the CIA's Near Eastern Affairs Office since 1972, and is unlikely to create problems for Kissinger. But nothing was said about Richard Ober, the official who ran the CIA's Domestic Operations Division (renamed the Foreign Resources Division in 1972) during the period when the agency was engaged in spying on antiwar militants. Ober currently is assigned to the National Security Council staff where, presumably, he enjoys Kissinger's protection. Angleton, who stayed on for three months to assist Constantinides during the transition, was awarded on April 7, 1975, the CIA's Distinguished Intelligence Medal in a surge of bureaucratic irony. Colby managed to be in New Orleans on the day of the award and Angleton received it from Colby's deputy, Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters. Another power struggle had run its course.

As we've noted, the CIA is forbidden by federal law to operate in the United States except for managerial, policy, training, and support functions related to its foreign operations. But this prohibition has been violated to a steadily increasing degree since the CIA was founded twenty-eight years ago. The violations range from supporting local police departments and spying on American citizens to managing a huge corporate empire, shielding mysterious private companies producing lethal devices for use at home and abroad, supplying tax covers for such companies, as Howard Hughes's Summa Corporation, which built the submarine-recovery ship *Glomar Explorer* (it saved Hughes over \$9 million), and conspiring on United States soil to commit foreign assassinations. Conspiracy to commit murder is a major criminal offense under the United States Penal Code (it probably would be

considered a federal rather than a state offense because such murders would most likely be planned in a federal office) and current investigations by the Justice Department could lead to indictments of CIA personnel.

If this happens, one may well ask why "higher-ups" in the government, including members of the White House "Forty Committee," which must authorize foreign assassinations by American agents, would not be liable to prosecution. The Forty Committee is presently headed by Henry Kissinger and a case of legal accountability may develop against him and his predecessors. It may even be argued that presidents of the United States can be named as co-conspirators in foreign assassinations, inasmuch as they supposedly must clear such acts when Americans are used. But traditionally presidents have been protected by the so-called doctrine of "plausible denial," under which they are able to officially ignore this type of activity. Moreover, the Forty Committee keeps virtually no records, thus depriving courts of needed evidence. And no official is likely to incriminate himself in court—should it ever come to that.

It is obviously impossible to separate completely the CIA's domestic and foreign activities. The agency, after all, has its headquarters in the United States and all its operations are planned and coordinated at its sprawling building at Langley, Va., just outside Washington. Because of all the support requirements at home, the CIA's operations inevitably spill over to American cities. It is this spill-over factor that has often led to the abuses and violations.

The CIA claims that it acts legally on American territory when it engages in training and recruitment, the contacting of Americans and foreigners who may possess useful intelligence information, and the investigation of potential agents or informers it may wish to hire (as distinct from campus recruitment for CIA careers). Few CIA critics would dispute this claim. Likewise, there appears to be nothing wrong with the work here of the agency's Technical Services Division, which concentrates on intelligence technology and the equipping of agents for foreign missions, or the Office of Security, which supposedly does what its name suggests. In fact, "overt" CIA offices in dozens of American cities are listed in local phone directories.

The trouble, however, is that the CIA also runs "covert" offices and operations throughout the United States—the ones Colby does not mention in his increasingly frequent public appearances in defense of the agency. Here are five examples:

1. The Miami area is the center of major covert CIA operations. The principal operation is Support Station East, headed by a senior CIA official named Paul Holliswell, in charge of all the activities in Florida. A special section deals with anti-Castro Cuban refugees, many of them veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion and other CIA adventures in Cuba. The Cubans are used as intelligence sources and as infiltrators into Cuba (although this activity has been considerably curtailed over the years). Eugenio Martinez, one of the Watergate burglars, was still on a \$100-a-month CIA retainer when he joined E. Howard Hunt's Cuban-American team for Beverly Hills and Washington break-ins. All the other Hunt accomplices were ex-CIA personnel. Miami law enforcement authorities remain highly concerned about the ac-

tivities of CIA-connected Cubans, many of them armed, in local crime. There is talk of a "Cuban Mafia" using CIA Cubans, and there have been numerous instances of terror bombings and assassinations. But the local police and even the FBI often find that some Cubans with criminal records are "untouchable" because of CIA protection and invocation of "national security."

"Support East" uses the facilities of Miami International University for operations in Latin America and provides technical and financial support for far-flung CIA missions. But, most important of all, it controls a worldwide network of double agents under Operation SEEBOLT, one of the most sensitive CIA missions. A special staff known as the "Green Light Group" runs SEEBOLT on behalf of the agency's Clandestine Services chiefs in Washington. It is in close touch with the Inter-Agency Defectors' Committee (IDA), a major source of double agents. Despite many valid objections to turning an American city into a major espionage center, CIA officials insist privately that this activity is all really part of foreign operations.

The Miami group has its counterpart, Support Station West, in Burlingame, California. This station, near San Francisco, concentrates on Asian operations in roughly the same manner in which the Miami station works on Latin America and Europe. There is also a large covert CIA station in Denver, and there is one in Las Vegas, where the Mafia provides a fertile field for foreign and domestic intelligence.

2. In the overlapping of the CIA's foreign and domestic functions, the agency's representatives in Los Angeles first persuaded Howard Hughes's Summa Corporation to build the \$350 million (in taxpayers' money) deep-sea mining ship, the *Glomar Explorer*, and then went to the Los Angeles County tax assessor to inform him in secrecy that the vessel belonged to the United States government. The Summa Corporation thus was not subject to local taxes in excess of \$9 million. But this is where the CIA got caught in its own game of secrecy: the ship's license, filed under oath with the Coast Guard, states that the *Glomar Explorer* belongs to the Hughes interests. Los Angeles County was thus cheated out of taxes. Inasmuch as the CIA did the lying, it may well become the target of tax fraud prosecution. The same may happen with federal taxes, although the IRS has not yet been heard from, and we may face the extraordinary situation of a federal agency (IRS) suing another federal agency (CIA) for tax fraud. And there is the additional fact that the CIA representatives were introduced to the tax assessor by an FBI agent, suggesting further intra-governmental collusion. The CIA's request that the tax assessor cooperate in the secret cover is another example of the agency's domestic activities that often verge on the illegal.

This story is further complicated by Global Marine Inc., a publicly held company (unlike the Summa Corporation) which designed and operated the *Glomar Explorer* for Summa and the CIA. Under Securities and Exchange Commission rules, public companies must provide "full disclosure" of their activities. Global Marine chafed up profits from the *Glomar Explorer* operations, but, according to an SEC staff study, its public reports were "inaccurate and incomplete due to the classified aspects." Thus far the SEC has been reluctant to make a broad ruling on Global Marine's public reporting. If one is

made, however, it would affect other public companies with secret CIA contracts, possibly blowing their covers.

3. In the CIA's operation of its vast corporate activities—the so-called "proprietary" companies—the agency has always badly needed the secretive cooperation of federal and state authorities. It is, of course, a matter of subsequent legal determination whether the incorporation of the proprietaries and their operations have been in violation of laws. The existence of the CIA corporate empire, estimated at some \$200 million annually in sales and services, has long been a secret and there have been no court tests of the legality of these proprietary companies. Since none of these companies has publicly owned stock, problems with the SEC are unlikely to arise.

The CIA began putting together its proprietary corporate network in the early 1950s in order to acquire domestic and foreign covers for secret operations. And to channel funds discreetly to its overseas operatives. Only top CIA officials know how many of these companies are or have been in existence—what is known of the operation suggests that the agency has been closing down some of them and creating others, according to need—but the system is being used to this day. Colby, in fact, confirmed it earlier this year when he denied a charge that profits generated by the proprietaries can be used for covert foreign operations, thus bypassing restrictions written into law by Congress late in 1974.

Most of the proprietaries were incorporated in Delaware, a state that does not levy local corporate taxes, and there are reasons to believe that the CIA even has its own incorporating company in Dover to handle the business away from prying eyes. CIA officials say, however, that in some instances officials in the office of the Delaware secretary of state had to be informed of the true nature of the proprietaries to avoid blowing the CIA covers.

Probably the oldest major proprietary is the Pacific Corporation, with headquarters in a third-floor suite in an office building at 1725 K Street in Washington. Incorporated in 1950, Pacific is one of the principal CIA holding companies because it provides financial and management controls for other important proprietaries. Pacific's president is Hugh L. Grundy, believed to be a long-time CIA official, who actually lives just a few blocks away from the agency's Langley headquarters.

Operating directly under Pacific are Air America, Inc., the "private" CIA airline that has operated planes and helicopters for years throughout Indochina in support of the agency's "clandestine army" in Laos and other paramilitary activities. Air America is funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), which has often served as a cover for the CIA's operations in Asia and elsewhere. The CIA refunds AID through a complex bookkeeping system involving the concealment of CIA appropriations throughout the federal budget.

Pacific also owns Civil Air Transport Co. Ltd., a Taiwan-based scheduled airline known as CAT. CAT, in turn, owns major aircraft repair and overhaul facilities on Taiwan. The third known CIA airline is Southern Air Transport Inc., which is also the most mysterious. Southern (not to be confused with Southern Airways), located at 1625 K Street in Washington in a building

with a number of unusually large antennas on the roof, has interlocking directorships with Air America. Between 1966 and 1972 it leased aircraft from Air America as well as from Air Asia Co. Ltd., another proprietary controlled by Pacific. According to Federal Aviation Administration records, the present ownership of at least four jet transports leased from Air America and subsequently returned to it is "unknown." These planes, in fact, are not even registered anymore with the FAA. At present, Southern owns three transport planes, one of them a DC-6 (bought from Air Asia). A DC-6B was sold to Ethiopian Airlines in 1972.

(Southern's attorney is James H. Bastian, who is vice-president and secretary of the Pacific Corporation. Bastian, incidentally, is the registered owner of several apparently uninhabited townhouses in Washington.)

Most of Southern's operations have been in Latin America, including eight flights to Chile in 1971 (on earthquake relief missions for LAN, the Chilean national airline, according to a CAB certification) when the late president Salvador Allende was still in power, but very little is known of the current use of its planes. Its operational headquarters are in Miami, but at one point Southern was leasing one of its aircraft to a U.S. oil company working in the Niger in Africa and another to a company in Alaska.

Late in 1973, Southern was officially for sale and it filed a petition with the CAB for "cancellation of certificates" for charter routes. But the airline then changed its mind, and on December 31, 1973, became a "commercial operator" under FAA Regulation 121. No longer under the CAB's operating authority, Southern has greatly increased its anonymity—it no longer has to file documents showing aircraft purchased or sold, detailed financial statements, and a log of all civil operations listing the number of hours flown by aircraft types, tonnage carried on each route, intermediate stops, and the number of trips made over each route. As a "121" contract operator, Southern has no restrictions on where it may fly—except those by foreign governments. Under the new status, Southern cannot advertise for commercial work, but this seems to be the least of its worries.

Other Pacific subsidiaries include the Pacific Engineering Co. and the Thai Pacific Services Co. Ltd. The nature of their activities is unknown. Foreign Air Transport Development Inc., another proprietary, has gone out of business. And over the years the CIA and its subsidiaries have dealt with such companies as Lao Air Development Inc., operating in Laos under Air America, and Birdair, the company that flew the Cambodian airlift for the U.S. air force in 1974 and 1975.

Acting through other channels, the CIA had been funding since 1965 a Washington firm named Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc., whose function was to conduct psychological assessments of American citizens hired for foreign employment and to study brainwashing techniques of foreign intelligence agencies. PAA was organized by two former CIA officials, Samuel B. Lyerly and Robert E. Goodnow. (Goodnow has since gone to live in Australia for unexplained reasons.) PAA operates in complete secrecy. Admission to the office, in a residential uptown section of Washington, is obtained by pushing a buzzer so that the door may be opened. But PAA's present directors are not available

for interviews and the CIA has refused comments on its links with the company.

As a rule, CIA proprietaries pay taxes and meet other official requirements, but CIA director Colby had to arrange for a special dispensation from the now defunct Price Commission so that Pacific Corporation's books would not have to be opened for the commission's inspection.

In addition to proprietaries, the CIA runs "fronts" and "conduits" through companies it does not run outright but supports financially. The fronts and the conduits provide covers for CIA operations at home and abroad. The best known of the fronts was the now disbanded Robert R. Mullen public relations company that employed E. Howard Hunt after his resignation from the CIA in 1971 until his involvement in the Watergate break-in. Interestingly the Mullen company also handled a public relations account for the Howard Hughes interests. The company, as it developed in 1974, was controlled by a full-time CIA case officer. There are many other such fronts.

Some of the most interesting CIA conduits—channels for transmission of funds and other materials—were the German companies broken up after the war by the Allied military authorities. These companies included such giants as the Farbenindustrie A.G., the huge Nazi conglomerate, and there are indications that the CIA planted its agents in new firms resulting from postwar decentralization, including their United States subsidiaries. These and other companies—some of them famous American business institutions—serve the CIA through the supply of invoices for materials and services that were never rendered so that money can be easily shifted abroad for the agency's operations. It was through the branch offices of a large New York-based banking and currency firm that the CIA sold dollars for piastres in the black market in Vietnam.

4. The case of the B.R. Fox Company. According to its letterhead this company specialized in "custom designed electronic specialties," but in reality it manufactured lethal explosive devices. As noted earlier, there is no direct evidence to connect Fox to the CIA. However, one of its directors, Michael Morrissey, had past links with the CIA's Paramilitary Operations Branch, according to agency officials. It is also known that Morrissey, according to memoranda written by him, had been in contact with Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein, a former senior CIA official currently serving with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Conein admitted to newsmen that he had been approached by Morrissey, but insisted he never became involved in any dealings with him.

Fox, which operated from a warehouse at 2701 Fairview Drive in Alexandria, Virginia (it also had an office at 15 Abingdon Square in New York City), produced a line of "Astro" horror items. These lethal devices included explosive-filled telephone handsets, booby-trapped magazine clips for the M-16 rifle, flashlights and cigarette packs full of explosives, a "fragmentation ball," and an exploding camera.

Fox's catalogue notes that "the information contained herein is CLASSIFIED by the manufacturer for U.S. Government use only. The handling and storage of this material should be done so mindful of its sensitive nature." This is the explosive phone handset device is described: "Size 1.25" x

75" x 0.5". Use the inside telephone handset. Automatic charge fired at (blank) seconds following lifting of instrument handset. Easy and quick installation to underside of mouthpiece. Any desired time delay can be preset. No switches, presetting, or batteries. Simply install 4-wire module. . . . Miniature unit . . . rugged and durable. All band wired. Unlimited lifetime with proper handling."

The exploding cigarette pack, described as an "anti-disturbance explosive," functions as follows: "Electronics and explosive module packed inside cigarette pack. When the pack is lifted or moved in any manner, the explosive is set off. Simple operation. Only one switch. . . . A built-in electronic counter is factory set for 90 seconds to allow time for evacuation of the area. . . . The circuit will stay armed for a period of 2½ to 3 years. . . . Explosives are not included and is the only thing to be added." In the flashlight, the catalogue explains, the "normal On/Off switch on the side activates the operation." Then the catalogue adds: "This is an example of an explosive anti-disturbance dummy unit. Any other items desired to be so modified may be submitted for such evaluation."

That the CIA may have been the intended, if not actual, client for the Astro line is suggested in Fox's classified catalogue, which says that the explosive devices "have been designed and manufactured for sale to authorized agencies of the United States government, specifically intended for application outside of this country." A well-informed government official remarked in an interview that "I can't think of anybody outside the CIA who would want to buy this kind of stuff—and I'm not even sure the CIA would." But the mystery remains: if the CIA was not the client, for whom was Fox working? Moreover, as we've said earlier, Fox never requested or obtained the required license for manufacturing explosives in Fairfax County. How did Fox get around it?

Nobody seems to know what has happened with these assassination devices after Fox Company suddenly went out of business. It may be something the Rockefeller Commission and the congressional committees will wish to explore as they look into charges that the CIA has been involved in foreign assassination plots.

5. The CIA is explicitly forbidden by law to exercise domestic police functions. But it has secretly collaborated with numerous police departments throughout the U.S. in support of their political intelligence functions. One of the most notable examples was the agency's "formal liaison" with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., going back to the late 1940s. Maurice J. Cullinane, the new MPD chief, acknowledged in a report last March that the Washington police borrowed agents, automobiles, and electronic surveillance equipment from the CIA to help them spy on political activists in the capital. This "Cullinane Report" was one of the most detailed admissions by any U.S. police department on its political intelligence work. The department's intelligence division spent \$1.7 million since 1968 on political surveillance. The relationship between the CIA and the Washington police became particularly active in 1969, when the agency trained at least seventeen MPD officers, twelve of them in "intelligence activity." The CIA gave the department what was described as "portable lamps capable of intercepting oral commu-

nications." Even the department's morals squad received wiretap devices from the CIA. Between 1968 and December 1974, the Washington police had also been training "selected CIA employees" in interrogation techniques. Police departments in the Washington area have also provided CIA officials with local police credentials to facilitate domestic undercover work.

Former CIA director James Schlesinger suspected the CIA may have been engaging in illegal activities shortly after he replaced Richard M. Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran. In an internal memorandum to "all CIA employees" sent out on May 9, 1973, Schlesinger said:

"I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in the CIA can make to the national security of the United States. I am taking several actions to implement this objective: I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency. I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6353) and say that he wishes to talk to me about 'activities outside CIA's charter.' . . . Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director . . . immediately."

Schlesinger evidently received substantial response to his request because Colby, when he succeeded him later in 1973, began turning evidence over to the Justice Department for investigation and possible prosecution. However, for reasons that remain unclear, Colby apparently failed to notify the president of his move. Ford became aware of it only after the domestic spying scandal broke out late in 1974.

Subsequently, David Blee, deputy director of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (Clandestine Services), advised CIA employees by memorandum that they should retain private counsel in the event of legal proceedings against them in connection with the Justice Department's investigation.

But the CIA is not alone when it comes to illegal domestic political operations aimed at American citizens. The FBI, as we now are beginning to discover, was among the culprits. The new attorney general, Edward H. Levi, told a congressional subcommittee earlier this year that J. Edgar Hoover had amassed at least 164 files containing folders with information, some of it derogatory, on "presidents, executive branch employees, and seventeen individuals who were members of Congress." The files were marked "OC," meaning "Official and Confidential." Levi added that the existence of these files was not made known by the FBI to the Justice Department, of which the FBI is a part, until early 1975. In other words, the Hoover files were a secret from dozens of attorneys general over the years. (The present FBI director, Clarence M. Kelley, never told Levi's predecessor, former attorney

general William B. Saxbe, about them.)

Under a secret program known as COINTELPRO, initiated by Hoover in 1956, the FBI ran for years a counterintelligence operation aimed at domestic dissenters. Although the program was formally terminated in April 1971, these activities, including the harassment of radicals, went on at least until 1973. Among COINTELPRO's targets were the Socialist Workers' Party, the Young Socialist Alliance, the "New Left," American Communists, "black extremists," and "white hate groups." COINTELPRO was originally aimed at foreign intelligence agents in the United States, a proper FBI function, but Hoover, without clearance from successive attorneys general, applied it to domestic groups as well.

In 1969, for example, the FBI sent a fake threatening letter to a black Baptist minister, Donald W. Jackson, to force him to abandon his civil rights work at Tougaloo College in Mississippi. The letter was sent in the name of a nonexistent "Tougaloo College Defense Committee," whose members were said to be armed. And in 1972, a Florida resident was recruited by the FBI to infiltrate and disrupt radical groups in the United States and Canada. The informant, Joseph A. Burton, told newspaper interviewers that as late as 1974 he was told by the FBI of its efforts to put the Vietnam Veterans Against the War out of business in Florida.

One of the FBI's most astonishing unauthorized efforts was against the small Socialist Workers' Party and its affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance. The party had not been prosecuted since 1945, but the FBI files on the disruption program runs to an amazing 573 pages. The bureau's harassment of the party reached the point where, last December, a federal judge in New York ordered the FBI to desist from conducting surveillance on a national convention of the Young Socialist Alliance. Another instance of unauthorized FBI activity came to light when it was learned that the security chief of the American Indian Movement during the Wounded Knee takeover in 1973 had been a paid FBI informer. Evidently, neither Hoover's death nor Watergate has taught the FBI anything about the need to observe the constitutional rights of Americans.

It seems as if every government agency has been involved in some form of spying on Americans. Thus the CIA, with the cooperation of postal officials, has been intercepting, reading, and copying since 1953 uncensored thousands of first-class letters written by Americans to addresses in the Soviet Union. Former CIA director Richard Helms refused to stop the interception in 1969, but Colby testified that the agency suspended the operation in February 1973. He admitted the program was "illegal." So frantic was this mail reading by the government that the CIA developed, at great cost, a special machine to unseal and reseal envelopes of every conceivable size in a matter of seconds.

During 1974 the U.S. Postal Service surveilled and recorded the origins of all mail received by nearly 4,500 Americans. The CIA was no longer requesting such mail covers last year, but the Postal Service was acting on the behalf of the Naval Intelligence Service; the Army Intelligence Command; the Air Force Special Command; the Air Force Special Investigations Office; the Interstate Commerce Commission; the

ure Department; the IRS; the FBI; the Postal Inspection Service; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Secret Service; the Coast Guard; the Interior Department; the Labor Department; the Justice Department; the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Customs; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and a vast number of local police departments and tax offices.

The Internal Revenue Service, through its special service staff, was also involved in domestic espionage. A congressional investigation established that the IRS had 1,458 files on individuals and organizations (including 706 persons from Nixon's "enemies list") for reasons that clearly had nothing to do with tax collection. In Miami, the IRS cranked up its "Operation Lep-

rechaun" designed to assemble data on the sex and drinking habits of prominent residents, including the state's attorney.

The National Security Agency, a super-secret outfit dealing with code breaking and electronic intelligence, is currently continuing to monitor all overseas telephone calls and cables. During the Nixon period, the NSA was an enthusiastic supporter of Nixon's domestic intelligence program, particularly when it came to breaking into foreign embassies. Admiral Noel Gayler, then the NSA director, has been rewarded with the post of commander-in-chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC).

There could be an endless list of the intrusions of our government into our private lives. Let us conclude with three of the more

striking examples: in 1969 Henry Kissinger recommended names of his closest aides and several newsmen to be bugged by the FBI for "national security" reasons; the CIA investigated the personal life of a Nixon campaign adviser in 1968; and a deputy attorney general proposed in 1975 that "internal passports" be issued to aliens in the United States, a step that could have led to a national identification system on the Soviet model. However Attorney General Levi vetoed the scheme.

Spying and covert activity is now an official government pastime in the United States. Can the president or Congress arrest this trend toward an American police state? The answer is vital in determining the kind of society in which we will live. **Q-T-A**

EDITOR & PUBLISHER
14 JUNE 1975

CIA inquiry confirms investigative stories

As a result of a *New York Times* investigation first published on December 22, 1974, the Rockefeller Commission this week (June 10) released a report that substantially confirms allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted unlawful and uncontrolled domestic operations.

On the release date, the commission also recommended tightened controls on the agency and criticized the Justice Department for abdicating "its statutory duties" for more than 20 years in a secret agreement with the CIA.

The events of the week substantiated stories that both plagued President Ford's administration in its early days and shocked Washingtonians from the highest levels down.

Although hardly as shattering as the Watergate revelations, the CIA investigation revealed a number of suspect operations conducted by the agency long before the commission report.

Among early allegations by Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh and others were:

—charges that the CIA had established files on at least 10,000 American citizens as part of a special agency unit. This now has been confirmed by the commission which said that a unit called Operation CHAOS had maintained 13,000 files on individuals as well as 11,000 FBI memoranda and 3,500 internal memoranda. A computer system, it was revealed, has indexed over 300,000 names and organizations that apparently are not connected with espionage. An additional 800 files were created on dissenting organizations with some 12,000 to 16,000 names indexed in them.

—charges that the CIA had used illegal methods for their operations including break-ins, wiretaps, and mail inspection that began as early as the 1950s. The commission found that the CIA had logged 32 wiretaps, 32 buggings, 12 break-ins. None were conducted under a judicial warrant and only one was with the approval of the Attorney General. Further, mail openings in New York City alone accounted for more than 4,350,000 incidents.

—charges that the CIA had followed anti-war and other causes demon-

tors. This was confirmed.

—charges that the CIA had set up a network of informants in anti-war groups. This too was confirmed although the commission reported that CIA actions went far beyond just monitoring such organizations.

—charges that the CIA had placed members of Congress under surveillance. This too was confirmed.

—charges that the agency had destroyed many of the files proving its guilt just prior to the CIA investigation. In this instance, the commission found that some files on a test of LSD on persons who were unaware they were being tested were destroyed. In one instance, a person died (1953).

—charges that the CIA had established a secretive unit for domestic intelligence operations. The report confirmed that Operation CHAOS was indeed this unit and that in some instances had overstepped its legal authority.

Further in the report, it was revealed that among those individuals kept under surveillance by the CIA were newsmen who were watched in five different investigations in an effort to determine their sources who leaked classified information.

The report's section on reported plots to assassinate foreign leaders has been withheld although the commission has collected information on the subject.

The one allegation that the report pointedly did not confirm was the use

of the word "massive" in conjunction with CIA operations. According to Times associate editor, Clifton Daniel, the commission report avoided the word and used in its place terms such as "considerable," "large scale" and "substantial."

The commission report served a dual purpose in the eyes of many reporters. The first was its confirmation of reports by Hersh as well as some allegations made by a former CIA Inspector General. This confirmation, many feel, was necessary since the running of stories on the highly secretive CIA was considered both daring and, at times perhaps, speculative.

The second purpose was to clear the Rockefeller commission of any charges of a possible whitewash of the entire subject, although several things including the assassination attempts were withheld from the public.

Daniels' article in the June 11 edition of the Times traced the history of the story from its appearance to William E. Colby, director of the CIA, who denied the allegations.

Daniel reported that on January 16, Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger and principal editors had met with President Ford for a luncheon at the White House. During this occasion, Daniel reported, "... the President, under questioning, used the word 'assassinations' in a discussion of the activities of the CIA." His conversation was off-the-record, however.

As well as tighter restrictions through a Congressional committee, the commission also suggested that the President tighten executive control by making the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board an effective watch-dog agency, open the CIA director's job to people outside the government and put a 10-year limit on the director's term of service.

PARADE • JUNE 15, 1975

Q. I understand that Columbia Pictures is secretly negotiating with Victor Marchetti, author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, to write a film called *The Director*. It would be based on the clandestine activities in Italy of William Colby, director of the CIA. In this film Colby would be depicted as having fallen in love with Clare Boothe Luce, who was U.S. Ambassador to Rome when Colby was CIA chief there. Is any of this so?—L.G., McLean, Va.

A. Marchetti and a Hollywood studio have been discussing a screenplay to be entitled *The Director*.

THE MIAMI HERALD
12 JUNE 1975

Covert Action Is Called Vital To Counterbalance the Soviets

By MIKE ACKERMAN
With WILLIAM MONTALBANO
(c) 1975, Miami Herald Publishing Co.

Intelligence is like an air conditioner in the summertime. It is nice to have. But it is no good unless you use it.

The Soviet KGB and the Cuban DGI are experts in translating intelligence into effective covert action. They use a worldwide network of allied Communist parties to help.

The CIA must be able to counterbalance these activities. That, pure and simple, is the case for covert action. However great the uproar in the United States over its propriety, covert action is a necessary tool of the CIA.

AN EXAMPLE:

One steamy morning in a Latin American country a few years ago, a source tipped me that a Communist group was secretly plotting a takeover of the port workers' union. They planned to sow discord among the workers by spreading rumors of corruption, by disrupting meetings, and by stealing an upcoming election through a secret sympathizer on the election committee.

That was intelligence. The Communist takeover could have mortally wounded a new, weak and unstable democratic government.

My CIA station chief directed me to act on the intelligence. I sought out the incumbent union leader, a tough, basically honest but unlettered former stevedore. I told him what the Communists were planning, and I offered to help him.

FOR TWO WEEKS, I lived with the man in a safe house outside the capital city. By the time he went back to his union, he knew propaganda theory; he knew how to counter Communist attempts at disruption; he knew how to guard against election-rigging. He was his country's foremost authority on parliamentary procedure. He also had a modest sum of money to start a health insurance plan among his workers.

He won the election. The new government still had its problems, but at least it did not also have a Communist union threatening to close down the country's ports.

That was covert action. Most of the operations I ran between 1965 and 1970 as a CIA street man were in this field. I worked in Latin America and in Africa.

Covert action is an attempt to clandestinely influence the politics of another country without showing your own hand. Like it or not, it is a major part of the intelligence business.

To those who insist we have no business interfering in the affairs of other countries, I say, "Fine, if no one else will interfere either."

EVERY MAJOR intelligence agency in the world has covert action specialists. It is true of the British MI-6, the French SDT, the Israeli Mossad, and it is even more emphatically true of the Soviets, the Cubans, the Chinese and the East European satellites. All use covert action as an adjunct to diplomacy.

Once, the CIA leaned heavily on covert action as a clandestine means of furthering the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, as a halfway house between diplomatic gumbating and military intervention.

Today, if the CIA again needed to help the Latin American union leader, it would legally have to advise between 50 and 150 members of the House and Senate. In those circumstances, it might as well take an ad in The New York Times.

In countries where covert action used to be the CIA's bread and butter program, the term isn't even heard anymore. I know that firsthand.

About five years ago, the CIA — rightfully — began cutting back its covert-action operations. The agency recognized that it didn't need covert operations in every banana republic.

NOW, THE PENDULUM has swung too far the other way. We are out of the business altogether.

The Soviet KGB admits to no restraint. Cuba's DGI encounters no public pressure to curtail its widespread international activities. We have dropped our guard, but they keep punching.

Covert action can follow many paths, and the Soviets and the Cubans have been down all of them.

In the mid-1960s, local terrorists allied with the DGI firebombed the offices of a moderate newspaper in one Latin American country. I passed funds to the publisher to get the newspaper back on the street.

In another country, Communist infiltrators secretly engineered the takeover of a Muslim religious organization, intending to use it as a platform for anti-government and anti-American propaganda.

I FORMED a counter organization that was more rigorously orthodox. It was nonpolitical. Given an alternative, the country's serious Muslims opted for what some of my CIA friends teasingly called the "Abdul Ibn Ackerman Benevolent Society."

In another country, Communist agents were successful in placing one of their sympathizers in the

party.

In a prolonged and often angry dialogue with a young moderate who was a natural antagonist of the sympathizer, I persuaded him to enter public life. He did, and came to be a vital counterweight to Communist influence. He may one day be his country's president.

On other occasions, I worked with another union leader to break a general strike called by the Communists to upset an elected Latin American government. Once, I provided advice and financial aid to African politicians locked in an election battle with Communist and Communist-leaning parties.

Although covert action is usually directed against a clear Communist threat, there are exceptions.

Once in Latin America I worked covertly with other case officers to help cool both sides in a Latin American border dispute that came perilously close to bloodshed.

THE MOST EFFECTIVE covert operations are not the ones that make headlines.

In Moscow, the KGB never makes headlines. It is well-trained, well-financed and historically committed to the art of covert action. It is the pride of a society which has elevated conspiracy to a life-style.

Americans take for granted that back-room maneuvering plays a large role in their own domestic political flux. Why do they then recoil with horror at the reality of clandestine political intrigue at the international level?

International politics is not a polite bridge game. There are no Marquis of Queensbury rules. The choice between black hats and white hats is not always clear.

Often, the CIA is criticized for backing right-wing dictatorships as an alternative to Communism.

But if you ask me whether the United States is better off with a friendly military junta than with a hostile Communist government, my answer is "Yes."

MILITARY JUNTAS do not last forever. They allow for the possibility of eventual change toward more democratic forms.

Perhaps Communist dictatorships don't last forever either. But the fact is that no institutionalized Communist government has ever been overthrown.

Even in countries where they do not hold power, Communist parties pose a clear and present danger of irreversible dictatorial change.

They are organized conspiratorially. They play the game of covert action to the hilt. Often, they have

NEW YORK TIMES
24 June 1975

Soviet Intelligence Agents Reportedly Intercept and Record Phone Conversations in U.S.

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23—The Soviet intelligence service has been able for at least a year to intercept and record telephone conversations within the United States between Government officials, military leaders and private citizens, according to informed Federal intelligence officials.

One official said today that the National Security Agency, which has the responsibility of insuring the security of domestic communications, had been aware of the practice "for some time," but that there was "nothing that can be done about it, absolutely nothing."

The reason, he said, was that the interceptions were made at the point that the conversations, chiefly long-distance ones but including some cross-town calls, entered the extensive microwave relay network that passed them through the air to satellites or between the radio relay stations that stretch across the United States.

Sensitive Channels Separated

The Russians, the official said, had developed the ability to separate certain sensitive channels from the myriad of frequencies that make up these transmissions, allowing them to monitor calls to and from "the military, Congress, anybody—you name it, they can do it."

A White House official familiar with the Soviet operation, which until two weeks ago was among the American Government's best-kept secrets, said that telephone calls placed and received by members of Congress "undoubtedly must be among those that were overheard."

A spokesman for Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who heads the Senate committee investigating intelligence activities, said today that the panel's staff had been instructed to find out how long such external eavesdropping had been going on and what had been overheard.

tary, the press, the police. When the right moment comes, they can act with terrifying speed.

That is what happened in Portugal. The speed of the Communist rise to power there did not surprise me. The tactics the Communists used there are not new.

But they have seldom been as successful as they were in Lisbon. Perhaps there is a reason why not.

My conviction is that communism has not prospered more because the CIA's Clandestine Services, through covert action, has served as a powerful check on Communist aspirations.

That check, that vital balance, no longer exists.

The first hint that foreign operatives might be eavesdropping on domestic telephone communications inside this country was a brief allusion to that possibility in the recently released report of President Ford's commission that investigated the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Chicago Tribune reported today that a six-page section of the report containing the reference, prepared by Vice President Rockefeller, who headed the commission, had been "censored" for security reasons by White House, State Department and N.S.A. officials.

Censoring Denied

A spokesman for the Vice

President said today, however, that the report "was not censored by anyone," although the commission had sought "the advice of experts on classification as to certain sensitive matters," and that as a result a few passages have been "rephrased."

The interception of electronic intelligence, or "elint," as it is known, has become within the last two decades an increasingly costly and time-consuming undertaking of both the Soviet and American intelligence communities, and to a lesser degree of the other technologically advanced nations as well.

The United States, for example, reportedly developed the ability some years ago to

listen in, via a satellite poised over Moscow, to the conversations of Soviet leaders over radio-telephones installed in their limousines.

One former intelligence official described today the collection of such intelligence as "very expensive" because of the resources required to monitor and cull it, and of "very marginal value" because of its sheer bulk and the fact that much of it was case in indecipherable codes.

Officials said today that the Soviet interception of microwave telephone transmissions was believed to have been accomplished with fixed antennas, such as those on the roof of the Soviet Embassy here.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
2 June 1975

US shares its intelligence secrets with the Shah

From SIMON WINCHESTER, Washington, June 1

A secret deal between the Persian Government and a big American defence contractor, which leaked into the press here today, would not only have further strengthened Iran's domination of the Middle East oil regions but have compromised some of America's most sensitive intelligence secrets.

The project was the building of an intelligence communications system, at a price which could be as high as \$500,000, in the heart of the Shah's increasingly powerful empire. The corporation involved is Rockwell International, which is based in California.

The story began with a series of ostensibly unremarkable advertisements which started appearing in newspapers across this country last November including one on the sports page of a Washington paper, and which called for "engineers, operators and analysts" who had a keen interest in "communications analysis, voice processing, and intelligence operations."

These ads, it has now been disclosed, were the initial phase of the big deal, which is now being regarded with acute concern here.

The fear about the loss of US secrets has arisen because,

as part of the deal Iran has won the right to recruit former members of two of America's most clandestine intelligence agencies, to help to build the new message-intercepting and code-breaking centre.

The contract with Rockwell, made it is understood at the Shah's personal request and signed with the blessing of a little known State Department office, calls for the recruiting of former officers of the National Security Agency and its Air Force subsidiary, the Air Force Security Service.

Both of these agencies, which make it their business to collect radio, cable and diplomatic traffic intelligence from all over the world and subject it to the most sophisticated kind of code-breaking, operate with a degree of secrecy that makes CIA sound like the local public library.

The new Persian agreement — which goes under the code name "Ibex" — is unique in that it is the first time American military aid has been provided without any kind of continual supervision by the US Government.

It is assumed that the Shah's immense and growing influence in Washington, and his close personal ties to the US Ambassador in Tehran, the former CIA chief, Richard Helms, led

to the writing of this extraordinary contract.

The contract document, believed to have been signed in February or March, called for Rockwell to start a programme, to take between five and 10 years, to build the intelligence system, and an initial payment of \$50 millions was demanded.

The proposed facility will make use—in much the same way as the NSA headquarters at Fort Mead, Maryland — a battery of expensive and sophisticated radio monitoring apparatus, with a number of electronic monitors carried in C130 aircraft on constant intelligence-gathering patrols. Ibex, it is thought likely, will be of special use against Soviet forces and diplomats based in neighbouring Iraq.

But the Americans concede that many more producers of radio and cable traffic in the Persian Gulf region could, in theory, be monitored by the Shah's new facility — and American military groups themselves could have their radio messages so listened to.

There is concern that internal security work may be performed by the radio monitors: the Persian secret police for example, could use them to locate dissident groups in the remoter parts of rural Iran.

LE MONDE

Paris, 12 June 1975

CONTROL TO BE RESTORED

It would be easy to write that the Rockefeller report on the CIA contains no new elements for action concerning the abuse of power which, since the end of last year, some American opinion had been looking forward to. It confirms at least three-fourths of the accusations made against the Agency (more precisely, the Central Intelligence Agency) last December by our colleague of the New York Times, Seymour Hirsh. In the wake of his investigations, "revelations", "leaks", calculated indiscretions, etc. have abundantly nourished the curiosity of the public, which saw for the first time a little opening of the cover of the sanctuary of the American state.

Two points need to be made at the very outset. The first is the very fact that there is a commission of inquiry appointed by the President, which today has submitted the result of its investigations. It should also be noted that the task of Mr. Rockefeller and his associates was precisely circumscribed, namely to focus on "counter-espionage" operations conducted domestically by the CIA. This concerns legal matters with diverse, complex aspects which are secondary when compared with the wide range of external actions based on the large technical capabilities for intercepting and decoding signals in the atmosphere which the "place" ("maison") in Langley, outside Washington, has become known for in our time.

The three hundred pages of the Rockefeller report contain a documentation which one may still judge to be inadequate but one could not imagine the issuance of a similar report in any Western democracy.

The second point is that it is disastrous that an organization with the great mission that the CIA has, frequently became involved in actions beyond its assigned mission: it matters little that it occurred most often at the instigation of the White House that the CIA compromised itself on affairs which were not within its competence. And just an off-hand remark about the negligence of Congress which over a twenty-year period has not shown the slightest sign of taking a close look as to what was going on and was carried out under the name of the three famous initials.

As a matter of fact, the responsibility of the Congress is perhaps a heavier one than that of the Executive. For, it is the legislator who is concerned here: it is he who defines the prerogatives of the important services of the nation. All irregularities revealed and condemned in the Rockefeller report are deemed to be "against the law": for sure, they are not compatible with good sense and good taste. Legally, things are little bit more delicate. The act by which the CIA came into existence, the "charter" invoqued to prevent its involvement in domestic police functions, dates back to 1947 and is not marked by clear logic. It has, among other things, been erased and overloaded with and superceded by hundreds of "directives" from the White House, some general in nature others more specific; they constitute what is called - officially! - the "secret charter" of the CIA. It seems that the White House has decided to refer the integration of this confusing matter to Senator Frank Church, who heads a commission of inquiry of the Senate on the conduct attributed to the CIA. He firmly intends not only to change the practices but also the statutes of the obscure institution.

The CIA has shown by its cooperation with the Rockefeller inquiry as well as with the two special Congressional commissions which were created for the same reason and in the same spirit, that it is vitally interested not to come out of the shadow but out of the semi-darkness into which certain of its marginal activities had spread, to devote itself in good conscience to that which will always be its untouchable and hence irreproachable domaine: espionage abroad, worldwide by a super-power.

Un controle à restaurer

Il serait facile d'écrire que le rapport Rockefeller sur la C.I.A. n'apporte pas d'éléments nouveaux sur le procès en abus de pouvoir que, depuis le début de l'année, lui intente une partie de l'opinion américaine. Il confirme au moins aux trois quarts les accusations portées en décembre dernier contre l'« agence » (puisqu'il s'agit, pour être précis, de la Central Intelligence Agency) par notre confrère du « New-York Times », M. Seymour Hersh. Dans le sillage de son enquête, « révélations », « fuites », indiscrétions dirigées, ont surabondamment nourri la curiosité du public, qui voyait pour la première fois s'entreouvrir le voile de ce sanctuaire de la raison d'Etat américaine.

Deux remarques s'imposent d'emblée. La première est le fait même qu'il y ait eu commission présidentielle d'enquête et que celle-ci livre aujourd'hui le résultat de ses investigations. Encore faut-il noter que la tâche de M. Rockefeller et de ses assistants était étroitement circonscrite aux aspects des opérations de « contre-espionnage » intérieur menées par la C.I.A. Il s'agit là d'aspects litigieux à de nombreux points de vue, mais plus que secondaires en

comparaison du rayon d'action extérieur de l'immense laboratoire à ficher et à décoder l'univers que la « maison » de Langley, aux environs de Washington, est devenue de nos jours.

Les trois cents pages du rapport Rockefeller contiennent une documentation qu'on pourra toujours juger insuffisante, mais dont on n'imagine pas l'équivalent dans une autre démocratie occidentale.

Seconde remarque : s'il est fatal qu'une organisation de l'ampleur de la C.I.A. soit fréquemment tentée d'entrepasser le cadre des missions qui lui sont assignées, il n'en reste pas moins que c'est le plus souvent à l'instigation de la Maison Blanche que la C.I.A. s'est compromise dans des affaires qui n'étaient pas de sa compétence. Et ne parlons que pour mémoire de l'incurie du Congrès qui, vingt ans durant, n'a pas montré la moindre velléité de regarder de près ce qui se passait et se pétrait à l'enseigne des fameuses trois initiales.

En la matière, sa responsabilité est peut-être encore plus lourde que celle de l'exécutif. Car c'est à lui, le législateur, s'il s'en soucie, qu'il revient de définir les attributions des grands services de la nation. Toutes les irrégularités relevées et dénoncées par le rapport Rockefeller sont censées être « contraires à la loi » : à coup

sûr, elles sont contraires au bon sens et au bon goût. En droit, les choses sont beaucoup plus floues. L'acte de naissance de la C.I.A., la « charte » invoquée pour condamner son ingérence dans la police intérieure, date de 1947, et n'est pas d'une logique limpide. Il a été, en outre, raturé et surchargé par les centaines de « directives » émanant de la Maison Blanche, tantôt de style général, tantôt d'usage particulier, qui constituent ce qu'on appelle — officiellement ! — la « charte secrète » de la C.I.A. Il semble que la Maison Blanche ait pris la décision de transmettre l'intégralité de ce fatras au sénateur Frank Church, qui dirige une commission d'enquête sénatoriale sur les agissements prêtés à la C.I.A., et que soutient le ferme propos de réformer non seulement les pratiques, mais les statuts de cette ténébreuse institution.

La C.I.A. a montré par sa coopération à l'enquête Rockefeller comme, aux travaux des deux commissions spéciales du Congrès créées dans le même esprit, qu'elle était la première intéressée à sortir non pas de l'ombre, mais de la pénombre où certaines de ses activités marginales se déroulaient, pour se consacrer en paix à ce qui demeurera toujours son domaine intouchable et d'ailleurs inattaqué : l'espionnage du reste du monde par une superpuissance.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 June 1975

Joseph C. Harsch

Afterthoughts on the CIA

The Rockefeller Commission report on mistakes committed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the past was not a whitewash. On the contrary, it uncovered and reported to the public several highly improper actions which had not been sniffed out previously by any investigating news reporter.

The worst examples of such newly disclosed impropriety included giving LSD to an unwitting person who subsequently jumped out of a 10th-story room to his death. Others included keeping a defector in solitary confinement for three years and "in one other case a defector was physically abused."

The major published allegations against the CIA were confirmed. There was widespread abuse of the rights of American citizens. The CIA did exceed its charter on a very broad scale. It did allow itself to be used improperly for political purposes.

This confirmation of published charges and disclosure of more that had not been suspected by reporters can, and should, be the beginning of the restoration of public confidence in the integrity of government processes in Washington. It is noteworthy that many newspapers both in the United States and abroad assumed that the Rockefeller Commission report would be a whitewash, and some rushed to a whitewash conclusion on the first day after publication. Only after reading the text was it generally realized that this was a remarkably honest job.

The principal subsequent criticisms were that the report had not expressed sufficient outrage over the mistakes it had uncovered or confirmed. Another was that it had not gone beyond its mandate which was limited to improper activities inside the United States. Perhaps. But there was no whitewash, and no

withholding of information damaging to the CIA.

Not all, but most of the abuses confirmed or disclosed in the report occurred after 1961 when the CIA moved from various antiquated and obscure buildings scattered around Washington into its superpalace at Langley, Virginia.

This was in the middle of one of the most expensive and exclusive suburban residential districts around Washington. The building looks like a junior Pentagon, and not all that junior. It is highly visible from the air and scarcely concealed from heavily traveled highways. It lost its anonymity when the move was made.

No one could weigh the extent to which life in a supersplendid building contributed to what can be called delusions of grandeur. The ill-starred Bay of Pigs affair was conceived before the move was made, but during the construction process. The widespread surveillance of American citizens by the agency, in confirmed violation of its charter, was triggered by the radical movements of the '60s which grew out of black unrest and antiwar protests. But it remains a fact that the CIA was largely anonymous and largely non-controversial while it was living in humble quarters. Did it share in the "arrogance of power" which marked the Johnson-Nixon era?

Remedies proposed by the Rockefeller Commission largely deal with ways and means of improving supervision over CIA activities. Particularly interesting is the recommendation that in the future directors of the CIA should be persons of "stature, independence, and integrity." The report goes on to say

that this does not necessarily exclude persons from within the service. But it says "consideration should be given to individuals from outside the service" and it adds that "management and administrative skills are at least as important as the technical expertise which can always be found in an able deputy."

All CIA directors up to 1956 were recruited from outside the CIA. They came either from private life (John McCone, Allen Dulles) or from the military services (Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Admiral Hilenkotter). In 1956 Richard Helms became the first CIA director promoted from the ranks of the service. William E. Colby, the present director, is also from the career CIA service.

The above should be read against the fact that the report finds that Presidents Johnson and Nixon used improper pressure on the CIA to do things which it ought not to have done. The implication is that Mr. Helms, a career service officer, was less able to resist the pressure than a person from outside the service who because of personal position or personal wealth would have had enough "independence" to resist presidential pressure.

The Rockefeller Commission considered but discarded a recommendation to separate the CIA's open appraisals of information from its clandestine overseas operations. Congress should consider this idea further. It is difficult to see how clandestine operations can be conducted from such an "overt" building as the palace at Langley. If the covert work were separated and moved into physical obscurity, the overt and vital work of intelligence evaluation could go on at Langley with less of the James Bond paraphernalia of fences, guards, dogs, and passes.

CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
19 MAY 1975

How Much Cooperation with the CIA?

PR man's disclosure of faculty travel plans prompts policy-drafting

By Larry Van Dyne

ST. LOUIS

A disclosure that a Washington University public relations man had been providing the Central Intelligence Agency with information on the foreign travel plans of faculty members over the past few years has prompted the university to begin drafting formal guidelines to govern its contacts with government investigators.

The guidelines, which will be prepared by a university-wide committee that is now being formed, apparently will be one of the first publicly acknowledged attempts by an American university to spell out clearly its staff members' rights and responsibilities in this ticklish area.

At issue is whether, and under what circumstances, information should be given to the C.I.A., whose interest in national security and international politics might sometimes run counter to the rights of individual professors and the desire for a climate of trust among scholars from different countries.

The Washington University case has implications for other American universities. Many of their internationally known scholars regularly attend foreign conferences at which they have access to sensitive information and are in contact with scientists, doctors, and scholars from communist countries.

The disclosure that prompted the guideline writing at Washington University involved the activities of Dan Gashler, former director of the news bureau in the university's medical school. Mr. Gashler, who became director in 1966, says it seemed to him from the outset to be perfectly reasonable to cooperate with the C.I.A.

He understood, he recalls, that the news bureau had given C.I.A. agents access to faculty travel plans for several years before he arrived.

Every year the bureau circulated a memorandum to faculty members asking them to detail their travel plans, presumably for use in publicity releases. Mr. Gashler's understanding was that C.I.A. agents from the agency's St. Louis office had come around regularly and had been given access to the information the faculty members supplied.

Mr. Gashler also was, by temperament, a good source for the C.I.A. A politically conservative man who has been active for many years as an officer in the Naval Reserve, he says he believed it was the duty of any patriotic American to help the C.I.A. when he could.

He remembers, for instance, a lecture at a Navy training session that made precisely that point. "It was pointed out," he says, "that a lot more communists are involved in [intelligence work] than our people, so the thought occurred to me that whatever I could do toward getting us some information would be a patriotic gesture."

Briefings Sought

So Mr. Gashler cooperated. Acting at least in part on his information, C.I.A. agents would telephone professors who traveled to overseas conferences and request a meeting. Sometimes the agents would seek such meetings before the trips so they could outline what information they wanted the professors to look for and identify the foreign scholars in whom they were interested. At other times they would ask for a briefing only after a professor returned home.

In any case, the connection between the news bureau's annual solicitation of travel plans and the calls from the C.I.A. eventually prompted someone to bring the matter to the attention of William H. Danforth, then vice-chancellor for

the medical school and now chancellor of the entire university. Mr. Danforth told Mr. Gashler to end his relationship with the C.I.A., and the annual solicitation of travel plans was suspended.

Sense of Patriotic Duty

For a while, the Gashler-C.I.A. connection was interrupted. But as protests against the war in Indochina escalated in the late 1960's, Mr. Gashler's sense of patriotic duty drew him back into contact with the agency.

"One thing really sticks in my mind," he recalls. "The ROTC building was burned [in 1970], and the students were really getting away with a lot of things I considered really unpatriotic. I guess the next time I got a call from them [the C.I.A. agents] asking if I could help, I felt that I could."

Thus Mr. Gashler's office again became a conduit for information, although evidently on a less comprehensive basis than in the days of the annual memorandum.

Late in 1973, however, his activities again came to the attention of the medical-school administration, and he was again told to end his C.I.A. contacts. The order came this time from Samuel B. Guze, who had succeeded Mr. Danforth as vice-chancellor.

That might have been the quiet end to the matter. Instead, the story turned up last January on the front page of the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, about the time that interest in the C.I.A.'s domestic activities had been heightened by disclosures in the national press.

Faced with the publicity, the university responded by appointing a committee of faculty members to investigate. Not long ago that committee, headed by John W. Olney, a psychiatrist on the medical-school

faculty, issued a short report that basically corroborated the facts in the newspaper story.

"Faculty members or their secretaries assume, and are correct to assume, that when the news bureau contacts them for faculty information, it is the bureau's intent to disseminate that information for purposes strictly beneficial to the faculty and medical school," the committee said. "Relaying such information on to the C.I.A. would certainly be interpreted as non-beneficial by some faculty members."

"Mr. Gashler acknowledges requesting faculty information from the secretaries of faculty for the sole purpose of relaying it to the C.I.A. . . . The committee holds that the news bureau has solicited information under an inappropriate guise."

Guidelines Proposed

The Olney committee also pointed directly at the broad issues involved:

"To many faculty, C.I.A. interest in their activities can seriously compromise their standing in their professional communities, can bring into question their independence and bona fides in their contacts with foreign colleagues and can inhibit them in the pursuit of their legitimate academic interests."

Because such important issues were involved, the committee said, clear guidelines for handling relations with the C.I.A. are a necessity. The committee to develop the guidelines is now in the process of being appointed by Mr. Danforth.

Mr. Gashler, in the meantime, is continuing to serve as director of alumni affairs but has been relieved of his responsibilities in the news bureau. The university says his removal from the news job had been planned before the disclosure of his C.I.A. involvement and occurred for reasons unrelated to it.

WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC)
15 JUNE 1975

THE FRONT PAGE

By Rudy Maxa

One of the CIA's least favorite former employees, writer Victor Marchetti, is at his Virginia home working on a spy novel that is an "interpretive history of the CIA in fictional form, a CIA Godfather." The courts are still considering whether the CIA can censor all of Marchetti's writing as the agency did in the case of *The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence*, the best-seller he wrote with John Marks.

WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Rebuke to Harrington

Despite private advice from the parliamentarian's office that the House Ethics Committee lacks jurisdiction in a case looking toward a possible rebuke of Massachusetts Rep. Michael Harrington, a liberal Democrat who has led attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency, the Ethics Committee is expected to meet next week to consider the case.

The move against Harrington, an outspoken CIA critic particularly in the Chile affair, has been hatching for almost a year, the result of smoldering resentment over what some Armed Services Committee members say privately was Harrington's violation of a signed secrecy pledge.

Harrington signed the pledge on June 4, 1974, as a condition for obtaining access to secret testimony given to the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA oversight by CIA director William Colby on the agency's activities in domestic Chilean politics before and during the Allende regime.

The secrecy pledge signed by Harrington was as follows: "The contents of such classified information (Colby's testimony) will not be divulged to any unauthorized person in any way, form, shape or manner."

Angered over what he regarded as congressional apathy in the CIA-Chile affair, Harrington subsequently informed the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, as well as other congressmen, members of his own staff and one highly reputable reporter, that Colby's testimony contained political dynamite. The general trust of Colby's testimony was given by Harrington at least to the two committee chairmen, and possibly others.

Harrington admitted as much to the Armed Services Committee last Sept.

12 after the CIA's activities in Chile were exposed by The New York Times. He was called on the carpet by then-committee chairman, Rep. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, who suspected Harrington himself as the leak for The Times expose.

Denying he was the leak, Harrington was excused by the Armed Services Committee after his Sept. 12 interrogation and the matter appeared closed. But on May 25, Harrington read former CIA Latin America chief David A. Phillips' defense of the agency in a signed article in the New York Times. Phillips wrote that it was a "myth" that the CIA "encouraged the Chilean plotters who toppled President Salvador Allende-Gossens and funded the strikes leading to the coup" against Marxist Allende.

Angered once again, Harrington wrote a circular letter to House colleagues suggesting that they do what he did last June: obtain access to Colby's still-secret testimony to the Armed Services CIA oversight committee. He also asked for access himself to other classified committee documents.

That letter triggered the disciplinary action by the committee. It voted unanimously on Tuesday (with 13 of 40 members present) to deny Harrington access to any more classified material at least until the House Ethics Committee (officially the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) examines the whole question of access to a committee's secret testimony by non-committee members—a direct rebuke to Harrington.

President Ford's as-yet unannounced presidential campaign committee in the home state of former Gov. Ronald Reagan will include at least two of Reagan's long-time aides and political

advisers, including state Republican Chairman Paul Haerle.

Haerle and state Attorney General Evelle Younger, the state's top Republican officeholder, will be co-chairmen of the Ford campaign committee, with Anita Wentner Ashcraft, vice chairman of Reagan's 1970 re-election finance committee, to take over as active head of the Ford California campaign later this year.

For Mr. Ford, the quiet acquisition of Haerle and Anita Ashcraft is a major coup, establishing his political clout and proving that Reagan, a possible contender against the President for the 1976 nomination, does not own his own state.

Haerle was an all-out conservative backer of Sen. Barry Goldwater's presidential nomination in 1964. Northern California chairman for Reagan's first gubernatorial campaign in 1966, Haerle became his personal appointments secretary for the next three years. More recently, Haerle has been out of the inner Reagan circle—but all his past Republican credentials are with the former governor.

With David Packard, board chairman of Hewlett-Packard, as national finance chairman for the Ford campaign, White House operatives feel the President has made more solid progress in California than any other state. Top coordinator for the state is Mr. Ford's close personal friend, Leon Parma, vice president of San Diego-based Teledyne Corp. and one-time administrative assistant of conservative Rep. Bob Wilson of California.

A footnote: Haerle has been criticized for his imminent move to the Ford camp on grounds that the Republican state chairman should be neutral. But Haerle won't change his mind.

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THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
21 JUNE 1975

Mr. Nedzi is unresigned

The House of Representatives has overwhelmingly rejected the resignation of Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and whatever its motives, its decision was a wise one.

The select committee was appointed by Speaker Albert in February, mainly to investigate charges against the CIA. It consists of three Republicans and seven Democrats, some of whom—notably Michael Harrington of Massachusetts and Ronald Dellums of California—are inveterate liberals and bitter critics of the CIA.

When it was learned earlier this month that as chairman of an Armed Forces subcommittee Mr. Nedzi had been briefed by the CIA on some of the very activities to be investigated, five of the select committee Democrats demanded his resignation. He appeased them by agreeing to turn the CIA investigation over to a subcommittee of

which he would not be a member. But in the interest of objectivity he also refused to name Messrs. Harrington and Dellums to the subcommittee, which so inflamed them that the compromise fell apart and Mr. Nedzi submitted his resignation.

Anti-CIA elements whipped up sentiment in favor of accepting Mr. Nedzi's resignation, pointing out that it would be almost unprecedented to reject it (but neglecting to say that it would be just as unusual to accept the resignation of a committee chairman over internal committee bickering).

Fortunately the House rejected the resignation on Monday by the surprising vote of 290 to 64. A majority of both parties supported the chairman. For the most part, the vote was taken

as a demonstration of confidence in Mr. Nedzi personally and in committee chairmen in general. But to some degree it also reflected a feeling that the investigation of the CIA should not be turned over to a bloodthirsty clique whose clear purpose is to emasculate it.

In either event, we're better off as a result. Either the select committee will be immobilized or more likely it will be abolished and the investigation turned over to a more objective group.

An investigation is needed, and very likely there should be some congressional action along the lines recommended by the Rockefeller Commission. We're entitled to some assurance that the CIA will never again venture as far beyond its authority as it did in the decade before 1973. But the last thing we need is a destructive witch hunt carried out by fanatics and based on excesses which almost certainly no longer exist.

WASHINGTON STAR
17 June 1975

Mary McGroarty

House Has a Cloak for CIA's Dagger

In the morning, Rep. Michael Harrington, D-Mass., was cashiered, 15-13, by the House Armed Services Committee amid high talk of treason, anarchy and the decline of the West.

In the afternoon, Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., by a vote of 290 to 64, was handed back his crown as chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to a chorus of "For he's a jolly good fellow."

It seemed an appropriate double observance on the eve of the third anniversary of the Watergate break-in, which precipitated the country's greatest cover-up to date, and it put the House of Representatives on record as being a safe house for the CIA.

Nothing the agency did, the House was saying, was so reprehensible as talking about it.

HARRINGTON'S crime was that he tried to bring to the attention of Congress allegations from CIA Director William E. Colby that the CIA spent \$8 million dollars bribing Chilean officeholders, and labor officials and in creating economic chaos for the Marxist government of Salvador Allende.

Nedzi knew all about this and more — but he understood that the House didn't want to know, and so he never told. He also found out about murder, but he kept that under his hat, too. He offered to resign in the face of outrage from several members of his

committee, but the House wouldn't have it. Nedzi is perhaps the chicken in the chicken coop, but the House wants it that way.

The members have heard just enough about poisoned cigars (for Castro), a poisoned ring (for De Gaulle) to realize that they do not want to bite into the poisoned apple of more information. If they do they might have to do something about it. Besides they want to teach their dissidents and upstarts a lesson. It is the revenge of the Cavemen.

Harrington, yellow-haired and pumpkin-faced, has an "up-the-rebels" air that enrages them. Because he did laugh at the classification system, and did talk about ne-

Point of View

farious deeds to unauthorized persons, he offers the perfect battering-ram for the demolition of the Select Committee.

IF HE CAN BE denied access to classified information, he obviously will be disqualified for service on the CIA panel, and the group can be dissolved without further fuss.

Dangerous people like Rep. James Stanton, D-Ohio, who marked his doubtless fleeting chairmanship of the special subcommittee by announcing that he knew of successful assassinations, can be evicted from the premises, and the inquiry can be turned over to "national security" freaks, who can be trusted to endorse the "no name, no blame" report of the Rockefeller Commission.

Everybody will be happy, except those souls in the country who object to political assassination in peacetime and who would rather know if it's been tried, even if it turns out to be at the direction of John F. Kennedy, and his brother Robert.

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller

has stepped forward as the hit man against the Kennedys. He said on "Meet the Press" that the "White House knew" about such activities. He was preceded, of course, by former CIA Director John McCone, who went before the cameras and invited the country to believe that an attempt had been made on Fidel Castro in the Kennedy years and even transposed the date of the installation of missiles "on the sacred soil of Cuba" to make the point.

ADAM WALINSKY, former aide to Robert Kennedy, told of a CIA-Mafia collaboration on Castro which was foiled by Robert Kennedy. Some Democrats are nervous, however, that the Kennedys may have had a hand in doing in Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.

But the evidence against that is that Richard Nixon illicitly requested all CIA files on Vietnam and found so little dirt that Charles W. Colson had to call in E. Howard Hunt to fabricate the "smoking pistol" cable implicating the Kennedys.

But the peoples' representatives cannot be expected to assume the burden of these troublesome and squalid matters. They are not self-conscious on such occasions, as witness their 10-year flight from the Vietnam War.

The Republicans are showing Gerald Ford they understand his tenderness for the CIA. The Democrats can claim that they are protecting the Kennedys and sparing the country much woe.

The tides of freedom and openness that ran strong in the House for three giddy months early this year have been turned back. F. Edward Hebert, deposed as Armed Services chairman by the freshmen, resumed his old seat for the Harrington auto-da-fe.

The House and the CIA now are working hand in glove. CIA has the dagger; the House is providing the cloak.

WASHINGTON POST
19 June 1975

Foreign Policy Report Faults Controls on CIA

Associated Press

A presidential-congressional commission studying U.S. foreign policy says in a draft report there is inadequate control over covert operations launched by the Central Intelligence Agency against foreign countries.

In recent years, the procedures for approving covert operations "have become quite informal" and at times the President has ordered the normal review process bypassed altogether, a draft of the Murphy Commission

report says.

The current process for approval of covert actions involves the submission of proposals to the so-called "40 Committee" headed by Henry A. Kissinger in his post as the President's national security adviser.

The draft report says that because of Kissinger's other duties as secretary of state, the 40 Committee "has rarely met" and consultation is frequently done over the telephone.

mission executive director, acknowledged the existence of the draft report but said "it has been changed and probably will be changed again" by commission members who include Vice President Rockefeller.

The draft version recommends that the President's national security adviser be prevented from holding any other Cabinet position. It also recommends that all covert activities be made known to Congress but says the President should not have to give his personal endorsement of such operations in order to avoid harmful effects.

Headed by retired Ambassador Robert Murphy of New York, the 12-member Commission for Reorganization of the Government's Foreign Policy was created in 1972 by President Nixon and Congress. The commission is scheduled to

NEW YORK TIMES
14 June 1975

A highly placed Iranian, moved by the latest news about operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, told a story this week to an American correspondent.

When Richard M. Helms, former head of the C.I.A., was named Ambassador to Iran in 1973, Vladimir Y. Yerofeyev, the Soviet Ambassador, went to the Iranian Premier, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, and inquired sneeringly, "Why did the Americans send their No. 1 spy as Ambassador to Iran?" Premier Hoveyda looked the Soviet Ambassador up and down and replied, "The Americans are our friends — at least, they don't send us their No. 10 spy."

NEW REPUBLIC
28 June 1975

Playing Fast and Loose With Truth

Led Astray by the CIA

by Morton H. Halperin

One technique of the Central Intelligence Agency, discussed only in passing in the Rockefeller Commission report released two weeks ago, is *dis-information*. As Philip Agee discusses in his book *Inside the Company*, the agency has expensive facilities for producing fake documents and other means for misleading foreigners. As with other CIA methods, *dis-information* has been turned against the American people. The clearest and most important domestic *dis-information* project of the agency was the effort, still going on, to discredit the Seymour Hersh story on the CIA's "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations" and to conceal the scope of CIA domestic activities.

From 1953, when a program to open first-class mail began, CIA officials had no doubt that they were engaging in illegal activities. By May of 1973, if not long before, they knew that they had engaged in extensive violations of the legislated mandate to avoid internal security matters. Yet every effort was made to conceal this knowledge.

In May 1973 James Schlesinger, then director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and now Secretary of Defense, asked all present and former employees of the CIA to bring to his attention any activities that they believed to be illegal or in violation of the CIA charter. This memorandum produced some hundreds of responses and an inspector general's report laying out many, but apparently not all, of the activities described in the report of the presidential commission.

Schlesinger's response was to order an end to some of the activities. He made no report to the oversight committees of the Congress or to the public. Soon thereafter he or his successor, William Colby, reduced the inspector general's staff and ordered him not to conduct any investigations of agency operations.

As the full extent of the Nixon administration's paranoia about domestic dissidents became public, questions began to be raised in the Congress about whether the CIA had been drawn into any of these activities. It had, of course, in the massive way discussed below, but CIA officials at first saw no need to inform Congress at all. Richard Helms, Schlesinger's predecessor as director of Central Intelligence, and a man ubiquitous in the Rockefeller Commission's account of CIA misdeeds, was probed on the question by Sen. Clifford Case. Helms had been nominated to be ambassador to Iran and the Foreign Relations Committee took the opportunity to ask him about reports of CIA domestic activities. In light of the Rockefeller Commission's description of operation CHAOS, directed at domestic dissidents, and Helms' role in it, one has difficulty deciding which is more astonishing—his answer or that Helms remains ambassador to Iran. Here is the text:

agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about the antiwar movement, and during this period US Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on US citizens.

Do you know anything about any activity on the part of the CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was.

Senator Case. What do you do in a case like that?

Mr. Helms. I would simply go to explain to the President this didn't seem to me to be advisable.

The Rockefeller Commission apparently considered deception of the American public and possible perjury as beyond the scope of its inquiry into CIA domestic activities. Thus it neither reports nor comments on this testimony. Statements of current Director William

Colby are treated in the same way. One needs, therefore, to refer to the published hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee preceding Colby's confirmation to learn that he saw no reason to report to that committee, even in closed session, on the results of the investigation launched just a few months before as a result of the Schlesinger memorandum. Indeed, in July 1973, Mr. Colby had this exchange with Sen. Symington:

Senator Symington. As I understand it, you do not intend to participate in any way in any domestic intelligence.

Mr. Colby: I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Would this prevent you from helping to make policy regarding the collection of intelligence on domestic groups?

Mr. Colby. I believe it would, yes, Mr. Chairman. I do not see that as within my responsibilities at all.

Senator Symington. Would the 1947 act prohibit the CIA from collecting, or providing the support necessary for collecting, intelligence within the US on domestic groups?

Mr. Colby. I believe that is the same question, essentially.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Mr. Colby. And it would prohibit me from doing that.

Sometime after, Mr. Colby decided to give the subcommittee to which he reports some account of the illegal and inappropriate activities uncovered in the Schlesinger investigation. This testimony, which has still not been made public, produced no congressional action. In desperation one or more middle level officials of the CIA gave Hersh the bare outlines of the story.

Before publishing his article, Hersh, faithful to *New York Times* tradition, conferred with Colby. The DCI, by his account, attempted to convince Hersh, and no doubt *Times* executives, that the story was fundamentally wrong and misleading. The *Times* was in this case not persuaded and on December 22, 1974 published Hersh's account under a four column headline reading "Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years." The opening sentence reported that the CIA had conducted a "large-scale intelligence operation"

Senator Case: It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House had a meeting with

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against the antiwar movement and other dissidents.

That phrase—"massive illegal domestic"—was to become the focus of a massive illegal domestic CIA campaign to discredit the Hersh story. As will be shown, every fact save one in the *Times* story is confirmed by the commission.

The agency pulled out all the stops in the effort to divert attention from its activities to a discussion of how Sy and the *Times* could have gone so wrong; suggestions were put about that both were eager for a Pulitzer Prize to get even for *The Washington Post's* Watergate coverage; hence the need to rush into print before the end of the year. Reporters with little or no prodding came to talk of Sy's carelessness and bias.

Although neither Hersh nor anyone else could get additional detail or further confirmation of the story, it would not die and Colby was forced to confront the Congress. He picked his target carefully, a closed session of the ultra-friendly subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His opening statement was released to the press and billed as a complete description of the agency's domestic activities. This January 15, 1975, statement has to be read carefully, along with a correction sheet issued quietly a month later, and compared to the Rockefeller Commission report in order to appreciate the subtleties of dis-information as practiced by the company.

The DCI in this statement denies the Hersh story fully and frontally. A month later testifying before the House Appropriations Committee he characterized his earlier testimony as a flat denial of the *Times* allegations, stating that "this operation was neither massive, illegal, nor domestic, as alleged." The operation he was referring to was CHAOS. That is as good a place as any to begin a comparison of the Hersh story, the Colby statement, and the report of the commission appointed by President Ford. In the process we can review the facts brought about by the official panel while examining the agency dis-information campaign. We will then be in a position to consider the tone of the Rockefeller report and its recommendations.

Operation Chaos. As Hersh acknowledges, he was not able to get many details about the special unit set up to investigate domestic dissidents. Even its "Get Smart" name had not been revealed to him.

These are the facts he reported:

- Files were compiled on 10,000 American citizens.
- Specific individuals were targeted, including one antiwar member of Congress.
- Information on the targeted individuals was collected from a variety of sources including informants who penetrated antiwar groups.
- There were names of others in the files, including other members of Congress.
- The activities were conducted by a special unit, reporting directly to DCI, set up initially to look for evidence of foreign involvement in the antiwar movement but growing into a domestic intelligence operation.
- The group produced a series of reports on the antiwar movement, one of which was sent to Henry Kissinger.

While claiming to deny the entire story as it related to the special unit, Colby in his statement confirmed many of the facts. However he carefully left the impression that the unit never strayed beyond the mission of

exploring the links domestic dissidents might have had to foreign groups.

Colby conceded that there were files on 10,000 Americans. He admitted that agents had infiltrated the antiwar movement as part of operation CHAOS. He said that they had been limited to gathering information abroad, although he admitted that some reports were submitted on the activities of American dissidents. He denied that surveillance had been conducted on antiwar congressmen and, after an initial denial, confirmed that there were files on four members of Congress. In five pages of testimony, Colby failed to touch on the other specific facts in the Hersh story.

The basic ploy was to divert attention away from the details of what the special unit had done and focus it instead on the disputed accuracy of the *Times* story. Until the Rockefeller report was published, this ploy had largely succeeded. The *Times* had pulled Hersh off the investigation claiming that he was part of the story and could not cover it objectively. Many reporters and observers were convinced that there had in fact been no massive effort and nothing very illegal, only as Colby had put it, a few occasional missteps brought about by intense presidential pressure.

The writers of the Rockefeller report were well aware of the controversy over "massive illegal domestic" and they were not about to explicitly confirm the characterization that had been made the touchstone of the accuracy of the *Times* story. However they leave the reader in little doubt. The operation, the eight conservative commissioners concluded, "unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority." So much for "illegal." As to "domestic," they write unanimously that the operation became a "repository for large quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citizens" and that "much of the information was not directly related to the question of the existence of foreign connections with domestic dissidence."

Notice the use of the adjective "large." The commission staff must have wanted to avoid "massive." Earlier, they had referred to a "veritable mountain of material," and a paragraph summing up the activities of this unit, which at its peak had more than 50 employees, reads as follows:

By August 1973, when the foregoing Colby memorandum was written, the paper trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals (including approximately 7,200 personality or "201" files); over 11,000 memoranda, reports and letters from the FBI; over 3,000 disseminations to the FBI; and almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the operation. In addition, the CHAOS group had generated, or caused the generation of, over 12,000 cables of various types, as well as a handful of memoranda to high-level government officials.

On top of this veritable mountain of material was a computer system containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations which, with few exceptions, were of United States citizens and organizations apparently unconnected with espionage.

By any standard other than that of directors of the CIA, this was a massive operation.

The commission, in the process of describing and deploring the CHAOS operation, confirms all the Hersh facts with one possible exception. There were created some 7,000 detailed files on American citizens and 1,000 on domestic organizations. The computer

system of CHAOS had indexed some 300,000 names of citizens and domestic organizations. Specific individuals, those with "201 files," were the targets of information gathering from many sources including the penetration of antiwar groups. While the commission found no evidence that a congressman was specifically targeted, the "inaccuracy" in the Hersh story is simple to explain. An agent of the CHAOS operation "became involved as an adviser in a United States congressional campaign and, for a limited period, furnished reports to CHAOS of behind-the-scenes activities in the campaign." The activities were, as Hersh reported, conducted by a special unit reporting directly to the DCI. This unit was, as he explained, originally set up to gather evidence of foreign connections and grew into a domestic intelligence operation. Finally, a series of reports was produced and at least one forwarded to Kissinger.

In describing these reports, the commission blows the agency cover that, as Colby put it, this was a "counterintelligence operation directed at possible foreign links to American dissidents," and that it was a proper activity observing the limits on CIA domestic activity.

The commission report describes some eight studies prepared by the CIA on the antiwar movement in the United States in the period between November 1967 and January 1971 and forwarded outside the agency. These studies reached the same conclusion: there was no evidence that foreign governments or agencies controlled or directed domestic dissident movements or provided financial assistance to them. The agency didn't have any doubt about this, nor does the commission report on any evidence to the contrary.

If the agency knew that its efforts were not directed at studying what it knew to be a nonexistent connection, neither did it have any doubts about the impropriety of what it was doing. In sending one study, "Restless Youth," to Walt Rostow in the Johnson White House, Helms wrote that "You will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared a report on student activities both here and abroad." In forwarding a second copy of the report to Henry Kissinger in February of 1969, Helms was even more explicit:

In an effort to round-out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing. . . .

In addition to confirming all of the facts of the Hersh story regarding the CHAOS unit, the presidential commission provided considerably more detail of its operations. Several items are worthy of note in light of the CIA effort to paint the unit's activities as proper.

On three occasions, the commission notes, agents who had infiltrated the antiwar movement were sent on specific assignments wholly concerned with domestic activities. One of these assignments yielded 47 separate disseminations to the FBI with such titles as "Plans for Future Anti-War Activities on the West Coast." As the commission explains, the bulk of these "related solely to domestic activities."

Another agent reported on the high-level leadership activities of a dissident group, and a third infiltrated the group planning May Day demonstrations.

The CHAOS unit had a watch list of some 1000 organizations and thousands of individuals. Forty-one names from this list were sent to the unit opening mail in New York; it sent back a two-file-drawer load of material obtained from the illegal opening of mail.

Names from the list were also supplied to the National Security Agency, identified by the commission delicately only as "another agency." NSA monitored the overseas phone calls of those on the list, in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and provided some 1100 pages to the CHAOS unit.

Other Domestic Surveillance Programs. Thus far I have discussed all of the facts in the original Hersh story related to surveillance of domestic dissidents except one. This is the assertion that CIA agents followed and photographed participants in antiwar demonstrations. Not so, said Mr. Colby in his January statement to the Congress. He went on to detail several instances of surveillance of American citizens but said that they related to leaks of information or assassination plots.

According to the Rockefeller Commission report that statement to the Senate committee was simply false. Participants in antiwar rallies were followed by CIA agents as part of a totally different program that is not mentioned at all in the original Hersh story.

Colby touched briefly on these activities in his statement, telling the Senate committee that beginning in 1967 the CIA office of security, acting out of fear of the safety of its installations in the Washington area, has inserted 10 agents into dissident organizations to gather information "relating to plans for demonstrations, pickets, protests, or break-ins."

The presidential commission tells a different story. The program, which ran from February 1967 to December 1968, involved many different agents, although no more than 12 at any one time. These agents penetrated a number of different organizations including the Women's Strike for Peace, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The infiltrators sought to learn whatever they could about the organizations, including their domestic sources of funds and the names of those who attended meetings. To learn their identities, some of the participants in these meetings were followed home. In the words of the report, "the Agency's infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went far beyond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, personnel and operations."

The DCI made no mention in his statement to the congressional committees of yet a third CIA operation directed at domestic dissidents. This entirely separate project, run by the Office of Security, maintained more than 5000 files on dissident organizations and individuals including some 12,000 names, and published weekly from 1968 to 1972 "Situation Information Reports" dealing with dissident activity in the US.

Other illegal activities. The Hersh story reported that in addition to the activities directed at domestic dissidents, the CIA had also engaged in dozens of other illegal activities, including "break-ins, wiretapping, and the surreptitious opening of mail." These, Hersh reported, were a "different category of domestic activities carried out by CIA agents in the US." The commission also reported that CIA agents had been suspected foreign

intelligence." These facts too were fully confirmed in the Rockefeller report. The commission provided the details Hersh could not get and it yields insight into the agency's view of its relation to the laws of the land.

The commission report devotes considerable attention to the agency's programs to open first-class mail. These operations, running from 1953 to 1973, were the largest, clearly illegal and unconstitutional programs discovered by the commission. Colby in his statement to the Senate committee dealt with these allegations in deadpan fashion in a single page. He asserted that the primary purpose was to identify individuals in active correspondence with Communist countries for "counterintelligence purposes, the results being shared with the FBI." That sentence would not enable one to infer that the CIA did not even inform the FBI that it was operating the program. It was only when the bureau approached the postal authorities to propose a similar scheme of mail covers that the agency told the bureau what it was up to and agreed to share the fruits.

Colby's statement does not acknowledge that the program was illegal and unconstitutional. It is only from the commission report that we learn that the agency was aware from the beginning that the operation was illegal and that CIA officials, including Richard Helms, deliberately deceived postal authorities into thinking that the operation was limited to mail covers, i.e., to the copying of information off envelopes. The details of how the agency deceived postal authorities provides an interesting study of CIA disinformation techniques as applied to other government agencies. The discussion of "cover stories" to use with the public should the operations' existence leak, provides evidence of the conscious nature of the CIA's use of false information to mislead the public.

A careful reading of the Colby statement gives no hint as to the scope or dimensions of the program. The DCI lists each of the operations reported by the commission with the significant exception of 12 separate operations to open the mail of American citizens who had no connection with the agency. But there is no suggestion of the magnitude revealed by the commission report:

Statistics gathered by the CIA show that in the last full year of its operation, the New York mail intercept handled approximately 4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside of over 2,300,000 of those items. Photographs were taken of the exteriors of approximately 33,000 items. Some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyzed.

Selections for opening were made on the basis of a watch list given to the crew and upon various other intelligence factors. During the last year, approximately 5,000 of the selections were made on the basis of the watch list.

In the last year, the program made over 3,800 separate disseminations of information derived from the project within the Agency and sent some 1,400 separate items of information to the FBI. At the end of 1972, the active watch list of names totaled approximately 600. The number of names watch-listed varied from month to month as they were supplied by CIA components and the FBI.

Although only mail coming into the United States was intercepted in the early years of the project, both outgoing and incoming mail were involved during most of the project's operation. CIA personnel estimate that, overall, approximately 30 percent of the mail intercepted was outgoing.

The project not only disseminated current information but provided file data back to 1953 in a compartmented,

computerized machine record system containing almost 2,000,000 entries. Institutional and organizational files were also maintained for reference and analytical purposes.

One minor CIA ploy not cleared up by the commission report concerns the opening of mail to and from non-Communist countries. The original Colby statement talked of opening mail to and from "two Communist countries." In a correction sheet released a month later that phrase was changed to "countries, mostly Communist." The commission does not comment on this change (as noted it refers not at all to these Colby statements) and seems to suggest that only mail to and from Communist states was opened. Colby told the Senate that the last of the mail surveillance program ended in 1973. He neglected to mention that this was only because a postal inspector, who had been a CIA official, ordered the agency to end the program.

The Rockefeller Commission report deals with the charges of illegal wiretaps and burglaries in a single section in which it discusses agency "special coverage" of American citizens. As usual we find Colby with his numbers too low and with no hint of illegality. The DCI's statement reports four break-ins; the commission found 12. Colby admits to 27 wiretaps; the commission found 32 and 32 bugs in addition. It also found 16 illegal examinations of tax returns and the 12 individual mail openings described above. The commission reports more than 100 cases of "special coverage" involving one or more of these techniques.

Despite the alleged comprehensive nature of his description of CIA domestic activities, Colby did not report on other illegal or unauthorized activities noted by the commission in its report. Among these are:

- giving LSD to unsuspecting Americans, one of whom killed himself as a result
- holding a defector in solitary confinement in the United States for three years
- aiding the Bureau of Narcotics in violation of the CIA charter
- giving gratuities to local police forces
- securing telephone records for the National Security Agency.

In many of these and other cases the Commission reaches the conclusion that the agency clearly violated its charter, the laws of the land, and the Constitution.

The Report. When the Rockefeller panel was appointed by the President, many critics predicted that this panel of eight establishment figures, including, besides the Vice President, Ronald Reagan, Lyman Lemnitzer and C. Douglas Dillon, would produce a whitewash. First reactions to the report reflected pleasant surprise at the detail provided. However a closer look makes plain why the commission reveals what it did. The tone and recommendations of the report reveal the next line of defense to which supporters of the CIA are retreating.

Early in its deliberations the Rockefeller Commission must have become aware of the Schlesinger study and the inspector general's report covering most, if not all, of the episodes in the commission report. The commission members knew that the Church committee investigating this matter for the Senate had this material and would eventually make it public. To fail to provide the information now would be to discredit the entire commission and its recommendations when the Senate debate on what to do got underway. A report issued now without detailed

facts would have been branded as a whitewash.

The candid tone of the report has earned it a respectful hearing. Many editorial writers and commentators have adopted the tone and approach of the report. The abuses are to be deplored but we need a secret intelligence agency to counter the Communists.

The commission's style is reflected in the second chapter of the report titled the "Need for Intelligence," which notes that the "United States remains the principal intelligence target of the Communist bloc." The chapter closes with this curious sentence:

Americans have a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.

One would suppose that this is intended in some way to justify the same intrusions on our privacy by the CIA.

Having set the tone in the opening section, the commission remains consistent. Flagrant abuses of the Constitution are described with no sense of outrage. Agency explanations of the need to take the illegal actions in order to perform its assigned missions are accepted in general without question. The commission members evidently believe that the agency has the right to investigate what it calls "dissident" organizations and individuals even if they have broken no laws and show every intention of remaining law abiding. The commission knows a "dissident" when it sees one. Thus it reports without comment that such peaceful and nonviolent groups as the Women's Strike for Peace and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, among others, are dissident groups but reports that a few non-dissidents such as Father Hesburgh somehow crept into the files.

When it turns to recommendations, the commission lays out the approach likely to be adopted by the Ford administration, the agency and its supporters. First the report notes that many of the activities discussed in the report were terminated in 1973. It presents a total of 29 recommendations of various kinds. On the whole they add up to saying that the President and the director should issue instructions that the agency must obey the law. Various internal monitoring mechanisms are to be beefed up and a joint congressional oversight committee is to be created. The budget of the agency might, the commission suggests, be made public at least in part and other material should be declassified. At the same time the commission endorses a law making it a crime for present or former employees to divulge classified information learned in the course of their employment. The commission doesn't even comment on the fact that such a law would have made criminal the leaks that forced the information in the report to surface.

Most important are the commission's recommendations on what domestic security functions the agency should have. The basic commission approach is to avoid the problem of the agency violating its charter in the future by authorizing it to do the things it has done in the past in violation of its charter. If the recommendations of the commission were accepted, the agency would be able to resume most of the programs it terminated in 1973 subject only to whatever deference it chooses to give to the Constitution and the general laws of the land.

These startling suggestions are stated so matter of factly as recommendations (1) and (2) that they have occasioned little comment. In recommendation (1), the commission proposes that the agency be permitted to approach willing sources in the United States openly and be prohibited from efforts directed at unknowing American citizens. It would thereby sanction covert operations aimed at gathering intelligence from foreigners in the United States. Then, in recommendation (2), the commission would authorize the agency to engage in collection of information about American citizens in the following circumstances:

- a) Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly, or others who require clearance by the CIA to receive classified information;
- b) Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA facilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished;
- c) Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished.

Thus, the agency would have authority for most of its domestic programs. These proposals would, of course, give the agency the domestic police and internal security functions that Congress explicitly denied to the CIA when it set up the agency in 1947. It would ignore the warnings issued then about the dangers of a super secret agency coming to operate at home and infringe on the liberties of American citizens. And it would do so in the face of some 200 pages of its own evidence that those fears were well founded.

The legislative history of the creation of the CIA is very clear. Congress intended that the agency do nothing in the US but maintain a headquarters and train its personnel. That there was to be only one exception to this rule—the overt collection of information about foreign activities from willing sources in the US—is made explicit in an exchange between a congressman and Allen Dulles in a closed House hearing on the bill creating the agency.

In light of the evidence presented by the commission, it would be foolhardy to do anything but return to this original understanding. The CIA must be told by the Congress that it may not operate at home. Congress must spell out in explicit detail all of the things that cannot be done. It must then make the violations of this law and failure to report the violations to the Attorney General criminal offenses. The right to sue for civil damages should also be made available to those whose rights are violated by the agency.

Nothing short of this will be sufficient to create even the possibility that the agency will not in the future succumb to external or internal pressures and resume its massive illegal domestic surveillance.

In the domestic field what must be done is clear. The commission has given us all the facts we should need to conclude that a secret spy agency cannot be permitted to operate at home. We can expect a new disinformation campaign to assure us that all is well and that we need only to adopt the commission proposals. If the Congress and the public fall for that line they will get the government they deserve.

Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, 12 June 1975 (Norwegian Labor Party)
INVESTIGATION OF CIA

Paranoia is Greek and is used as an indication of illness characterized by systematic, firmly-anchored delusions. There are a number of variations. One of them is inventor-paranoia.

It was the latter variety that during the course of the Vietnam decade insinuated itself in the office of the American president. In the White House in Washington enemies of society were discovered all over the American society. Active and passive critics of USA's war in Vietnam were shadowed and photographed. Demonstrators' mail was opened, their telephones were tapped. Dissenters were duly recorded in files by the tens of thousands.

This began seriously under President Lyndon B. Johnson and was developed further quickly under President Richard Nixon. Nixon was not only convinced that the Americans who openly declared disagreement with the Vietnam policy, in reality all those who were a danger to the country's morale (he often used those words), but also he went a step further: Nixon critics were suspected of belonging to a network centered in Moscow. Ultra red and contagious.

The Watergate hearings disclosed that it was during Nixon's presidency--at the president's order--that the American intelligence organization CIA systematically began to overstep the statutes Congress had passed for the organization's activities. When CIA was set up in 1947, Congress had established by law that CIA should limit its activities to other lands. The Federal police, FBI, would be responsible for domestic security.

In 1970 Richard Nixon had reached the point where he had convinced himself that J. Edgar Hoover, FBI chief, no longer had the necessary fervor and the right drive for hunting down communists and foreign agents.

Monday evening the so-called Rockefeller Commission publicized its 300-page report on CIA's activity. For the first time the legal infringements we have cited were officially confirmed. The report also describes other excesses and infringement of internationally-recognized human rights. CIA agents, for example, experimented with the drug LSD on people who were unaware of this. One defector was held in solitary confinement for three years because CIA had suspicions that the man was actually a planted spy.

What makes the Rockefeller Commission report especially effective is the composition of the commission. None of the eight members can be described as a dissenter. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller has long been a member of the Foreign Intelligence Board, which is charged among other things with keeping an overview of CIA but which has never followed up reports of excesses. Five of the members have had in one way or another contact with the intelligence organization.

The Commission correctly places emphasis on the fact an effective intelligence organization is of decisive importance for national security and often also a medium to serve in the relaxation of tensions. The Commission has found it to be necessary to recommend that a permanent control mechanism be set up, a control commission under the President's authority and a control committee consisting of members of Congress. CIA's budget in part ought to be made public, according to the Commission.

President Ford has decided to classify the Rockefeller Commission report on CIA's assassination plans against foreign politicians and chiefs of state. We understand that this sensitive matter is so delicate that the President sooner or later will be compelled to make public what the Commission has learned.

And so we hope that the leaders in the Kremlin will follow the lead of the American example and set up an investigating commission to find out if the KGB has committed excesses and infringed on human rights!

Granskning av CIA

Paranoia er gresk, og brukes som betegnelse på en sykdom som er preget av systematiserte, fast forankrede vrangforestillinger. Den fins i en rekke varianter. En av dem er oppfinner-paranoia.

Det var den siste avarten som i løpet av Vietnam-tåret snek seg inn i amerikanske presidentkontorer. I Det hvite hus i Washington ble det oppfunnet samfunnsfiender overalt i det amerikanske samfunn. Aktive og passive kritikere av USAs krig i Vietnam ble skygget og fotografert. Demonstranternes post ble åpnet, deres telefoner avlyttet. Dissenterne ble behørig arkivert — til sammen titusener av navn.

Det begynte for alvor under president Lyndon B. Johnson, og det utviklet seg raskt videre under president Richard Nixon. Nixon var ikke bare overbevist om at de amerikanere som hadde erklært seg uenige i den

amerikanske Vietnam-politikken, i virkeligheten alle som en var farlige for samfunnsmoralen (han brukte ofte det ordet), men han gikk et skritt videre: Nixon-kritikere ble mistenkt for å tilhøre det nettverk som hadde sitt sentrum i Moskva. Ultra-rødt og smittsomt.

Watergate-høringene avslørte at det var i Nixons presidenttid — på presidentens befaling — at den amerikanske etterretningsorganisasjonen CIA systematisk begynte å krenke de statutter Kongressen hadde vedtatt for organisasjonens virksomhet. Da CIA ble opprettet i 1947, hadde nemlig Kongressen ved lov fastslått at CIA skulle begrense sin virksomhet til andre land. Det føderale politiet, FBI, skulle forestå den indre overvåkingen.

I 1970 var Richard Nixon nådd det stadium hvor han klarte å overbevise seg selv om at FBI-sjefen J. Edgar Hoover ikke lenger hadde den nødvendige glød og det rette pågangsmot i jakten på kommunister og fremmede agenter.

Mandag kveld offentlig-

gjorde han den såkalte Rockefeller-kommisjonen sin 300 sider lange rapport om CIAs virksomhet. For første gang blir de lovbrudd vi her har nevnt, offisielt bekreftet. Rapporten forteller også om andre overtramp og brudd på internasjonalt anerkjente menneskerettigheter. CIA-agenter eksperimenterte for eksempel med rusgiften LSD, og lot intetanende mennesker bruke den. En overløper ble holdt i enecelle i tre år fordi CIA hadde mistanke om at mannen egentlig var en planlagt spion.

Det som gjør Rockefeller-kommisjonens rapport særlig virkningsfull, er den sammensetning kommisjonen har hatt. Ingen av de åtte medlemmene kan betegnes som dissenter. Visepresident Nelson Rockefeller har lenge vært medlem av «the Foreign Intelligence Board» — som blant annet er pålagt overoppsynet med CIA, men som tidligere aldri har fulgt opp meldinger om overtramp. Fem av de andre medlemmene har i hvert fall på ett eller annet stadium hatt nær kontakt med etterretnings-

organisasjonen.

Kommisjonen legger med rette vekt på at en effektiv etterretningsorganisasjon er av avgjørende betydning for den nasjonale sikkerhet, og ofte også et middel i avspenningens tjeneste. Kommisjonen har funnet det riktig å anbefale at det nå opprettes permanente kontrollmekanismer, en kontrollkommisjon under presidentens myndighet og et kontrollutvalg bestående av kongressmedlemmer. CIAs budsjett bør bli delvis offentliggjort, mener kommisjonen.

President Ford har besluttet å hemmeligholde Rockefeller-kommisjonens rapport om CIAs attentatplaner mot utenlandske politikere og regjeringssjefer. Vi forstår at dette er ømtålelige saker, ja så delikate at presidenten før eller siden blir nødt til å offentliggjøre det kommisjonen kan fortelle om dem.

Og så håper vi at Kremlederne tolerer seg ansporet at det amerikanske eksemplet og nedsetter en undersøkelseskommisjon for å finne ut om KGB har gjort overtramp og krenket menneskerettigheter!

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 June 1975

CIA linked to Trujillo murder

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

It was just before midnight. Moonlight glistened off the waters of the Caribbean. The lone car on the coastal highway, a chauffeur-driven limousine, sped westward toward the Dominican city of San Cristobal.

The limousine's two occupants, chauffeur and passenger, at first failed to notice the green Chevrolet that followed them — and by the time they became aware of the vehicle, it was too late.

The Chevrolet pulled alongside, spraying the limousine with rifle and carbine bullets. Both cars came to a halt. The chauffeur

escaped, but the passenger was killed.

The scenario marked the end of the 30-year dictatorship of Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.

The whole incident, which took place May 30, 1961, was long thought to have been solely the work of Dominican patriots, including Antonio Imbert Barreras, the driver of the Chevrolet, who himself became a general in the years after the assassination of General Trujillo.

But this weekend, there is mounting evidence that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a hand in the affair.

In fact, Washington sources say that the U.S. contributed "significant material support" to the Trujillo assassination.

Efforts this weekend to reach General Imbert, the lone survivor of the team of assassins, failed, but other Dominican sources say that "there were lots of CIA agents in Santo Domingo in the weeks before the Trujillo assassination."

If all this information proves true, it will be the first specific instance in which there is proof the CIA successfully participated in the

assassination of a foreign leader.

Speculation that the CIA had a hand in a number of such assassinations has been growing since the first of the year.

Just what the motive was for participating in the Trujillo assassination is not clear, nor is it clear at what level in the administrations of either President Kennedy or President Eisenhower it might have been ordered. The assassination took place four months after John F. Kennedy became President and only weeks after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which had been organized under President Eisenhower although carried out under President Kennedy.

The Trujillo assassination sparked a massive roundup of anti-Trujillo Dominicans. According to a Dominican government source, one of those picked up, who had been involved in the actual assassination, said after having been tortured, that the arms used in the incident had been supplied by the CIA.

It seems that no CIA agent was directly involved in the Trujillo assassination. But apparently quite a few gave material and perhaps physical help in setting up the event.

GENERAL

BALTIMORE SUN
17 June 1975

Will West's broadcasts to East die?

Budget cuts and layoffs create crisis at Radio Free Europe

By GENE OISHI
Sun Staff Correspondent

Munich—Radio Free Europe is undergoing a crisis of confidence and morale after being hit by a budgetary squeeze and another wave of layoffs.

Some see it as the beginning of the end for the radio station, which broadcasts daily to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to inform the people there about the events in the West as well as developments in their own countries.

While not all see the future so darkly, there is general agreement that the budgetary difficulties faced by the organization will reduce the effectiveness and quality of not only its broadcasting but also of its highly regarded research operation.

The same could be true for Radio Liberty, also based here and which broadcasts into the Soviet Union. But the next round of staff reductions of about 150 apparently will fall most heavily within Radio Free Europe.

The mood at Radio Liberty, therefore, while not bright, is not quite as pessimistic.

At Radio Free Europe some see the present situation as a crisis comparable to the early 1970's when both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were cut off from the funds from the Central Intelligence Agency.

At that time, there was opposition in Congress against continuing the two operations out of regularly budgeted funds. Senator William Fulbright (D., Ark.), then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in particular, questioned the propriety of continuing the two stations during a period of

East-West detente.

Since then, both organizations have gained respectability with the creation of the Board for International Broadcasting in Washington to oversee their operations.

The board is criticized here, however, for not being vigorous enough in looking after the interest of its charges. Under its stewardship, the two stations have had to cut their staffs by a third because of insufficient funds.

David Abshire, the chairman of the board, told congressional budget committees, for example, that because of the devaluation of the dollar and inflation an operation that cost \$30 million in 1968 would cost more than \$80 million for fiscal 1976.

Nevertheless, the board asked for only \$65.6 million for fiscal 1976, and only because of one-time needs to make up for overdue pension fund contributions, renovation of the building and replacement of old equipment.

For fiscal 1977, he promised to reduce the budget request to \$57 million, which is the reason for the reduction in staff which already is beginning.

Radio Free Europe sources said the board made the commitment without studying the inevitable consequences. One source called it a "verdict of slow death," adding, "in two or three years we will be extinct."

One department head said the cutbacks mean the loss of some of his top talent, with no possibility of replacing them. Because of the German labor laws, he said, the cutbacks cannot be made selectively to weed out the least effective personnel.

Many of those being laid

off, he said, are the younger members of the staff, "our fresh blood, the people who represent our future."

Others noted that, even if funds were available, it is difficult to find qualified persons willing to come to what could become a moribund organization.

The cutbacks, according to Radio Free Europe sources, will mean cuts in programing, which currently ranges from 19 hours a day for Czechoslovakia to 8 hours a day for Bulgaria, to an estimated total audience of about 30 million.

Perhaps of more general concern is the likelihood of cutbacks in research. Radio Free Europe subscribes to more than 600 East European newspapers and periodicals, in addition to monitoring and transcribing radio reports from the various East-bloc countries.

Its publications, including special reports based on this information as well as surveys of the East-bloc press, are sent out to more than 1,100 subscribers, who include universities and other academic institutions, individual scholars, journalists, Western foreign ministries as well as the United States State Department.

While the research section at Radio Liberty is not quite as extensive, it keeps tabs on more than 500 newspapers and journals, most of them from the Soviet Union, but also publications that deal with the problems of the country published in the West.

Both organizations receive a constant stream of scholars and journalists who make use of their archives, which generally are acknowledged to be the best of their kind in the world.

Radio Liberty, moreover, has a growing collection of the so-called samizdat documents—underground publications of Soviet dissident groups—which Albert Boiter, its chief of research, says is more complete than what the KGB, the Soviet secret police, has.

While both organizations are products of the cold war, advocates insist that the operations are even more essential during a period of detente.

The two stations, for example, intend to broadcast details of the declarations on freer human contacts to which the Soviet bloc will agree at the European Security Conference but is not likely to publicize.

Others say that the two stations' value also has increased because the Voice of America, a State Department operation, has softened its broadcasts and reduced its commentaries in the interest of detente.

It is also noted that the Voice, the BBC and other Western broadcasts heard in the East report mainly on events around the world and do not deal as much as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with internal developments of the countries to which they broadcast.

Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, the Russian novelist expelled from the Soviet Union, for example, said after his exile that his main source of information on what was happening in his country was Radio Liberty.

One broadcaster noted that Moscow was increasing its foreign language propaganda broadcasts and to cut back on U.S. broadcasts to the East would be a "one-sided concession to the Soviet Union."

BALTIMORE SUN
15 June 1975

How much blame does the U.N. really deserve?

By DEAN MILLS

Washington.

The United States has long regarded the United Nations as an unpromising child, but one which—thank God—at least had the admirable habit of obedience. Now that even that virtue has dissolved in a fiery show of independence, what's a parent to do?

Spank, prescribes Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who has been picked to be the next U.S. ambassador to the U.N. because his ideas on the organization appeal to President Ford. In a well-publicized article in the March issue of *Commentary*, and again in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Moynihan laid out his formula for whipping the U.N. back into shape.

The problem, as Mr. Moynihan sees it, lies largely in the Fabian socialism which many Third-World U.N. members absorbed, while still colonies, from a dying British Empire. The solution, he argued, is to prove the advantages of American (or Japanese) capitalism over these unhealthy socialist transplants, and to expose the hypocrisies of Third-World officials who see political injustice everywhere but at home or in the Soviet Union.

In his testimony Mr. Moynihan also endorsed the suggestion of Arthur Goldberg, a former U.N. ambassador, that the United States withdraw from the organization if Israel is expelled.

Mr. Moynihan's get-tough attitude seems to be in tune with public, as well as presidential sentiments. Mail to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. and public opinion polls show disillusionment and anger with the behavior of a General Assembly dominated by the Third-World bloc.

But there is another view. It holds that the United Nations, despite faults, has accomplished immeasurable—and generally unremarked—good for the world; and that American delegations, far from being too passive in the defense of U.S. interests, have been too stubborn in demanding their way. And although the United Nations seems to have become a popular target among liberals as well as conservatives, it was this view which predominated among Mr. Moynihan's less publicized fellow witnesses.

Former Senator J. William Fulbright,

a former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the United States, accustomed to getting its way in the early years of the U.N., has turned into a poor loser. "It seems to me that the great-power role has gone to our head and we have not learned to take the brickbats and setbacks philosophically and the tail-tweaking with good humor. When opposed, we pick up our marbles and go off to play by ourselves, making the situation only worse."

The witnesses for the defense in the U.N. hearings had little trouble making a case for the organization's utility in the nuts-and-bolts business of running a planet. Indeed, even most of the U.N.'s severest critics concede that if it were abolished overnight, something would have to be invented to take the place of the two dozen specialized agencies it operates.

To the extent that some agencies touch on areas with political as well as practical content—the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example—their effectiveness may be diluted by national jealousies. But in less ideological areas, the international bureaucracy can have decisive clout. U.N. agencies have all but wiped out smallpox, have made English the universal language of international traffic, and have made national stamps valid for the international mails.

The various international financial, economic, and trade agencies that operate under the U.N. or in close co-operation with it have been essential in providing the ground rules for international barter and the funding for economic development in poorer countries. While the General Assembly and the Security Council dominate the decreasing amount of news space devoted to the U.N. these days, it is these agencies of economic co-operation that do the most work. They use 90 per cent of the U.N. system's annual budget of \$1.5 billion.

Richard N. Gardner, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who is now the U.S. member and the rapporteur of a committee appointed by the Secretary General to propose changes in the U.N.'s system of economic agencies, told the Foreign Relations Committee:

"It is a useful exercise to ask where we would be today had we had no United Nations economic system—no institutions for trade and monetary co-operation, for economic development aid, for agriculture, population and environment, for the establishment of safety standards in air and ocean transport, for

exchanging weather information, for allocating radio frequencies. Bad as our situation now is, it would have been immeasurably worse—quite possibly beyond repair."

And even most critics of the U.N. would not dispute its usefulness as a supplier of policemen and observers in crises—from the first Middle East war in 1948 to the most recent Middle East war.

Mr. Gardner divides the U.N.'s functions into two systems, the rhetorical and the active. The latter does most of the work and the former—the debates of the General Assembly and other organs—gets all the attention.

It was three General Assembly votes in the last session that crystallized the growing American anger with the "tyranny of the majority." The Assembly expelled South Africa, accorded Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, the honors of a head of state, and adopted the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States."

The Ford administration's critics do not, on the whole, blame the administration—or the American public—for being angry over these actions. Indeed, many of them share the annoyance. But most of them differ radically from the administration on diagnosing the disease behind those unpleasant symptoms and in prescribing a treatment that might help. The General Assembly, they argue, was only registering, not generating, the anger felt in the Third World toward the United States. Any treatment must therefore deal with the reasons for that anger, not with the General Assembly.

Mr. Gardner agrees that the assembly's double standard on the Middle East and on economic and human rights questions "is often deplorable." But, he said in his testimony, "It is an unhappy fact that United States leadership has been badly damaged by Vietnam, Watergate, economic mismanagement and neglect of Third-World interests. So if that U.N. reflection is ugly, it's not the mirror that's to blame."

As treatment, these administration critics propose co-option and co-operation rather than confrontation. The United States would, for example, concede that Third-World producers of raw materials have gotten bad deals in the past, and it would work to set up a system to protect both consumers and producers from wild price fluctuations. It would work to ensure that multinational corporations do not exploit weak governments. It would work to draw developing countries into wider participation in the financial agencies that affect them so critically.

Above all, the critics would have the United States make a bigger effort to get the United Nations to work: to beef up its delegations—quantitatively and qualitatively; to make the U.N. a central part of its diplomacy, rather than a form of last resort; to make its jumps gracefully when it loses.

Eastern Europe

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1975

Detente Is Said to Give the K.G.B.

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1—The K.G.B., the Soviet Union's security and intelligence organization, has taken on some new foreign assignments and a bigger work load at home as a result of East-West détente, Western espionage specialists say.

While détente has increased the ability of the K.G.B.—the initials stand for the Russian words for Committee of State Security—to infiltrate Western countries, it has also given it more work at home keeping surveillance over the larger number of foreigners moving around the Soviet Union.

For the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are similarly occupied.

The Soviet Union, the espionage specialists said, has 1,083 nationals working in the United States as diplomats and trade representatives, whereas 10 years ago, there were 456 Soviet citizens in such roles.

Thousands of Soviet and East European trade representatives are visiting the United States, and the number of East European student visitors and East European seamen here is up.

Counterintelligence officials assume that 40 per cent of the Soviet diplomats in the United States are full-time intelligence officers. It is assumed that this may rise as high as 75 per cent in other countries.

'Broadening of the Base'

"It means a broadening of the base," a counterintelligence official here remarked. "It makes the totality of the United States a target. Their operations are always damned good and their technology is first-rate—very good trade-craft."

But there is no comparison between the situation of the Committee of State Security and that of the Central Intelligence Agency in terms of the United States agency's ordeal of Congressional and executive investigations, according to an informed Administration official.

The K.G.B., he said, has "no less forces and no less budget." "I don't want to paint it 12 feet high," he added, "but it is still alive and well and plays a very major role."

"The K.G.B. is praised, not attacked in Moscow," he said. Around Washington these days, such statements are not made about the C.I.A.

Broadly, the K.G.B. combines the domestic work of the F.B.I. and the foreign intelligence-gathering of the C.I.A. It is the secret police in the Soviet Union and the intelligence

agency in foreign work.

"They provide the cement that holds the whole thing together," an analyst remarked of the K.G.B. With a degree of professional admiration, he added: "If I had their system, then it is the only way I would do it—to have a K.G.B. I see it as part of the main show, an integral and well-integrated part of Soviet society. They are not a freak show."

3 Instruments of Power

In the Soviet Union the K.G.B. has three main instruments of power, as far as the Western analysts can determine.

the Communist party's Politburo by the K.G.B. chairman, Yuri V. Andropov; control of all essential communications networks and code used in the country, and supervision of the 175,000 border guards assigned to protect the frontiers. No Western intelligence agency is known to have such pervasive powers.

Outside the Soviet Union, the K.G.B. operates much as do other espionage organizations, although it has greater manpower and more sophisticated technology than most.

Of its estimated total of 420,000 employees, the K.G.B. has about 10,000 officers assigned to foreign operations, of whom 2,500 are abroad. Between 50,000 and 80,000 officers are assigned to internal security work, Western specialists believe.

By contrast, the Central Intelligence Agency, which focuses on foreign activities, has about 16,000 employees, of whom 4,000 work abroad. The F.B.I., dealing with internal security, has 19,500 employees, of whom 8,600 are listed as special agents.

In the judgement of K.G.B.'s Western counterparts, its officers are much more security-conscious than Western agencies.

As gleaned from some of the 15 K.G.B. officers who have defected to the West in the last 20 years the following picture emerged.

Only One Notebook

The Soviet intelligence officers keep almost no files in the field. They destroy copies of telegrams received at the "residence"—a legal cover station such as an embassy—within 24 hours.

Only the "rezident" (chief of a station) may keep a small notebook. The sheets are numbered and the notes are handwritten. When he is sending a report it is photographed and the film is placed in a boobytrapped cassette and sent

cow. There must be receipts at each end. This creates a virtually unbreakable security system.

K.G.B. personnel at home tend to keep to themselves. This is explained in part by Western specialists as a result of the hierarchical system of the K.G.B. Officers have military-style rank—from lieutenant to general—but are paid five to six times more than the equivalent rank in the armed forces.

But the rank system, a specialist said, creates "a lot of incest and infighting—backstabbing because of rank."

The K.G.B. is also "extremely compartmentalized," he added, even in comparison with Western intelligence organizations.

Although K.G.B. officers permeate Soviet society, including the armed forces, in which they play the sole counterintelligence role, they tend to be mavericks, according to a Western expert. They have more defectors than we do," he added.

They are also feared throughout the Soviet Union, although not as much as during the rule of Stalin. But ordinary Soviet people would no more think of talking critically in public about the K.G.B. than they would of disrobing in front of Lenin's mausoleum.

One reason for continued fear of the K.G.B. is its large and still active "wanted list" of Soviet political enemies. A 460-page document contains abstracts on 1,132 Soviet citizens, is stamped "sovershenno sekretno" or "top secret."

Nureyev on the List

It lists such seeming innocents as Rudolf Nureyev, the dancer, who defected to the West in 1961. After noting his family particulars, the dossier entry says:

"While on tour in France on June 16, 1961, he betrayed his country. In 1962, the Leningrad City Court sentenced him to seven year's deprivation of freedom. He lives in London."

Another entry lists Nina V. Paranyuk, a ship stewardess who fled at Melbourne, Australia, in 1956. The entry says that she was "sentenced to death July 26, 1957."

Security System Effective

In the prevailing Western view, the K.G.B. has proved highly effective in maintaining security in the Soviet Union—to the degree, as a specialist said, that Western intelligence agencies have "never penetrated the Politburo" and have only "gotten close to the Central Committee" of the Communist party.

It has also kept dissidence

defector appeared in February, 1974, was a captain of military counterintelligence assigned to the Sixth Armored Guards Division in East Germany. "Dissidence doesn't exist," he said.

Among the uses that Leonid I. Brezhnev the party chief, has for the K.G.B. is its daily summary of "vital events" in technology, science, economics, defense and political affairs. Once a week, the K.G.B. secretariat also provides the leadership with a "broader view" of domestic and international affairs.

The K.G.B. has an elaborate apparatus for dealing with civilian dissidents, the so-called Fifth Chief Directorate, with subsections assigned to Jews, young people, intellectuals and religious figures.

Intimidation of the political Effectiveness Abroad Declines dissidents over the last four years has largely eliminated the problem for the time being, in the view of Western specialists.

It is in the foreign field where the K.G.B. is considered somewhat less effective than in the past, despite the large number of agents it has in the field and the high quality of many of them.

"The great successes of the K.G.B. were in the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties, when they had ideological recruits," a Western analyst commented. "Now revolutionary élan is dead and Soviet life is marked by increased bureaucracy."

This, too, is seen as a reason for the relatively high number of K.G.B. defectors.

As an example, Western specialists quote Vladimir N. Sakharov, a K.G.B. agent who defected to the West in 1971 after having served four years in Middle East posts.

Mr. Sakharov told the C.I.A. officers who dealt with him that once, when he had written an objective analysis of the Egyptian political scene that did not correspond in all details with the official Soviet view, his superior remarked:

"You have a brilliant career. Take that back and write it so that they can understand it at home."

In the powerful Western industrial countries—chiefly the United States and West Germany—K.G.B. officers are also under instruction to wield "political influence" wherever they can.

A correspondent of The New York Times in Bonn reports that the agents work under the guise of diplomats, trade officials or journalists to cultivate private relationships with politicians and businessmen—the purpose being to "convey Soviet views and warnings" on critical issues.

Posed as a Journalist

An official of the Krupp concern, which has millions of dollars in trade with the Soviet Union, spoke of one such intelligence officer posing as a journalist: "I like to talk to him because he makes no secret at all of whom he really works for. You know that anything you tell him goes straight to the Lubyanka [K.G.B. headquarters]."

It is telling, perhaps, that few of the K.G.B. men who have come over to the West manage to make headway in the new lives arranged for them, despite their abilities as espionage agents.

"We set them up in business and they go bankrupt," a Western analyst remarked. "Most of them can't handle being alone and on their own."

In K.G.B. usage, the United States remains the "main adversary"—as it has been since the collapse of Nazi Germany.

This is reflected in such statistics as 800 attempts to recruit American citizens for espionage purposes over the last 10 years—most of them outside the United States. It is also evident in the tremendous amount of attention paid by the K.G.B. to acquisition of military, industrial and scientific secrets, the analysts said.

The K.G.B. formed a scientific-technical directorate in 1962 and recruited science and engineering graduates to staff it. It employs 500 to 600 officers abroad, many of them in the United States.

Concerning the more James

Bondish aspects of espionage work, the Soviet secret service has been credited with perfecting ingenious coding systems, tiny assassination weapons and listening devices to promote covert operations. But Western specialists believe the KGB is still basically agent-oriented and remains far behind the C.I.A. in technology.

There is no evidence that it has displayed any of the scientific daring, technical know-how or financial risk comparable to the successful C.I.A. effort to recover part of a sunken Soviet submarine last summer in the Pacific northwest of Hawaii. That venture, involving a salvage vessel specially built by Howard Hughes enterprises, is said to have cost more than \$350-million.

Nor is there anything in the ambitious Soviet submarine-development program comparable to the electronic surveillance missions of United States Navy submarines, which are said to have tapped Soviet coastal communications cables, monitoring on-shore missile firings and identified individual Soviet submarines by their sound patterns.

As for covert operations abroad, the K.G.B. maintains a strong capability, in the estimate of Western analysts.

Among the most recent K.G.B. involvements in insurgencies were in Portugal's African territories in Cambodia and Laos, and in the Dhofar region of Oman. Potential guerrillas are recruited by the K.G.B. and then passed

on to the G.R.U.—the Soviet military intelligence service—for training.

The K.G.B. maintains a very large operation in Thailand, a New York Times correspondent reports, presumably to control operations throughout Indochina.

Must Wait on the Porch

Visitors to the Soviet Embassy, where the K.G.B. has its offices, are asked to wait on the front porch and staff members come out to meet them. Western intelligence operatives assume the 15-member Soviet trade delegation in Bangkok consists primarily of K.G.B. officers since Thai-Soviet trade amounted to \$6-million last year. The rent and services for the trade delegation are estimated at \$500,000 annually.

Since 1958, the Thai Government has expelled nine Soviet officials after they had been identified by Western intelligence agencies as K.G.B. officers.

Western analysts believe the K.G.B. has abandoned its practice of "wet affairs"—the Soviet euphemism for covert actions like assassinations.

According to Oleg A. Lyalin, a "wet affairs" specialist who defected in Britain in 1971 causing the expulsion of 105 Soviet spies, the K.G.B. halted its political assassination program in 1959. But Mr. Lyalin said that the K.G.B. retained plans for assassination and sabotage of vital installations in the event of a war threat.

In the opinion of Western specialists, the K.G.B. has re-

ceived orders from Mr. Brezhnev not to undertake any operations that would compromise or undermine his policy of relaxing tensions with the United States and other Western countries.

Close to 10,000 Soviet and Eastern European trade representatives visited the U.S. last year, as against 1,249 in 1964. There are 45 Soviet students here, and 50 other scholars are engaged on research projects. The number of Soviet-bloc seamen arriving in American ports has risen from 1,300 to 13,000 since 1964.

An area in which the K.G.B. continues to excel, especially in less developed countries, involves "disinformation," the practice of misleading people with forged documents and the planting of distorted information in the press.

For a dozen years, it is said, the K.G.B. has financed a political weekly in India called Blitz, which disseminates propaganda damaging to the United States.

Another fairly recent change in K.G.B. priorities noted here is increased emphasis on China-watching. It formed a special China department about 1970. The K.G.B. has a network of "old China hands," and is sending young recruits to Ai-Yang University in Singapore to learn Chinese, but it is evidently weak on reliable intelligence about China, the analysts said.

NEW YORK TIMES**8 June 1975****Many of Soviet Emigrants Reported Asking to Return****MOSCOW, June 7 (Reuters)**

—The Communist party newspaper Pravda says that the Soviet Embassy in Washington has received "hundreds of applications" from recent emigrants who want to return to the Soviet Union.

The report was in an article yesterday by Yuliy Semyonov, who has been touring the United States as a special correspondent for Pravda.

"There are hundreds of applications lying in our consulate, and many of them are tragic," he wrote.

Mr. Semyonov quoted from one of the letters:

"I came here with my two children, and I know there can be no forgiveness for me. But I beg you to allow my children, who have not yet come of age, to return to the motherland."

The Soviet Union normally refuses to allow the permanent return of emigrants, who usually have to renounce their citizenship to gain an exit visa.

Western Europe

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, June 16, 1975

How a handful of Communists aims to rule Britannia

Over the years the Communist Party has made little headway with British voters. But today Communists hold key posts in some of the country's most powerful trade unions, a cause for growing concern in an economy where the unions call the tune.

By David Anable

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

London

Just a carrot's throw from the boarded-up remains of Covent Garden's former fruit and vegetable market stands a grimy office building, fronted with thick frosted glass and crumbling stone and marked with a barely visible, small brass plate. Inside, light bulbs hang unshaded from their wires. The walls of the waiting room are bare and dingy. It is the headquarters of the British Communist Party.

Despite the seedy anonymity of their King Street offices, Britain's Communists are today the focus of an unaccustomed glare of public comment and concern.

Columns about their activities, known and guessed at, appear frequently in the national dailies. Politicians of various persuasions speak out against the Communist threat. And ordinary Britons tend to answer questions about Communist influence with faintly embarrassed phrases such as, "I've never been a 'Reds under the beds' person myself, but..."

The reason does not lie in any sudden electoral success. The Communists' parliamentary performance remains as dismal as their headquarters.

Rather, the reason lies in the current power struggle between Parliament (regardless of which party is in power) and militant trade-union leaders.

It is widely accepted here that some union leaders are using vast wage demands and inflation as blunt instruments to push a virtual economic revolution past a feebly protesting Parliament. And since Communist power, overt and covert, is concentrated in the unions, there are fears here that:

1. The Communists are actively fomenting industrial strife and union-Parliament conflict for their own ends.
2. Their allies have infiltrated the Labour Party's parliamentary ranks to weaken that party's traditionally strong democratic ideals and to undermine its leaders' ability to resist union demands.
3. The Communists and their fellow travelers are

if they could, use the present turmoil as a stepping-stone to something nearer real, preferably irreversible political revolution.

'A faithful Moscow satellite'

All this sounds far out in a country so solidly democratic, so skeptical of wordy ideologies, so firmly attached to that curiously British mixture of common sense and self-deprecating humor. What are the facts?

The British Communist Party, with a membership of about 28,000, ranks as one of Moscow's faithful satellites. But there is no solid evidence that Communist officials in British unions respond to strings pulled from Moscow.

On the visible parliamentary level the Communist Party is a complete failure. The party has no seats in the House of Commons, nor has it even come near winning any over the past couple of decades.

Out of a total vote in last October's general election of just over 29 million, the Communists managed to gather in a paltry 17,426 votes.

On the less-visible parliamentary level, however, a rather different picture emerges. Some of the Labour Party's "social democrats," who comprise the bulk of the party and almost all the present Cabinet, appear as anxious as their Conservative colleagues about the motives and loyalties of some extreme left-wingers in Labour's ranks.

How much influence?

Lord Chalfont, a former Labour minister who is now an independent peer, put the point discreetly to the House of Lords earlier this year:

"... in what I have to say I shall suggest that the governing [Labour] Party provides, in one way or another, shelter for a number of people who are almost certainly committed to undermining the existing political system in Britain."

How much such back-benchers can influence Labour Party and government policy is an open question. Assessments vary greatly according to the political viewpoint of the speaker. But with Prime Minister Harold Wilson holding only a very narrow majority in the Commons, the votes of the extreme leftists in his own party can on occasion be of immense importance to him.

On the trade-union level, the Communists have a much more obvious foothold. Indeed they have clearly put most of their intellectual and ideological eggs into this basket, under the watchful eye of their tireless industrial expert Bert Ramelson.

Britain's trade unionists are Communist Party members, the party has managed to get itself into a position of influence out of all proportion to its numbers.

More than 10 percent of union executives now are card-carrying members of the Communist Party. Many other union officials are active sympathizers or follow the Communist Party line. In total, some industrial-relations specialists reckon, from 30 to 40 percent of union officials are probably Marxist in their outlook.

In addition, the Communist Party succeeded last September in getting one of its members (Ken Gill) on to the general council of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the central body of British unionism.

Methods, worker apathy blamed

The outdated operating methods of British trade unions, and widespread worker apathy, are most usually blamed for this formidable Communist-cum-leftist foothold in the union movement.

Postal ballots, for instance, are few and far between. Hence, a well-organized, vigorous minority is often able to get its candidates into office because of minuscule turnout (sometimes as low as 5 percent or less) or occasionally by straightforward manipulation of the ballot.

Of course, it is perfectly legal for anyone to run for union office. The current spate of concern arises over how elected officials may use or abuse their influence.

According to one leading trade unionist, the Communists "never cease working in their cells, magnifying every grievance into major proportions, and struggling to get into positions of influence."

In the words of Lord Shawcross, a former attorney general in Clement Attlee's postwar Labour government, "There are forces now actively and openly at work whose object it is to bring our existing society and establishment to collapse" (May 15 speech to the Wider Share Ownership Council in London).

Similarly, as Lord Chalfont pointed out in his speech to his fellow peers, the Communists use all the leverage they can muster to sway the Labour Party. According to Lord Chalfont, Mr. Ramelson claimed last year that "the Communist Party can float an idea early in the year, and it can become official Labour Party policy by the autumn. . . . We have more influence now on the Labour movement than at any time in the life of our party."

Anti-Communists rallied

The Communists have burrowed their way into the union movement in classic fashion — via the formation of small, highly active, cells. The second most powerful union in Britain, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), provides a vivid example of the party's mode of operation and its results.

The AUEW is a prime Communist target. Its 1 1/4

WASHINGTON POST

15 June 1975

No Policy Change, RFE Officials Say

By Richard M. Weintraub
Washington Post Staff Writer

Radio Free Europe has given no guarantee to Portugal in an interview with Washington Post Correspondent Patrick Champana that RFE in its programming as a result of discussions with the Portuguese, RFE officials said. A member of the Portuguese Armed Forces, Capt. Tomaz Rosa, said in an interview with Washington Post Correspondent Patrick Champana that RFE had given "assurances" that it would broadcast nothing to harm "the Portuguese revolution" or "the politics and democracy of Portugal."

million members include only about 2,500 registered Communists. Yet of the 52 men on the AUEW's National Committee, 16 are card-carrying members of the Communist Party, according to Lord Chalfont. About half the National Committee are either party members or sympathizers.

Until five years ago the mighty AUEW appeared to be slipping inexorably toward total Communist control. With union election turnouts sometimes as low as 2 1/2 percent, the Communists were able to tuck their men or tacit supporters into more and more union offices. "A majority of such a small percentage are always Communists with chips on their shoulders," explained John Boyd, the union's newly elected and fervent anti-Communist general secretary, in an interview.

Hence, in 1969 Mr. Boyd rallied the anti-Communists and managed by one vote on the National Committee (meeting as a rules committee) to switch the union to a postal ballot. The result was a dramatic increase in participation, often rising well above 30 percent, and the defeat of many Communist candidates.

However, the Communists counterattacked last month. The National Committee (meeting again as a rules committee as it does every five years) narrowly voted to retain the postal ballot. But, taking advantage of a mixup in committee members' credentials, the leftists managed to reduce this majority to a tie. Union president Hugh Scanlon (a former Communist Party member) later used his vote on the seven-member National Executive to throw the postal ballot out.

Such tactics, repeated throughout the union movement, give the Communists and fellow travelers national scope. "There are very few unions in Britain which don't have a Communist cell," says Mr. Boyd. "Fundamentally the Communists look upon their aim and object in life as being to undermine what they consider is the capitalist society."

Under normal conditions Britain's mixed economy and open society muddle along sufficiently well to make the Communists' real national impact of little importance. But today's conditions are far from normal.

Weak governments and successive economic crises have undermined the authority of Parliament. Militant trade-union leaders have taken advantage of the situation, defying attempts at wage control and even flouting laws enacted by Parliament.

It is a moot point how much the Communists are responsible for today's highly charged climate of anxiety and confrontation. What is certain is that it is an ideal atmosphere for them to exploit.

Their motives and methods, along with those of the rest of the extreme left, have therefore become the focus of far greater than usual concern. This is especially so since grave economic and political challenges still lie ahead.

"countries," Rosa said he had noted "small changes" in RFE programming.

With over 80 per cent of its programs transmitted from its facilities in Portugal, RFE officials have been highly concerned over what one of them has called a "live-or-die" situation.

While contingency plans are being drawn up in case the contract for the facilities is not renewed or is abruptly canceled, officials in Washington admit that it would be difficult if not impossible to replace the Portuguese facilities.

"The Portuguese have been concerned that Radio Free Europe might be forced to leave Portugal," Rosa said.

which could harm the movement in Portugal," Ralph Walter, head of RFE's Munich operations, said in a telephone interview.

"I have described to Capt. Rosa our policy about broadcasting on Portugal, which is a repertorial policy," Walter said.

Walter, who has handled most of the contacts with the Portuguese, said that the Portuguese are sent summaries of RFE's daily broadcasts and that tapes of all broadcasts are available to Lisbon authorities as they are to German government officials. He added that there had been no requests by the Portuguese for

tapes.

The Board for International Broadcasting, which was created to take over responsibility for both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty after Central Intelligence Agency ties were severed in 1971, has requested funds from Congress to update transmitter facilities in Germany.

Radio Free Europe broad-

casts to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Radio Liberty broadcasts to the Soviet Union. Total budget requests for the two radios this year amount to over \$65 million, a large portion of which is for pensions and related items stemming from staff cutbacks.

The radios often have been sharply criticized by the Soviets and Eastern European

governments.

William P. Durkee, retiring president of Radio Free Europe Inc., said in a telephone interview from New York that Capt. Rosa had been fully briefed about the nature of RFE programming both in New York and in Munich and that he believed that the "assurances" about which Rosa spoke stemmed from his better understanding about RFE broadcasts.

Alan Hovey, RFE vice president, said that "the only guarantee we give to anybody is that we will continue to adhere to the internal policy guidelines which require us to report the news of that area [Eastern Europe] and the rest of the world objectively, comprehensively and accurately."

Hovey, Durkee and Walter all said that there had been no change in RFE programming.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
3 June 1975

Portugal: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

The hints and whispers and mumbles from Washington are that Portugal is about to go Communist, that it will constitute a fifth column within NATO, that it will give the Russians an opening to the Atlantic; and oh if the CIA were only alive and well in Lisbon.

Portugal going Communist is not a happy prospect. It is also a considerable exaggeration. The immediate prospect, if the democratic forces fail to sustain themselves, is not a Communist takeover. It is rather the establishment of a military regime, Nasserite in its model and neutralist in its foreign policy, using the Portuguese Communist Party for counsel and support. Such a regime might well deny military bases to the United States, but there is no reason to suppose that, any more than Egypt or Peru, it would turn overnight into a Soviet satellite.

Moreover, if such a regime comes to power, it would be against the wishes of the Portuguese people as expressed in the recent election—and this is why the pessimism spilling out of Washington is so depressing. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger appear to have given up the battle for Portugal; the Portuguese people have not. In the election, the Socialists took 38% of the vote, the Popular Democrats, a center party, 26% and the Communists a wretched 12.5%. But, where the Communists are giving the dominant Armed Forces Movement unconditional support, the Socialists, under the leadership of Mario Soares, have irritated the military by their demands for democratic liberties. So, when Communist printers shut down the respected Socialist newspaper *República*, the military, despite mass Socialist protests, decided to go along with the Communists.

The question now is what the Western democracies can do to help the Socialists in their struggle to keep Portugal in the democratic world. On this question there are two divergent approaches: the American strategy and the Western European strategy.

Our strategy derives from the fact that we (i.e., our masters in Washington) really preferred the old regime in Portugal—the right-wing dictatorships of Salazar and Caetano. We found it convenient to deal with them, and we supposed that Portuguese authoritarianism had unlimited life expectancy. Our policies both toward Portuguese Africa and Portugal itself were based on this supposition. Our intelligence was gravely mistaken. The Portuguese army was a good deal less sanguine than we were about the Portuguese capacity to hold on to its African colonies, and Portuguese generals eventually

tion against the regime we had so stoutly supported.

Taken by Surprise?

When the revolution occurred, we were evidently taken by surprise. The Common Market countries of Western Europe promptly welcomed the emergence of "a democratic Portugal." The United States maintained a sullen silence for three weeks until our ambassador was finally instructed to deliver a good-will message to the new government. That was a year ago; and since then we have been acting as if we thought a Communist Portugal to be inevitable.

Our first ambassador after the revolution, Stuart Nash Scott, was quickly recalled because he rejected State Department defeatism and wanted to work with democratic elements in the new regime. His successor, Frank Carlucci, has reportedly had difficulties because he also sees possibilities for positive action. But the Secretary of State has taken a sour line almost from the start, expressing a concern for democratic processes in Portugal that he had ably concealed during the Salazar-Caetano years. In April he told a group of West European journalists, according to *The New York Times*, that "he believes that by next year Portugal will be a Communist nation or a neutralist nation under heavy Communist influence." On May 23 President Ford himself threatened the Portuguese government (in a statement that Dr. Kissinger felt obliged to qualify the next day) with excommunication from NATO if it does not shape up and ship out its Communists.

The argument for this, I imagine, is that lectures from such exalted personages will shock the Portuguese military into good behavior. This notion displays our usual gross misunderstanding of the psychology of small revolutionary states. Little is better designed to strengthen the

II" and calls for appropriate action. One hopes that the Ford administration, after proving to the world that the United States is stronger militarily than Cambodia, will not be rendered dizzy with success and send the Marines on to Portugal.

The Western European strategy is very different. It deserves a hearing if only because it is Western Europe after all that would be most immediately threatened by untoward developments in Portugal. The delusion that Washington, thousands of miles away, knows better than the people in the neighborhood got us into enough trouble in Vietnam. There seems no great need to carry it forward into Portugal.

The Western European view is that the struggle for Portugal is far from over. Many West Europeans see the events in Lisbon as a salutary reminder of the limits of détente. The fact that, for diverse good reasons, the United States and the Soviet Union have a stake in avoiding nuclear war does not mean that communism has become a benign and ennobling faith. Indeed, the big losers in the short run have been the Communist parties of Italy and France. These parties have recently presented themselves as national and parliamentary parties which, if trusted with power, would devoutly respect the rules of the democratic game. Such claims look a little tattered now. The ambition of the Italian Communists to join the government has been very considerably set back; and, while the French Socialist leader Francois Mitterand will certainly continue the Socialist-Communist electoral coalition, this is only because he feels, perhaps rightly, that he is wiler than his Communist allies and will use them more than they can use him.

Within Portugal the West Europeans reject the American idea of giving up the fight and are trying instead to stay in close and to help the Socialists. Two days after Mr. Ford's statement, the Common Market countries agreed to offer Portugal better trading opportunities, financial aid and industrial cooperation so long as such help might encourage the maintenance of democracy. Privately Common Market diplomats called Ford's intervention "clumsy" and "inopportune." Henry Brandon, the well-informed correspondent of the London Sunday Times, reports that NATO officials similarly think that ostracizing Portugal "would only help the Communists." The Ford administration's bright idea of inserting Spain into NATO as a substitute for Portugal has gone down in Western Europe, even in Bonn, like a lead balloon.

It is hard to see why we should not give the West European strategy a chance. It makes little sense to begin with drastic action in reserve. If the West European approach fails, we can al-

Board of Contributors

The Ford administration seems determined to consign Portugal to Communism and thereby assure the fulfillment of its own prophecy.

extremists than the kind of rhetoric now spilling out of Washington. I trust that it will stop at rhetoric. But Senator Buckley now solemnly informs us that Portugal confronts the United States "with the most

ways fall back on ostracism and excommunication.

What could we do to help strengthen the democrats in Portugal against the Communists? Washington officials say that the attack on the CIA has deprived the United States of its best weapon in situations of this sort. It is undoubtedly true that a year or two ago CIA would have been active in Portugal, not, I would hope, in trying to overthrow the regime in our Chilean style but rather in offering money and technical assistance to the non-Communist left, as we did in Western Europe generally 25 years ago. It is also undoubtedly true that the Soviet Union has been giving such support on a lavish scale to the Portuguese Communists. The sterilization of CIA, it is argued, means that the Soviet government helps its friends while we piously decline to help ours.

Help From Labor?

There is something to that argument. The CIA problem is more complicated than some of CIA's critics think. On the other hand, it is probably better, given the recent CIA record, to terminate the policy of covert political operations abroad. What we may lose in Portugal we will gain elsewhere in the world. Nor is CIA assistance the only kind available. It is ironic that the Swedish government of Olof Palme, abused by Richard Nixon as pro-Communist because it dared disagree with his Vietnam policy, is now taking the lead in helping the Socialists against the Communists in Portugal. Why should not the American labor movement be helping too? If Walter Reuther were alive and David Dubinsky active, one would certainly see more positive support for Portuguese democracy from American trade unions. Even now George Meany could make a difference if he would spend less time bemoaning General Thieu and more time

helping Mario Soares.

And where are the Portuguese Americans? In similar situations the Jews, Greeks, Italians, Irish in the United States have bestirred themselves to considerable effect. If the Portuguese voters were as well organized, Capitol Hill would be ringing with denunciations of our defeatist policy.

Such reactions outside government are all the more essential since the Ford administration seems determined to consign Portugal to communism and thereby assure the fulfillment of its own prophecy. Why our government has given up so readily, I do not know. But one can't help thinking that it is connected with our preference for the authoritarianism, however retrograde, of Salazar and Caetano over the untidy, volatile, untested democracy of the first year of the revolution. And this preference goes back to the prevailing official conception of international relations.

The Kissinger idea of diplomacy is as of a chess game played by masters in a sealed room. Legislatures, newspapers, public opinion are nuisances and irritations; they simply distract the mind and jog the elbow of the master as he prepares his next move. This style of diplomacy naturally finds it easier to deal with authoritarian states (rightwing if the states are small, leftwing if they are great powers). This is not because authoritarianism is regarded as philosophically superior but because authoritarian governments can deliver their countries without having to worry about a fractious opposition or a rambunctious press.

A Precious Asset

Diplomacy, alas, is no longer a chess game in a sealed room. For better or worse, the people, rancid and unwashed, want to play too. One of the advantages of

the American diplomatic tradition is that we have always, at our best, understood this and understood that our most abiding influence in the world has come, not from our arms and money, but from the intermittent sense ordinary people in other lands have had that America is on their side. We have seen great diplomatic virtuosity in Washington in recent years. But much of it has been at the expense of what has historically been this most precious international asset—the bond that once ran between the United States and the democratic aspirations of ordinary people around the world.

We are in trouble in Portugal today because we did not give a damn about the Portuguese. This meant that, when an unpopular dictator was thrown out, the Americans were identified with the idea of dictatorship and the Communists with the idea of liberation. Since then, instead of helping the democratic forces in the revolutionary regime, we have acted as if there were no middle ground between Caetano and communism. Almost as if in a state of pique over the downfall of our dubious friends, we hint and whisper and mumble that Portugal is irretrievably on the road to communism. Maybe it is; but it would not be if the United States had remained true to its deepest instincts and had shown any interest over the last generation in the fate of the plain men and women of Portugal.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

3 June 1975

A Monroe Doctrine for Europe?

Joseph C. Harsch

The Soviets have staked out Eastern Europe for themselves under the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. Under it, the Kremlin claims the right to use the Red Army to maintain communist parties loyal to Moscow in every country now within the Soviet system.

This is not exactly novel in history. It is similar in kind (with differences) to the Monroe Doctrine which since 1823 has been used off and on to keep outside powers from interfering in the Americas to the disadvantage of the United States.

There is ample room for argument about both doctrines. Historians differ over the original intent and the subsequent validity of the Monroe Doctrine. The Brezhnev doctrine is more precise. There seems little room for doubt that the Kremlin intends to use it to prevent the escape from its clutches of any of their East European clients. But Moscow's clients themselves challenge its implications, and so do some of the communist parties in other parts of the world. It violates the Tito doctrine of "separate roads to socialism." Romania stands in putative rebellion against the Brezhnev doctrine. The democracies deny the doctrine's validity but respect its application.

In broad terms the situation is that the Monroe Doctrine more or less keeps outsiders

out of the Americas while the Brezhnev doctrine excludes capitalists from everything lying east of the Stettin-Trieste line. It doesn't work exactly like that, of course. Tito's Yugoslavia is outside Moscow's discipline and Castro's Cuba is outside Washington's influence. But broadly speaking the Americas are an American sphere of influence, and most territory between the Elbe and Vladivostok is in the Soviet sphere of influence.

But right now the Soviets, who are so jealous of their control over Eastern Europe, are not deterred by any similar doctrine from taking advantage of the present political state of affairs in Portugal.

If Western Europe is to respect the Brezhnev doctrine then there should be a quid pro quo for the security of Western Europe from Moscow and its ideology. At one time the NATO alliance was sufficient to this purpose. But that was in the days when the only visible threat to the integrity of Western Europe was military. Now the threat is different.

In Portugal the people have overwhelmingly rejected communism. Yet Communists succeeded in closing down the newspaper voice of the Socialist Party, which was the big winner in the Portuguese elections. Is communism to be allowed to gain effective control in Portugal by totally undemocratic means after being massively rejected at the polls?

Communist in an open and fair election. But when the anti-Communist wishes were made clear and positive beyond any room for doubt then surely there should be some means whereby both the people of Portugal and the neighboring countries could protect themselves against an illegal seizure of power in Portugal.

It is difficult to see how Washington could issue a Monroe Doctrine for Western Europe. In today's international climate many Western Europeans would regard any such act by Washington as interference in their affairs. The initiative should come from Western Europeans, with Washington ready to give support if requested.

But Washington could make respect for Western Europe part of any further negotiations with Moscow over detente. Also, Washington could quietly let it be known that if Moscow encourages the communists in Portugal (who are under Moscow discipline) then it must expect the United States to ignore the Brezhnev doctrine.

Obviously, Washington is not going to attempt to stir up any actual revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary — much as it would like to see those countries liberate themselves from the Kremlin's yoke. But there are things short of incitement to revolution which could be done. John Foster Dulles used to talk about "giving them things to worry about in their own backyard." The

CIA was the instrument for that kind of work. Perhaps in its present form it is no longer usable for such purposes. Its cover has pretty well been blown. But still, with a little imagination, something could be done, enough to make Moscow uncomfortable.

After all, the Soviet Union is probably the most unstable thing of its kind. It is full of minorities who resent the dominance of the

Russians.

Also, the Sino-American tie could be strengthened. Any move in that direction is bound to make the Kremlin uneasy.

There are things that could be done. Best of all would be the equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine proclaimed by Europeans which would have to be recognized by Moscow if the West is to respect the Brezhnev doctrine.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

16 June 1975

Call for Azores to join U.S.: few takers

By Helen Gibson
Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Lisbon

A separatist movement in the Azores, spurred by islandwide poverty and discontent with the Portuguese revolutionary government, is demanding a break with Portugal and union with the United States — to the embarrassment of both Lisbon and Washington.

There already are strong links between the United States and the Azores — 1,000 miles out in the Atlantic — mainly because there are more Azoreans in the U.S. than on the islands.

The Azoreans have been emigrating in droves to the U.S., and particularly New England, ever since the early 19th century, when whalers from such ports as New Bedford, Massachusetts, called at the islands to replenish their stores and take on extra hands. At the end of the century, Azoreans provided cheap labor for the New England cotton mills.

Today, native-born Portuguese, mostly from the Azores, and Americans of Portuguese descent, number about 550,000 in New England. Another 300,000 live in California. The total population of the Azores amounts to only some 350,000.

Apart from social links, the Azores depend heavily on the emigrants in the United States for income. These send about a million dollars a year home to relatives on the islands.

Another major revenue-producer for the Azores is the U.S. Air Force and Navy base at Lajes Field on Terceira Island. Terceira, nicknamed "the Rock" or "Alcatraz" by USAF personnel, has the base to thank for being the richest of all the islands and the only one whose economy comes close to being self-sufficient.

With some 2,000 military personnel, 500 American civilian employees, and about 25,000 dependents, Lajes Field employs some 2,000 Portuguese civilians. Besides wages,

American personnel annually spend about a million dollars from their own pockets on the islands and the U.S. Government has been pouring about \$6 million a year into Terceira as an added fillip.

For centuries the Azores have been the neglected stepchild of Portugal — backward, poor and forgotten.

Initial hopes that the Portuguese revolution would change things have not been fulfilled. The islanders' main complaint is that the prices they are paid for their farm products are much lower than those given farmers in Portugal itself.

Antigovernment demonstrators earlier this month forced the left-wing civilian Governor, Borges Coutinho, to resign after taking over the local radio station and blocking the airport runways with stalled cars. Although troops restored order, feelings among the islands continue to run high.

When five NATO warships docked in San Miguel harbor the sailors found themselves being slipped pamphlets reading: "Help us. We want to be free."

For the Americans, however, as one Western diplomat pointed out, the separatists' calls for union with the U.S. can only be highly embarrassing. To start with, Portugal is a fellow member of NATO and the Americans are worried enough as it is over the future of Lajes in the face of an increasingly left-leaning government in Lisbon.

The Portuguese Government has made it clear it is not amused by Azorean calls for independence.

"While we realize that the Azores have not always had fair treatment, there are other regions in Portugal that have suffered the same way," Information Minister Jorge Correia Jesuino told foreign newsmen last week. "This is no reason to ask for independence. It is completely inadmissible. The Azores are part of Portugal, just as Texas is of the United States."

The prestigious weekend Lisbon newspaper Expresso blamed the situation on a clumsy central government too far away to diagnose and correct local difficulties. It suggested the islands be given greater freedom to run their own affairs, but said this should stop short of total autonomy.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
1 June 1975

Iran Is Reported in a Deal With Rockwell on Spy Base

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 31—Iran has signed a multimillion-dollar contract with a United States defense contractor to set up a communications intelligence facility in Iran that would be capable of intercepting military and civilian communications throughout the Persian Gulf area, according to well-placed United States officials.

The contract, which at the personal request of the Shah of Iran has not yet been publicly announced also calls for the defense company, Rockwell International of Anaheim, Calif., to recruit former employees of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) and its Air Force component, the Air Force Security Service (A.F.S.S.) for the project.

The United States has routinely provided military aid and expertise in communications intelligence to its allies around the world, intelligence officials said. But such help, they noted, was always under the direct control of the United States military, which could decide how much information should be made available to the host country.

Iran's new agreement is described as unusual by these officials because it provides for the direct recruitment of past and present National Security Agency and Air Force Security staff, many of whom have, or have had, access to this country's most closely guarded intelligence techniques.

Officials at the State Department, Pentagon and Rockwell International refused to be identified regarding their comments on the contract with Iran because of the request by the Shah and other Iranian leaders that the agreement not be made known yet.

The National Security Agency, with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., near Washington, is responsible for analyzing and interpreting all communications intelligence. Much of the collecting and relaying of this intelligence is conducted by this agency's personnel inside the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Rigid Security

All of this work, which involved at least 100,000 persons and \$1-billion a year, was

the Vietnam war, is done under rigid secrecy.

Government officials said that the agreement between Iran and Rockwell International was signed in late February or early March, and called for the company to embark on a five-to-10-year program to draw up specifications for the communications intelligence network. The Rockwell contract calls for an initial payment of \$50-million, the officials said, with the Iranian facility, now code-named IBEX, after the wild goat, eventually to cost as much as \$500-million.

The officials also said that Richard M. Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence who now is Ambassador to Iran, played a role in developing that country's basic communications intelligence needs and has been involved in determining the planned system's requirements.

As such, the communications program fits in with Iran's drive to build a modern and powerful military force. In the fiscal year 1974, Iran purchased nearly \$4-billion worth of military supplies from the United States and has been the leading foreign purchaser of such goods since 1950.

Shah Wants Rule of Gulf

The Shah has recently advocated a Persian Gulf security arrangement in which his military forces would play a major role. He has said that he wants all other powers out of the Persian Gulf. But he has acknowledged that as long as the Soviet Union maintains a presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the area the United States also must stay.

One United States official described the IBEX project as being part of Iran's "total defense plan." He added: "I find nothing mysterious about it in the least, I'm not in the least bit concerned about the loss of some technical information" due to Rockwell International's direct recruiting of N.S.A. personnel.

Another Administration official acknowledged that, to help set up and operate the Iranian communications project, those men who were recruited for IBEX would inevitably rely on highly classified information.

The official said there was "no way" of stopping the former National Security Agency men from violating their security oaths.

One former N.S.A. official said, however, that it was

was being handled in this way. The official wondered why the hiring of former personnel was being allowed instead of having military aid teams sent in to train people.

Amazed by Agreement

One former National Security official said, however, that it was "amazing that it's being done in this fashion." "Why are they being allowed to hire ex-personnel?" he asked. "Why not send [military aid] teams in to train people?"

A more basic concern was voiced by another official with knowledge of communications intelligence. "We can't say who the Shah's targets would be," he said. "We have to assume that among the people intercepted would be Americans—those working for the Mil [military advisory] Groups in Iran and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf."

This official noted that the communications system also could be used against Israel, and even used by the Iranian secret police, the SAVAC, to help locate dissidents inside the country and for other internal security functions.

A further concern he posed was that the Iranian military, aided by former N.S.A. experts, could develop counterintelligence means of preventing the United States from intercepting and decoding Iranian signals.

Another Weapons System

"Why is this a story?" the official asked rhetorically. "The Shah is able to buy information and expertise simply because he's able to pay for it. To him, this is probably just another weapons system."

One former intelligence official depicted the situation as being analogous to the much-criticized contract between Saudi Arabia and the Vinnell Corporation of Los Angeles calling for the private training of 4,000 members of the 26,000-man Saudi internal security force. But that contract, for \$77-million, was awarded in January by the Defense Department as part of a \$335-million agreement in which the Ford Administration agreed to provide the military goods and the training for the Saudi Arabian forces.

As outlined by Government officials, the Iranian contract provides for no immediate Defense Department involvement. Government officials did note, however, that the Shah's initial contract with Rockwell International was approved by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control, a little-known office that has the responsibility of assuring that no unauthorized materials or information are sold or provided to anyone.

That office in turn received approval from the Office of

in the Pentagon, the officials said, before granting Rockwell International and Iran the right to conclude their arrangements.

The officials involved in the project insisted in interviews this that the only secret information involved in the program was that so classified by the Iranian Government. "There is no United States Government classified material or equipment involved," one directly associated official said.

Others, however, noted that the Rockwell contract was in its feasibility stage, with no decisions made—or even necessary—at this time regarding the kinds of radio receivers, computers and other electronics goods that would be required.

The Collins Radio Service of Dallas, a division of Rockwell International, has manufactured most of the radio receivers and other highly sensitive electronic gear now in use worldwide by the National Security Agency.

At some point, officials said, Pentagon will be required to judge specific requests by the Iranian Government for the right to purchase classified electronic equipment. "But that, if it occurs," one official said, "is way down the line."

Informed officials said that the Shah was planning to use both airborne and ground-based electronic receiving and recording equipment in his communication intelligence system. Most of the airborne signals would be intercepted by crews and equipment aboard specially adapted C-130 aircraft, similar to those now used by the Air Force Security Service for its intelligence-gathering operations.

During the Vietnam war, the Air Force Security used the C-135 to fly 24-hour reconnaissance missions—with airborne refueling—from a special base at the Torii Station in Okinawa. The aircraft monitored communications over Southeast Asia and China every day.

Rockwell International's attempt to recruit former National Security and Air Force Security personnel apparently began last November, when similar want ads were published in newspapers in Washington; San Antonio, Tex., where the Air Force Service does its training; Biloxi, Miss., the site of a radio operators school, and San Francisco.

The advertisement, as it appeared in the sports pages of the Washington Post on Nov. 10, was headlined "Engineers/Operators/Analysts" and noted that Rockwell International was specifically seeking people experienced in communications analysis, voice processing and intelligence operations.

At the time, Rockwell was in the final stages of competition for the contract from the Iranian Government. As such, the company's ability to recruit

expert personnel was undoubtedly a factor in its winning the contract.

It could not be learned, however, how many former National Security and Air Force Security personnel have been hired by Rockwell for the Ibox project.

One source with good contacts among the intelligence community said that the Iranian project had caused consternation among some officials of the National Security Agency.

But this report could not be verified and was explicitly denied by Government officials,

who insisted that the security agency had approved the Shah's project.

The National Security Agency officially refused to comment on the report. But one high-ranking Pentagon official, who admitted that he had no first-hand information, said, "I should think that somebody would be teed off about it."

A former Pentagon official with some knowledge of communications intelligence, however, disputed the assertion that the Iranian project would compromise any significant national security secrets.

"What are they getting out of those people [who have been recruited by Rockwell]?" he asked. "They certainly aren't getting codes."

"They're just buying guys with techniques in receiving signals," he added. "I just don't think it's all that sensitive."

Iran has been a focal point in the past for communications intelligence in that area, sources said. The British communications intelligence unit, known as the Government Communications Headquarters, had sites inside the country from which the unit would fly over the

Caspian Sea to monitor the Soviet missile testing being done there. The British unit, also gathered intelligence in the Persian Gulf, sources said. The National Security Agency has a direct, close working relationship with Britain, Canada and Australia on communications intelligence, the sources said, with the Central Intelligence Agency having the primary responsibility for all communications intelligence relationships with other nations.

WASHINGTON POST
5 June 1975

Suez Called Aid to Soviets

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet navy will be "a major beneficiary" of today's re-opening of the Suez Canal because it will gain much quicker access to the Persian Gulf, U. S. Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf III said in an interview.

Soviet warships will be able to sail through the canal with ease, Middendorf said, while modern American aircraft carriers are too big to pass through.

Therefore, if first-line Soviet and American warships wanted to make a dash from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf, the Russian ships could take the Suez Canal shortcut while the Americans would have to sail around Africa.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other American policymakers have supported the reopening of the Suez Canal in the belief its diplomatic advantages in helping to restore normality in the Mideast would outweigh any military disadvantages.


Middendorf did not dissent from the judgment, but focused on what the reopening would mean in strictly military terms.

From a military standpoint, Middendorf said Tuesday, the reopening of the Suez Canal "is extremely significant, not for us but for others."

"The Soviets will be a major beneficiary, no question about it," he continued. "They'll be able to move their forces through the canal from the Dardanelles and into the Indian Ocean and save approximately 6,000 miles."

The Soviets will be able "to bring their whole fleet through," Middendorf said. "We can't bring our carriers through—a lot of our big stuff we can't bring through and we wouldn't wish to anyway."

The Soviets have opted for smaller helicopter carriers, rather than American-style at-



By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

The Suez Canal saves ships 12 days' travel between Europe and the Persian Gulf.

tack carriers, and other smaller warships that need less water than their American counterparts.

In a period of tension in the Middle East, however, U.S. and Soviet navy leaders might not want to risk getting their ships trapped in the canal. The Soviets, therefore, may send their ships through the canal only occasionally.

Until U.S. Navy leaders see how much use their Soviet counterparts make of the Suez Canal, the main naval presence in the Persian Gulf area is expected to be a continuation of periodic patrols in the Indian Ocean by 7th Fleet ships sailing out of the Philippines.

Soviet ships also often sail from their Pacific Coast ports to reach the Indian Ocean, but may change their deployment pattern to take advantage of the canal.

The U. S. Navy wants to up-

grade its communications base on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—providing runways for planes and deepening the port. But several members of Congress are opposing this plan for fear of increasing tensions that, in turn, might create the need for additional carriers.

Middendorf argued that history contradicts congressional critics who argue that the Soviet navy would stay out of the Indian Ocean if the U. S. Navy did. He said the Soviets moved into that ocean in force when the British fleet pulled out.

Another argument military leaders make is that the Soviet Union, no matter what the U. S. Navy does, will keep operating in the Indian Ocean to keep a wary eye on the southern rim of China.

Egypt closed the Suez Canal during the 1967 Six Day War by scuttling several ships in

the waterway. The United States spent \$20 million to reopen it, with most of the money expended by the U.S. Navy, which cleared away sunken ships and other debris.

Closing the canal has cost the nations of the world \$12 billion, according to the National Geographic Society news service, with the added cost of sailing around Africa to get to and from the Persian Gulf oil ports a good part of the expense.

At present, the canal is about 50 feet deep—about 30 feet too shallow for supertankers and big modern warships. Initially, the Egyptians will deepen the channel to 51 feet, then 64 feet, and finally—in the 1980s—to 77 feet.

Supertankers of the 300,000 deadweight ton class could fit through the canal when it is deepened to 77 feet, but the U.S. attack carriers still would not be able to fit through.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES
15 June 1975

A Key U.S. Appointment Angers Many Africans

By THOMAS A. JOHNSON

Special to The New York Times

DAKAR, Senegal—The recent appointment of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has angered many African leaders, who have registered unusually strong objections to the appointment.

In recent interviews, a number of African diplomats and political leaders indicated that while many of them had long found American policy toward Africa a source of confusion, frustration and anger, they regarded the appointment of Mr. Davis as especially disheartening.

A major reason was that Mr. Davis replaced Donald B. Easum, a veteran diplomat in Africa, whose appointment as Assistant Secretary early last year had been looked upon by a number of Africans as representing a positive change.

Role in Chile Condemned

When the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, which represents 42 African nations, condemned Mr. Davis's appointment in February, the stated objection was that he had been Ambassador to Chile at the time of suspected Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

An official from Zaire said at the O.A.U. meeting that the unusual move of condemning an appointment by a sovereign nation was made because of the job's "importance to Africa."

And a Nigerian official, stating an opinion shared by other Africans, said that the replace-

ment of Mr. Easum by Mr. Davis was a "landmark along the road of America's knowing nothing, do-nothing, don't-give-a-damn foreign policy in Africa."

Inability to Sympathize

This policy, Africans insist, has kept the United States from making a positive identification with black Africa's overriding interest, ending colonial and white-minority rule. They say that the Davis appointment served only to increase the frustrations of Africans with American policy.

African officials said Mr. Davis would probably be received "with diplomatic civility" but also "with suspicion."

Late last month Mr. Davis completed a two-week visit to the friendly countries of Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gabon and Cameroon. His trip was seldom mentioned on Voice of America broadcasts, and an American journalist based in Lagos was unable to get a copy of Mr. Davis's itinerary from the United States Embassies in the countries involved.

Too Sympathetic an Envoy

Mr. Davis's predecessor, Mr. Easum, was dismissed in January after holding the position for 10 months and after apparently giving too liberal an interpretation to the American policy on Africa.

Mr. Easum returned to Africa last month as Ambassador to Nigeria. He had served three previous tours in West Africa, the last as United States Ambassador to Upper Volta. There, journalists sometimes found the

bearded, outspoken career diplomat helping to load airplanes with bags of grain that were to be dropped from low levels to starving herdsmen during the height of the drought.

'Business as Usual'

But a more publicized action by Mr. Easum was his declaration in Dar es Salaam in November that "we are using our influence to foster change in South Africa—not to preserve the status quo."

A French-speaking West African diplomat said: "We thought American policy on Africa had changed for the better, but then Easum was sacked and Davis was appointed so that we are back to business as usual with the Americans."

Since 1963, the United States has refused to sell arms to South Africa. But black Africans say South Africa would be inclined to change her racial policies if the United States exerted pressure beyond its "talk-rather-than-fight" stance.

Still, some State Department officials, asking that their names not be used, have said that American policy on Africa—no matter how strongly criticized by Africans—is "well within our own best national interests."

'What's in It for Us?'

Spelling out that policy, they say South Africa represents a "part of the world stability America wants" and "we supported Portugal because she was important to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments."

One State Department official noted: "Africans say that we give this continent a low priority and they are correct. Our rule must be 'what's in it for us?' The answer is not very much. No major world power is going to get very close to any African country today—they make sure of that—so why should we knock ourselves out?"

The officials asserted that Africa has no "meaningful organized constituency in the United States." They said also that African nations are too poor and disorganized either to stop trading with the United States or to use their commodities as political weapons, as the Arabs have done with petroleum.

One official commented: "Africans use a double standard in viewing world politics since they look to America to sacrifice our self-interests to what they consider moral principles, but they do not expect the same of other world powers."

Expect More of U.S.

The former United States ambassador to Nigeria, John F. Reinhardt, was often told by those who disagreed with particular American actions or statements that "we simply expected more of your country."

This attitude extends to Africans beyond the sophisticated ones. An American journalist who traveled with guerrilla forces behind the Portuguese lines in Guinea-Bissau, before that nation's independence, was asked, "How can America save so many African lives in the Sahel drought and still allow Portugal to kill so many of our people with jet bomber attacks?"

A number of black African strategists are hoping that recent dramatic changes in Portugal, southern Africa and Indochina will influence American policy on Africa to shift.

Tennessee Makiwane, director of African Affairs for the Zambia-based African National Congress, said that "America's continued backing of the status quo in South Africa could boomerang."

"Angola and Mozambique are gone as buffers for South Africa," he said, "and Namibia and Zimbabwe [South-West Africa and Rhodesia] are soon to follow suit, leaving South Africa all alone."

Monday, June 23, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Army Plot Is Symptom of Instability in Zaire

By Colin Legum
London Observer

LONDON, June 21 — A fresh period of uncertainty has opened up for Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, after the failure of a military coup to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko. Few details have passed Zaire's tight censorship, but the Americans have been accused by the government

ing the army plot, and Mobutu has said that some of his closest aides participated in it.

It is too early yet to judge how much support there was for the plotters, but the fact that the plot came from within the army and was led by a number of the younger, modern-educated soldiers is serious for Mobutu. This is bound to raise questions about his

Zaire.

Details about the arrested army officers are significant in two respects. First, two of the alleged ringleaders, Maj. Bula Bajikila and Maj. Mpika zi Bikenbo, had spent time at American military colleges in recent years, while another, Gen. Fulu Sumbu, was for a time military attache in Washington.

Secondly, the generals all

Kasai region in the eastern part of the country. The guerrillas who are holding two Americans and a Dutch woman kidnaped last month from a research station in Tanzania, are based in the Kasai region.

Zaire has expelled Dean R. Hinton, the U.S. ambassador, because of allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored the abortive coup against Mobutu. The Department has

News Analysis

controlled press of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0

denied the charges and asked the Zaire government for any evidence of CIA involvement.

On the face of it these allegations seem both surprising and unlikely. Mobutu's rise to power was considerably helped by friendly U.S. policies. Recent reports have suggested that the CIA might have been implicated in the death in 1961 of Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic leader who was one of Mobutu's bitterest rivals.

Mobutu is still frequently accused by his critics in Zaire and in the rest of Africa of being "an American stooge," a suggestion supported by references to his close links with Washington and to the considerable amount of American financial investment in Zaire. There is, however, no real justification to label him as being closely pro-American.

Although there might have been some justification for this view in the early 1960s when Mobutu was making his way up to take control of the country, his policies in the 1970s have moved increasingly toward a more nonaligned position. He has refrained however, from quarreling with Washington despite some astringent criticisms of U.S. policy in Africa.

Mobutu's efforts to establish an independent role in foreign affairs led him in the last 18 months to make two trips to Peking. Despite long-standing quarrels with

the Russians, he also agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Although Mobutu has re-oriented his foreign policy, his policies at home continued to reflect his strong belief in a system of private enterprise, and he has remained suspicious of communism. This hostility to communism is reflected in the vigor of his support for Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FLNA) against the rival Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which, he believes, is under Soviet influence.

Mobutu is concerned over the future government of Angola, due to become independent from Portugal in November, because of his wish not to have a hostile, left-wing neighbor. His involvement in the power struggle between the rival Angolan movements, and his interest in encouraging the secession of the oil-rich enclave Cabinda from the new Angolan state, has brought Mobutu into the conflict.

To judge by Mobutu's recent negotiations in Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, with Portuguese envoy Maj. Victor Alves, it seems clear that Mobutu has begun to change his tactics towards Angola and Cabinda, and is no longer committed so exclusively to Holden Roberto.

Significantly, Mobutu also took the initiative in offering to seal the frontier

between Zaire and Angola across which his aid for Roberto's forces flowed.

Mobutu's changed approach to Angola occurred after he uncovered the army plot against himself. This sense of insecurity could explain his wish not to become inextricably involved in the affairs of Angola.

The army plot must undoubtedly be seen as a severe setback to Mobutu's career which, until last year, seemed to be on the ascent. He succeeded in making himself the "strong-man" of a country which until 1966 was in chaos, riven by tribal conflict and rebellion.

He has wielded his authoritarian rule through the single party created in 1967, the Popular Revolutionary movement and has built himself up as "Papa" Mobutu, a messianic father figure who rallied nationalist support by handing over foreign companies to Zaireans and by restoring national "authenticity."

This campaign for authenticity, which demanded the rejection of foreign names, cultures and values, led Mobutu into conflict with the emerging black bourgeoisie and with the powerful Roman Catholic Church.

This church-state clash is particularly serious over Mobutu's decision to close all church schools and to outlaw religious teaching. "Mobutuism" became the prescribed subject instead. He threatened to close down

any church which resisted these policies.

Mobutu's vigorous policy of nationalization of key industries and making indigenous all firms doing more than \$2 million business has run into trouble with the downturn of the country's economy in the last 12 months and a serious failure of rural production.

Inflation and other economic difficulties have contributed to growing discontent and mutterings against the authoritarianism of the president.

Special U.S. Envoy Seeks Reconciliation

From News Dispatches

A former U.S. ambassador to Zaire, Sheldon B. Vance, arrived in Kinshasa yesterday on a mission to persuade President Mobutu Sese Seko that the United States had nothing to do with an alleged plot to kill him and overthrow his regime.

The State Department hopes that Vance will be able to repair relations with Zaire, which declined rapidly last week with the expulsion of U.S. Ambassador Deane R. Hinton.

Hinton, who arrived in Madrid yesterday, described charges of CIA involvement in the coup attempt as senseless, but said Mobutu believed them. Mobutu was influenced by anti-American and anti-West groups, he said.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
4 JUNE 1975

CHARGE U.S.-W. GERMAN PLOT AGAINST ETHIOPIA

The CIA and the West German secret service together tried to organize a coup in Ethiopia last December, the major German Democratic Republic newspaper charged May 5. The story, stating that "instructions from Washington and Bonn demanded that every effort be made to strangle the 'Ethiopian revolution' before it gets off the ground," appeared in Neues Deutschland.

The East German account, based on information in the Algerian paper El Moudjahid, says that the two countries decided to take direct action because they felt the "socialist elements" in the junta "created a serious danger to the Western interests in the region."

The Ethiopian government, the report continued, discovered the plot and executed Gen. Michael Aman Andom, head of the junta at the time. He was accused of participating in the plot. The U.S. ambassador and a high West German official implicated in the coup attempt left Ethiopia immediately after Andom's death, while in Bonn the Ethiopian military attaché were granted political asylum in Germany.

WASHINGTON POST 24 June 1975 Americans Said Fighting In Rhodesia

By Hodari Ali

United Press International

American mercenaries are fighting in the Rhodesian army against black guerrillas and more are being recruited with State Department knowledge, according to Rhodesian black nationalists and U.S. officials.

A State Department official said the government is checking to see whether any laws have been broken, but has done nothing to stop the white mercenary recruiting so far.

"About 60 Americans are there already fighting and many more are being actively recruited in the United States," said Tapson Mawere, chief U.S. representative of the Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) Af-

rican National Union.

ZANU seeks black majority rule for Rhodesia, where minority white settlers declared independence from Britain in 1965 and have governed the country since.

Temple Cole, the State Department's country desk officer for Rhodesia, said "There are certainly indications that Mawere's description of mercenary recruiting is accurate."

Cole identified the recruiter as "Robert K. Brown of an organization called Phoenix Associates, near Denver, Colo."

Contacted by telephone, Brown confirmed he has been recruiting white mercenaries since September.

Rhodesia is recruiting mercenaries because it fears it will lose all the South African police who are in front line positions along the border. There were once between 2,000 and 3,000 police, but South Africa is reducing the force to pressure Rhodesia's white government to negotiate with black nationalists.

East Asia

WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1975

Viet Prison Brutality Documented

By Joseph Novitski
and Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Staff Writers

The U.S. government knew of beatings and large-scale brutality at some of South Vietnam's largest prisons and prisoner-of-war camps where "tiger cages" were found as early as 1969.

A 3-foot-high stack of International Red Cross reports, recently declassified, and interviews with Red Cross and American officials have provided for the first time a picture from a neutral viewpoint of South Vietnam's prisons, where between 65,000 and 70,000 people were confined at the height of the war.

Written in the cool, dry French of the Swiss doctors, lawyers and other professionals who served on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mission to Vietnam, the reports generally gave satisfactory to good grades to almost all facilities inspected.

But there were several significant exceptions.

After each inspection by trained Red Cross delegates, Washington was given a copy of their report.

The reports also document the standard American practice of taking civilian prisoners during military operations, classifying them as offenders and turning them over to South Vietnamese police, who often treated them as political prisoners.

The delegates found and examined North Vietnamese and Vietcong prisoners of war who had been beaten, sometimes fatally, by South Vietnamese guards. Red Cross doctors described women prisoners tortured to the point of recurrent hysteria.

The International Red Cross, which now has 150 delegates on missions around the world, does not publish its reports.

The reports were released here at the end of a 2½-year suit under the Freedom of Information Act against the State Department, which received, classified and held the documents until after the war ended.

Some reports came to the

United States through the South Vietnamese government, but, beginning in 1970, most came from Geneva headquarters of the ICRC through the U.S. Mission there.

"The situation [here] may be qualified as catastrophic," a Red Cross delegation concluded in its October, 1970, report on the POW camp on Phuquoc Island, where 25,900 prisoners, or almost one-third of all those held in the country, were then lodged.

Three POWs who had complained to the delegates were severely beaten by camp guards after speaking out and had to be flown out on an American airplane for treatment.

No entirely American-run facility was ever given a wholly unfavorable report, although scattered allegations of torture by beating or electric shock were made by prisoners at the prisoner "collecting points" attached to American units in the field.

These "collecting points," where prisoners stayed a few days at most, were the only kinds of camps run by Americans after 1968, and the American lieutenants and captains in command were often commended in writing by the ICRC. Red Cross doctors wrote enthusiastically of the advanced medical techniques being used in the treatment of prisoners at American field hospitals.

However, the delegates found continuing, systematic brutality at the two principal Vietnamese POW camps—at Phuquoc and Quinhon. American advisers were stationed in these camps beginning in 1967.

The ICRC gradually gave up visits to the large civilian prisons, where almost all political prisoners were held, because South Vietnamese authorities would not let them talk to prisoners alone.

For this reason, no ICRC report was made on the disciplinary cells at South Vietnam's biggest civilian prison on Conson Island, where between 9,000 and 10,000 were held. Conson's French-built tiny cells, called "tiger cages," made Vietnamese prison conditions an American issue after two visiting congressmen saw them in July, 1970.

The ICRC, a permanent, Swiss-staffed body that watches over worldwide compliance with the 1949

and on the treatment of prisoners, has had a mission in South Vietnam since 1965, a spokesman said.

But ICRC inspectors, in spite of numerous efforts, were never authorized by North Vietnamese authorities to visit American POWs held in the north.

Although the prisons in the south were run by Vietnamese and the camps were commanded by Vietnamese officers with U.S. advisers, the Red Cross considered the United States responsible for prisoners taken by American forces.

In the largest POW camp, according to the data recorded by the ICRC, that normally meant just under half the prisoners.

The United States specifically recognized its responsibility for POWs and civilian prisoners, in a letter to the Geneva headquarters of the Red Cross in December, 1970, six months after the Conson "tiger cages" scandal.

From 1967 to 1971 U.S. civilian and military missions spent \$122 million on police and prison aid and stationed hundreds of advisers around the country with orders to bring the Vietnamese into line with the Geneva conventions.

Those conventions, ratified by 138 countries, including the United States and South Vietnam, set out specific rules for the treatment of prisoners of war and forbid physical mistreatment, torture, deprivation of food or medicine or any disciplinary treatment lasting more than 48 hours.

The Red Cross delegates, escorted throughout the country by American staff officers in U.S. aircraft, found violations of all these prohibitions.

Some charges of prisoner mistreatment from opponents of the war and challengers of President Nguyen Van Thieu's government are substantiated in the dispassionate language of the ICRC reports. Others are not borne out.

The claim made by some American antiwar groups that the South Vietnamese government kept 200,000 political prisoners is not supported by the data collected by the ICRC.

Calculating from the detailed prison population reports given to the ICRC in mid-1970, it appears that the system of four national civilian prisons, including Conson, six major and 44 minor POW camps, and scores of

screening and interrogation centers could have held a maximum of about 70,000 prisoners.

About one third of those held at any given time — men, women and children — were prisoners of war captured with weapons in hand or wearing insignia.

The contention made by U.S. government officials until late in the war that political prisoners were a strictly Vietnamese affair is not borne out by the Red Cross reports.

In June and July, 1970, ICRC delegates visited 19 of the more than 20 prisoner screening and classification camps maintained by U.S. combat divisions and brigades in the field.

They were given population reports covering the preceding six months, which showed that the largest single group of prisoners held after screening by mixed Vietnamese-U.S. interrogation teams were civilians turned over to the Vietnamese police.

The group was made up, according to the U.S. regulation governing the screening process, of people subject to trial by the Vietnamese government for offenses that included political crimes and those suspected of spying or terrorist activities.

The Red Cross found men who had worked for or contributed to the Vietcong against their will in this group of American-captured and classified prisoners.

More than half of the Vietnamese captured by American units in the first half of 1970 were classified as "innocent civilians" and returned to their villages, sometimes by truck or helicopter. Of those who remained, according to the ICRC data, 870 were POWs and 2,489 were sent to the Vietnamese as "civilian dependents."

Finally, the reports of "tiger cage" disciplinary cells, dismissed by some U.S. officials as propaganda, are confirmed.

Although they never saw the rock-walled tiger cages with iron grate ceilings at Conson, the ICRC delegates found another kind in POW camps at Pleiku, Quinhon and in each unit of the sprawling barracks at Phuquoc.

Those they found were barbed wire cages about the size of an office desk, built in the open air. Prisoners were forced to crawl into

them and remain squatting in the tropical sun.

"The big thing was the sun in that punishment," recalled an American lieutenant colonel who visited many POW camps with the

ICRC.

He asserted, and other officers and former Red Cross delegates agreed, that the same punishment was used on soldiers in South Vietnam's army.

The Red Cross reports show changing attitudes toward the cages.

Delegates twice demanded that they be removed from the 2,000-person POW camp at Pleiku, and reported

their removal with satisfaction in late 1970.

But at Phuquoc, the largest camp, they reported the cages for three years before pressing successfully for their removal in 1971.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 30, 1975

"THEY FOUGHT IN VIETNAM WITH ONE HAND TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS"

The controversial "Rules of Engagement" that the Pentagon was forced to impose on its fighting men in Vietnam have been made public.

These rules make three points clear, insofar as military men interpret them:

1. No other armed force in modern history was ever called upon to fight under such severe restrictions—restrictions that actually aided the enemy.

2. U.S. superiority in firepower—both air and artillery—was deliberately not exploited in North or South Vietnam.

3. The air war against North Vietnam was hampered by orders that "targets, munitions and strike tactics will be selected to minimize risk of collateral damage to civilian population."

The rules were first promulgated by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1965 and revised off and on through May, 1971. The political motivation came from the White House and State Department. Secret for years, the rules were broken loose and placed in the *Congressional Record* June 6 by Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep.), of Arizona.

Combat rules. Here are some of the rules—and how military men now feel free to describe the consequences:

- Assaults on hamlets, villages and urban areas in South Vietnam known to shelter enemy forces generally had to be preceded by loud-speaker warnings and leaflet drops.

The practical effect was to encourage Communist forces to occupy populated areas, knowing they would be warned of attack in advance. There was a prohibition against air assaults on North Vietnamese villages. Thus, the North Vietnamese often parked motor convoys during daylight in the heart of villages. Antiaircraft batteries were similarly shielded.

- Infantry units could open fire only when the enemy was positively identified and in close contact. Sniper and mortar fire were not counted as "contact" unless "such fire interferes with the scheme of maneuver or is inflicting casualties or damage to equipment."

This rule handed the initiative to the enemy and it often forced American troops to accept casualties or damage before retaliating.

- Infantry units were required to re-

spond to fire from a civilian-populated area only with flat-trajectory weapons—rifles, machine guns, grenades and recoilless rifles—and then only if there was a specific, identifiable target.

To operate a flat-trajectory weapon, a soldier must expose himself to the extent that he can aim at the target. Thus, the rule gave the enemy the advantage of cover and concealment, while friendly troops often had to operate in the open.

- Pilots subjected to antiaircraft fire over South Vietnam were allowed to shoot back only if they could identify the target visually and were "sure the strike can be positively oriented against the source." Pilots could not use suppressive fire where they thought the enemy was hidden.

- Air and artillery strikes against targets in certain areas had to be withheld until specifically approved by the Province chief, district chief, sector commander and a battalion or higher command.

Targets for air and artillery strikes were, more often than not, sighted by aerial observers. As soon as Communist troops realized they had been spotted, they dispersed. By the time permission to strike was obtained, the enemy was long gone. There were some exceptions in "special strike zones," otherwise called "free-fire zones," mainly in remote areas.

- Aerial assault on North Vietnamese airfields was forbidden if a plane with a third nation's markings was present, something the North Vietnamese quickly figured out.

- Air attacks on dams, locks, dikes and targets within 11½ miles of Hanoi, Haiphong and the buffer zone along the Chinese border were banned without prior approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


The Air Force and Navy would have needed a massive number of large bombs to cut the dams and dikes—but it could have been done, thus flooding hundreds of square miles.

Most antiaircraft-missile sites around Hanoi and Haiphong were placed on dikes. U.S. air assaults around Hanoi and Haiphong were limited to relatively isolated areas until development of "smart

bombs." They were accurate enough that pilots could be assured that they would not hit civilian areas.

Responsibility. Military men who have led in combat point to what they call a frightening passage in a supplement to the rules issued by the Americal Division. It reads:

"The circumstances of the conflict call for restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish a mission, with due regard to the safety of their commands, and the importance of minimizing noncombat casualties. This requires the highest order of judgment and leadership. An unusual requirement is placed on junior leaders. . . . Determination of right and wrong in the heat of battle requires a keen, swift and decisive analysis of all contributing factors and must be based on a thorough understanding of the legal and moral principles involved.



Americans in Vietnam could not assault even enemy-held hamlets without sending a warning.

"A written set of rules cannot be provided that will apply to every situation. Therefore, the final decision on engagement will be at the discretion of the senior tactical commander present."

That passage deftly removed responsibility from the top leadership if anything went wrong, as at My Lai. It also made for very cautious combat leaders.

Says one U.S. veteran of Indo-China:

"While U.S. forces did not always adhere to the rules, they did make a genuine—and some would say heroic—effort. And they lost lives doing it.

"Our men can make a case for the assertion that they fought the war with one hand tied behind their backs."

The foregoing was written by Bern Price, one of the magazine's military correspondents.

MAINI CHI, Tokyo
26 May 1975

Reality Of Defense Alliances

By Keisuke Iwatsu
Senior Editor

The loss of South Vietnam to the Communist liberation forces has understandably renewed the long-standing and often-debated problem of credibility of American treaty obligations, particularly in the military field.

It is beyond doubt that America has failed to defend, and has finally abandoned, an ally which it had time and again vowed to help for all the world to hear and see. The fanfare the successive U.S. governments under presidents from Kennedy to Ford have made in praise of their resolve to defend the Saigon government at all costs made the American failure look even more miserable.

Now with the American presence removed from Vietnam the going arguments outside America seem, even in countries which should wish for sturdier military protection by America, to betray national relish at seeing the world's foremost superpower beat a retreat to lick its wounds. Mostly, they pick almost gleefully at the shambles of American credibility over defense commitments.

Should America be cuffed so broadly and openly as welshing on its defense pledge because it gave up on a hopeless government only after suffering the loss of 56,000 American lives, wounds to 303,000 Americans, in a country 9,000 miles away, in addition to footing \$141,000 million in war bills over 10 frustrating years and, at the end, even taking out of Vietnam 120,000 refugees who had reasons to fear retaliation by the new masters of Saigon? Could any other country have done better had it been in America's shoes?

The excess of slights now being piled on the forlorn patron saint of the free world stems from an often wishfully simplistic sense of security that people of America's allies are

tempted to have in puristic illusions that are completely devoid of awareness of the reality of international politics.

Defense alliances are not signed because some altruistic countries fervently wish to defend others, come what may. Substantially mutual defense pacts aside, alliances in which there are clearly the helping side and the one that is to be helped can work only as long as they do not seriously harm the interests of the helping country.

Countries should not sign defense pacts without full consideration of their own national interests. A pledge by one country to come to the aid of another is a solemn one. But what makes it worth more than the paper it is written on is the consideration of national interests that hinges on the pledge.

Quests by individual countries to better serve their own interests both tighten and moderate defense alliances just as the profit motive oils the free economy.

The American withdrawal from Vietnam is right in line with American interests as well as being a needed moderation in carrying out a pledged defense effort which was fast and hopelessly souring.

That America fought a losing war so hard and for so long should be cause enough for elation to leaders of America's allies some of whom profess doubts about the credibility of American defense commitments through an inverse interpretation of the same phenomenon. Do they want an all-out American war in that part of Indochina? In that case, the very same leaders will be criticizing the excess of U.S. military action.

Lessons from the American humiliation in Vietnam are numerous and valuable. The Vietnam debacle rightly jolted some of America's allies into realizing that American defense pledges are no assurance of an unearned security. Even such a heavy

dependor on American aid as South Korea's Park Chung Hee has called for greater self-reliance in resisting the threat from the North.

American leaders are to blame to no small degree for creating a false sense of an open-ended security promise among its allies. If a recent Kissinger remark "...we must be very careful in the commitments we make..." is any indication of future American moves, America is really learning from Vietnam.

The recent Mayaguez incident, along with Vietnam, has clearly demonstrated that, no matter how high in camaraderie an alliance may be couched, America acts according to its own interests, even if it has to snub an ally such as Thailand. The unforewarned dispatch of U.S. Marines to a Thai base was a foreseeable risk that Thailand undertook when it signed up for protection by the U.S., not in theory but, worse still, in reality.

This is undoubtedly a lesson that strikes closest to us. America's emergency reaction in Thailand over the Mayaguez case renders almost meaningless our national debate over the possibility of American warships clandestinely carrying nuclear weapons into Japan. The use of American bases in Japan to help the U.S. war effort in Vietnam in an inconclusive test of the limit of expanded application of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was well known.

We still know little about the real intentions of America's foes in Asia, who seem to be winning their "liberation" battles.

The risk of a thinly armed exposure outside the American protection to an unfamiliar new rising influence, and the risk of courting its displeasure by staying with America will continue to offer an agonizing choice for Japan.

WASHINGTON POST
20 June 1975

China Alone Jams VOA, USIA Says

China is the only nation that is jamming Voice of America broadcasts, James Keogh, director of the U.S. Information Agency, said yesterday.

The Soviet Union, once the major jammer of Voice of America broadcasts in pre-detente days, halted such operations in September, 1973.

With the recent decision by Albania to halt its jamming, "We are not jammed now anywhere except China," Keogh told reporters.

Peking's decision to continue jamming despite the policy of detente has not been completely successful, however. Keogh said there is evidence that Voice of America broadcasts are heard in parts of the Chinese mainland.

In response to questions, Keogh said that USIA—which includes the Voice of America—has no special policy on reporting the CIA controversy.

BALTIMORE SUN
25 June 1975

Marcos's New Friendship with China

By HERIBERTO D. SUYKO

Manila.

Liberal sprinkled with aphorisms and maxims, the June 7 conversation between China's chairman Mao Tse-tung and President Ferdinand Marcos lasted for an hour and fifteen minutes and was later described as more a family gathering than a meeting between two chiefs of state.

Chairman Mao acted the role

of a solicitous grandfather hungry for news of the latest achievements of granddaughters he was seeing only for the first time.

The ease with which the two leaders took to each other and the familiarity that characterized their conversation could be attributed to the earlier thawing of the three decades of icy relations between the two neighboring countries by Mrs. Marcos's visit to China in September last year.

But there is more to the warmth of the reception accorded the Marcoses and their party—from the welcome at the Peking airport to the unexpected intimacies—than meets the eye.

More so, with the cold shoulder given other chiefs of state and their representatives desperately seeking an audience with the chairman.

Mrs. Marcos was just as warmly received by Chairman Mao and by Premier Chou En-lai.

Although in some ways similar to the visit of former President Nixon, in that the Philippines, like the United States, had no formal relations yet with the People's Republic of China, the Marcos visit easily outstripped Nixon's. It was evident that the Chinese, from Chairman Mao down to the street, were eager to

open their arms to the Filipino visitors.

In the words of Mr. Marcos, the land bridges that used to connect the Philippine archipelago to China "may have been flooded by the waters of the ice age and washed away by the tides of colonialism... but the bridges of culture, of the spirit and of the heart, have always been there and they will always be there."

China, he said, knew of the Philippines long before Ferdinand Magellan, the Western explorer, discovered the Philippines for Spain. In like manner, the Philippines was familiar with China long before it was ever aware of Spain. Thus, the warm intimacy that pervaded the Peking visit.

The Nixon visit resulted in a detente and eased the tension between the United States and China at that time. It somehow helped reelect him with a huge majority, though it did not prevent the col-

lapse of Indochina to the Communists.

The Nixon visit fell short of normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, though it intensified the commercial activity between them. This was, of course, because of the prior commitment of the United States to the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan.

On June 9, Mr. Marcos and Premier Chou En-lai signed a joint communique formally establishing diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China. This ended three decades of embarrassing non-recognition of each other's existence in spite of being next-door neighbors.

This development was made easier by the sudden departure for home of the Chinese Nationalist ambassador to the Philippines.

It is of record that the People's Republic frowns on any measure

that may indirectly give dignity to the idea of two Chinas. Thus she has rejected overtures from the United States for formal diplomatic relations without the latter breaking diplomatic ties with Taipei.

It is evident that Mr. Marcos has been correctly reading the international diplomatic weather.

He first broke away from Washington's intransigent stand against the entry of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations.

The U.S., of course, eventually supported the entry of China, though she steadfastly opposed Taiwan's expulsion.

Later, the Philippines, with the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, promptly recognized the Communist Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia. The Philippines also shares with other ASEAN members the view that South Vietnam

is welcome to the association should she make a bid to join.

The normalization of diplomatic ties between Manila and Peking will surely get the wind out of the sail of Filipino Maoist rebels, including the so-called Maoist-oriented Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines.

In this connection, Chairman Mao himself has given assurances that China would not interfere with the internal affairs of the Philippines.

Not content with this, however, Mr. Marcos has directed a review of the Anti-Subversion Law, while making it known that the Philippines will maintain her hardline policy against the rebels of all shades.

Mr. Suyko is a journalist based in the Philippines.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 June 1975

A Laos Army Met Defeat Before Battle

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 21

In the virtual surrender of Laotian non-Communists to the Pathet Lao following the Communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam, no element of the Vientiane side collapsed more quickly and more completely than the armed forces that the United States had built, trained, paid, supplied and all but commanded.

Although a semblance of two separate armies — the Royal Vientiane Army and the Pathet Lao — continues to exist, it is conceded from the American Embassy to the Pathet Lao that the only force remaining is the Communist-led Pathet Lao.

Knowledgeable American sources concede ruefully that last month's flight of the military leaders who were most committed to the American view, notably Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak and Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, was merely the culmination of a process that began with the truce accord of 1973.

A less partisan Western expert went beyond this view, contending that it was consistent American military policy throughout the Laotian war that demoralized the Royal Laotian Army and brought it down without resistance. In this view, which is shared by many in political circles here, the United States placed its faith in the irregular army it created and directed, and relegated the Royal Vientiane Army to insignificance.

As a result, in this view, when the Central Intelligence

Agency stopped paying and supplying General Vang Pao's irregulars and they were integrated into the Royal Vientiane Army, there was no effective army left on the Vientiane side, both parts of the amalgam descending to the same level of low pay, low morale and, consequently, high corruptibility.

During the fighting, General Vang Pao's clandestine army of mountain tribesmen, mainly Meo, as he is, was paid at a higher rate and their families more regularly fed than was the case with the regular army. Their needs in food, ammunition and other supplies were filled directly through an American logistics network based in Thailand.

The Royal Army was paid and supplied, also by the United States, but through its own command, whose corruption, inefficiency and feudal rivalries increased throughout the war. The irregulars bore the brunt of the fighting. These differences intensified the distrust and contempt between the forces and particularly between their commanders.

Incorporated into the Royal Vientiane Army, General Vang Pao and his Meos felt like stepchildren, according to an American source, and could not get used to dealing with the command. The American military attaché, Brig. Gen. Roswell H. E. Round Jr., was said by the source to have been spending much of his time "nursing" General Vang Pao's feelings.

The entire Vientiane army was beset throughout the two years of truce with growing morale problems, leading to what a knowledgeable American source termed "atrophy" — corruption among the command and poverty among the troops — were exacerbated by the falling

Third of Troops Often Away

The paper strength of the Army, about 55,000 troops, always conceded to be a gross overestimate, fell to what a neutral expert put at no more than 10,000 at any given moment. At least a third of every unit's troops was always away, trying to raise enough food or money to keep their families alive.

"It became difficult to find troops at work or at play," the American source said.

At the same time, the neutral expert said, the Pathet Lao flagrantly violated the Vientiane truce agreement, moving the demarcation line consistently west by overrunning Royal Army forward positions over minimal resistance.

The final test of the Royal Army's will to resist began last February at what, throughout the war, was considered a critical junction on the dirt road linking this administrative capital with the royal capital of Luang Prabang.

Because of its strategic character, the junction at Sala Phou Koun had always been an object of dispute between military region commanders of the Royal Army, each wanting to avoid responsibility for its defense. With General Vang Pao integrated into the Royal Army, he was assigned responsibility.

The Pathet Lao raiders were driven back in February. They returned more successfully in mid-April and seized control of the junction after skirmishes at the end of the month. The Royal Army was ordered by Prince Souvanna Phoma, presumably swayed by the inevitability of events after the fall of Saigon, to offer no resistance. The Pathet Lao brought a token force down the road,

commanders of Vientiane troops along the way, to within 12 miles from here.

On May 10, Premier Souvanna Phouma's office announced that General Vang Pao had been replaced as regional commander and transferred to an unnamed post. The general fled to Thailand, using three transport aircraft under his control to ferry out his most faithful followers, in a three-day airlift.

In addition to General Vang Pao an Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak, five generals noted for rightist attitudes, or corruption, or both, fled. Those who remained recognized the authority of the Deputy Defense Minister, a Pathet Lao general.

Throughout the country, in a process paralleled in the civil administration, soldiers, supported by students and a vague entity described in official publications as "the masses," denounced their commanders as corrupt, as reactionary and as lackeys of the American imperialists. Those denounced were removed.

Royal Army units throughout the country have turned over their weapons for safekeeping by the Pathet Lao. In "officers' seminars," also paralleled in sessions for civilian public servants, resolutions were passed asking the Pathet Lao to attach advisers to Royal Army units. The theme propagated among the troops is, "First the Pathet Lao and the Royal Vientiane Army were enemies. Now they are allies; soon they will be one."

American military assistance has stopped in all but in name.

"Everything is on 'hold' right now," an American expert said, describing what is, in effect, the demise of an army that was built.

WASHINGTON POST
16 June 1975

U.S. AID's Legacy in Laos

By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE—Until a band of pro-Communist students recently forced the U.S. Agency for International Development to pack up and leave Laos, AID ran what amounted to a parallel government in this tiny Indochinese kingdom.

The real mission of this quasi-governmental structure was not to improve the life of ordinary Laotians, but to help support the country's anti-Communist forces in their battle against the Pathet Lao.

AID has left behind an impressive legacy, including improved highways and air strips, schools, hospitals, irrigation and agricultural projects and a relatively stable economy. But all of this was coincidental.

"We did create a lot of development," a senior AID staff member said the other day, "but it was just a side effect. There was never any doubt that we were spending millions here to support the royal Lao government in its fight against the Communists."

The Communist Pathet Lao knew this too. So, when the Communists took charge here following the defeat of U.S.-backed governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam, they swiftly singled out AID as a target for open hostility.

"We were big, we were rich and, as far as the Pathet Lao were concerned, we were the enemy," one agency staffer observed.

About being big and rich, there is no doubt. In 20 years, AID spent over \$1 billion in this country of just three million people. To house itself and its American personnel, it built fenced-in compounds of suburban-style ranch houses,

schools, clubs, office buildings and warehouses.

The AID expenditure was just a fraction of the billions of dollars the United States spent to pursue the war in Laos and the bombing of the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail through the kingdom into South Vietnam. Military assistance ran to at least 10 times the AID

News Analysis

budget. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's outlay has not been made public.

Just what AID did in Laos is described in a 179-page book. The book, "Facts on Foreign Aid to Laos," reports such wide-ranging activities as economic stabilization efforts, refugee relief and resettlement, narcotics control, public health, development of national roads and the rural economy, agricultural and educational development, civil police administration and sericulture — the commercial production of silk.

"We were into everything," said one AID officer. "We went through the whole mill in this country. Everywhere you looked, there was some American driving a truck, inspecting a new highway, feeding refugees, running the whole show."

As to being the enemy, there isn't much doubt about that, either. With its widespread network of Lao-speaking Americans, AID was a handy front for the CIA which was actively engaged in the fight against the Pathet Lao and its ally, the North Vietnamese army.

In the small provincial towns where AID had offices, CIA, military and other American personnel lived and worked with AID

workers. AID officers deny that any of their personnel were CIA agents, but they do not deny that the CIA used the organization for cover.

Where AID really went wrong, and what ultimately led to its humiliation and ouster by radical students, was in its insensitivity to Laotian self-respect and the burgeoning nationalism among the Pathet Lao.

Always in a hurry to get the job done, "because we were under our own pressures," said an AID official, the agency brushed Laotian bureaucrats aside.

"The Lao have a very slow and polite way of doing things," the official said. "We were always too impatient to wait... (and) ended up by doing most things ourselves."

After the Pathet Lao and the U.S.-backed rightists reached a cease-fire agreement in February 1973 and formed the coalition Provisional Government of National Union in April 1974, AID continued to operate only in support of the right wing.

Although some newer AID staffers made efforts to work with the whole government, veteran officials, some of whom had served in Laos for a decade, were too closely identified with the rightists to make the switch.

The right-wing ministers and senior civil servants who cooperated with AID were content to let the relationship continue. They had gotten rich on rakeoffs of U.S. money and they did not realize that the Communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam would give as much impetus as they did to the Laotian communists.

By the time the right wing crumbled last month, the Americans knew they

had extended themselves too far. AID had already made some effort to turn over its projects to the government. Most notably, the agency gave the government \$3 million worth of public works equipment and a maintenance and repair shop.

It was too little too late. Within a week of the leading rightist ministers' resignations, Communist-inspired students sacked the small AID compound in the southern city of Savannakhet and then captured the main compound in Vientiane.

The students agreed to leave only after the United States gave in to their demands, turning over all AID property to the government and withdrawing all U.S. personnel.

Even after acceding to these demands, U.S. officials find they are still harassed by the students, the Pathet Lao and local employees. Officials doubt that by the time the June 30 deadline set in the agreement arrives they will have completed the turnover in an orderly fashion.

After all these years, all the expenses and now to have it all end so ingloriously, was it worthwhile? "I think we've done a hell of a lot of good things for this country," said acting AID director Gordon Ramsey. "Maybe we did them wrong, but the results are here."

WASHINGTON POST
26 June 1975

Joseph Kraft

Korean Lessons

A quarter-century after the outbreak of the Korean War, northeast Asia remains the paramount pressure point in the world. Not for great power reasons. In fact, the lineup which engages the United States with Russia, China and Japan is fundamentally favorable to peace.

The trouble lies with a defect central to American relations with smaller countries throughout the postwar era. In South Korea, as in so many other places around the world, the Pax Americana has failed to foster a strong, progressive regime able to win local support and move with the times.

The critical importance of Northeast Asia can be seen from the disposition of American and allied forces in South Korea. The United States has equipped and supported a South Korean Army of 24 divisions backed by an air force of over 200 planes including the latest fighter-bombers and helicopters.

One of the 13 American divisions is stationed in South Korea. Elements of this country's navy, air force and marines are in the neighborhood. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has intimated the United States might use nuclear weapons in case war broke out in Korea again.

The prime purpose of all that force is to deter another aggression from North Korea. The Soviet Union has equipped the Democratic People's Republic of Kim Il Sung with an army of 23 divisions and an air force of nearly 600 bombers and fighter planes. If the North Koreans could achieve any military gains, there

would be accomplished a basic shift in the balance of power. For at stake on the Korean Peninsula are American relations with China and Japan.

The entente with Communist China is probably the best thing the United States has going for it in the world of great power relations. In ways nobody else can begin to match, Mao Tse-Tung puts the Russians on the defensive politically, militarily and in economic policy.

But the Chinese have a price for good relations with Washington. They want to be certain of American military support against the Soviet Union. That means at a minimum a continuing American presence around Russia's Asian rim—notably in South Korea.

A harmonious relation with Japan ranks only slightly behind the Chinese entente in any inventory of America's international assets. The Japanese are not only a mainstay of the international economic order so critical to American prosperity. They also use their economic strength to keep the Chinese in the game against the Russians.

But the Japanese rely on American military power to the point of voluntarily having abandoned any serious force of their own. Any wavering of the American stand in Korea would push the Japanese to rearm. That step would turn China around and upset the whole complicated balance.

For the time being the balance is relatively solid. The interrelations are in better order than before 1970 when the United States had no relations with China, or between 1971

and 1973 when the United States was too far out front of Japan in relations with Peking. Overwhelming evidence indicates that the Chinese are working to restrain Kim Il Sung from going over the top in a new military venture.

But maintenance of those favorable conditions depends on stability in South Korea. That is a chancy proposition. The government of President Chung Hee Park rules by military power and the security apparatus. Terror, including kidnapping and hanging, has been invoked against critics of the regime. Internal dissent has been officially banned.

The Park regime, to put it bluntly, is a liability. It cannot continue to elicit support from the American Congress. It is a standing target for radicals in the United Nations. Thus it cannot adjust to the requirements for political change which have been set in motion by the easing of tension between the great powers.

Twenty-five years after its inception, accordingly, the Korean War teaches a lesson in irony. American intervention on behalf of regimes menaced by Communist aggression turns out not to be an unequivocal good. A way has also to be found to avoid the corrupt, dictatorial governments which have grown up in conjunction with the American military presence. In Korea as in so many other parts of Asia and Southern Europe and Latin America, the United States needs to develop a tactic for managing openings to the left.

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WASHINGTON STAR
17 June 1975

Lewis is challenged on Mayaguez report

In a recent column, Anthony Lewis pointed out that U.S. warplanes had bombed a Cambodian airport four minutes after one of our destroyers had reported that it was being approached by a small boat carrying at least 30 white men, presumably the crew of the Mayaguez. Lewis said that 17 minutes later President Ford was informed that all the crew was safe, but that 41 minutes afterwards, our planes bombed an unused Cambodian oil refinery.

Lewis concluded from this that "the last attacks, at least, could only have been punitive in purpose. They were designed to punish a 'little half-assed nation,' in Senator Goldwater's elegant phrase."

Lewis did not mention the fact that Secretary of State Henry Kis-

singer had been asked about these attacks at his news conference on May 16. Kissinger said: "Some attacks occurred after the men had been released. At that point our biggest problem was that we had several hundred marines under very heavy attack (on Tang Island). There were also 2,400 Communist forces on the mainland and we wanted to absorb their energies in other things than attempting to intervene with our disengagement efforts."

We do not presume to judge the wisdom of the tactics or even the accuracy of the reply given by Kissinger, but Lewis is clearly misleading his readers by not informing them of the official rationale given for the attacks which he asserts were purely punitive.

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